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The Nature of Parenthood
AB S TRAC T. In the wake of Obergefell v. Hodges, courts and legislatures claim in principle to
have repudiated the privileging of different-sex over same-sex couples and men over women in
the legal regulation of the family. But as struggles over assisted reproductive technologies (ART)
demonstrate, in the law of parental recognition such privileging remains. Those who break from
traditional norms of gender and sexuality -women who separate motherhood from biological
ties (for instance, through surrogacy), and women and men who form families with a same-sex
partner -often find their parent-child relationships discounted.
This Article explores what it means to fully vindicate gender and sexual-orientation equality
in the law of parental recognition. It does so by situating the treatment of families formed
through ART within a longer history of parentage. Inequalities that persist in contemporary law
are traceable to earlier eras. In initially defining parentage through marriage, the common law
embedded parenthood within a gender-hierarchical, heterosexual order. Eventually, courts and
legislatures repudiated the common-law regime and protected biological parent-child relation-
ships formed outside marriage. While this effort to derive parental recognition from biological
connection was animated by egalitarian impulses, it too operated within a gender-differentiated,
heterosexual paradigm.
Today, the law increasingly accommodates families formed through ART, and, in doing so,
recognizes parents on not only biological but also social grounds. Yet, as courts and legislatures
approach the parental claims of women and same-sex couples within existing frameworks orga-
nized around marital and biological relationships, they reproduce some of the very gender- and
sexuality-based asymmetries embedded in those frameworks. With biological connection con-
tinuing to anchor nonmarital parenthood, unmarried gays and lesbians face barriers to parental
recognition. With the gender-differentiated, heterosexual family continuing to structure marital
parenthood, the law organizes the legal family around a biological mother. Against this back-
drop, nonbiological mothers in different-sex couples, as well as nonbiological fathers in same-sex
couples, struggle for parental recognition.
To protect the parental interests of women and of gays and lesbians, this Article urges great-
er emphasis on parenthood's social dimensions. Of course, as our common law origins demon-
strate, the law has long recognized parental relationships on social and not simply biological
grounds. But today, commitments to equality require reorienting family law in ways that ground
parental recognition more fully and evenhandedly in social contributions. While this Article fo-
cuses primarily on reform of family law at the state level, it also contemplates eventual constitu-
tional oversight.
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INTRODUCTION
Those who form families through assisted reproductive technologies
(ART) -donor insemination, in vitro fertilization, and gestational surrogacy-
frequently establish parental relationships in the absence of gestational or ge-
netic connections to their children.' In seeking legal parental recognition, they
do not deny the importance of biological ties, but simply urge courts and legis-
latures to credit social contributions as well.2 In other words, they ask for
recognition that turns on factors such as intent to parent, parental conduct, and
family formation.' Yet law fails to value parenthood's social dimensions ade-
quately and consistently. This failure has significant and painful consequences
in the lives of parents and children. Those who have been parenting their chil-
dren for many years may find they are not legal parents. Some become legal
parents only by engaging in the time-consuming, costly, and invasive process
of adopting their children. Others, for whom adoption is impossible, remain
legal strangers to their children. Indeed, some parents may not realize adoption
1. For early influential accounts of parentage in the context of ART, see JANET L. DOLGIN, DE-
FINING THE FAMILY: LAw, TECHNOLOGY, AND REPRODUCTION IN AN UNEASY AGE (1997);
Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determination
of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835 (2000); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have
Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other
Nontraditional Families, 78 GEo. L.J. 459 (1990); and Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive
Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIs. L.
REV. 297. For more recent interventions, see Melanie B. Jacobs, Parental Parity: Intentional
Parenthood's Promise, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 465 (2016); and Courtney G. Joslin, Protecting Chil-
dren(?): Marriage, Gender, and Assisted Reproductive Technology, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177
(2010).
2. Social contributions capture parental performance and may include forming a family, com-
mitting to the parent-child relationship, and engaging in the work of parenting. These con-
tributions can exist in the presence or absence of biological connections. For purposes of this
Article, biological connections include genetic contribution, as well as gestation and birth.
Law often labels women as biological mothers based on gestation and birth, genetics, or
both. It is important to recognize that gestation includes a functional dimension that may
blur distinctions between biological and social contributions.
3. Developments provoked by ART fit within the more widespread separation of "sexuality
from procreation," which William Eskridge relates to "the decline of the natural law under-
standing of romantic relationships and its substantial displacement in public discourse by a
utilitarian understanding." William N. Eskridge, Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-
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is necessary until it is too late, perhaps when their relationship to the legally-
recognized parent dissolves.'
Consider just a few examples. In Connecticut, a married different-sex cou-
ple had a child through surrogacy and raised the child together for fourteen
years. When they divorced, the court deemed the mother, who had neither a
gestational nor genetic connection to the child, a legal stranger to her child.' In
Florida, an unmarried same-sex couple used the same donor sperm to have
four children, with each woman giving birth to two children. They raised the
children together until their relationship ended several years later, at which
point the court left each woman with parental rights only to her two biological
children.6 In New Jersey, a male same-sex couple used a donor egg to have a
child through a gestational surrogate.' The court recognized the gestational
surrogate, rather than the biological father's husband (and the child's primary
caretaker), as the second parent.'
Today, many courts and legislatures seek to promote gender and sexual-
orientation equality in the family. Judges and lawmakers have repudiated gen-
der-based distinctions in both spousal and parental regulation,' including gen-
dered presumptions in child custody.10 More recently, courts and legislatures
have acknowledged same-sex couples' interest in family recognition. In extend-
ing marriage to same-sex couples in Obergefell v. Hodges, the United States Su-
preme Court sought to protect not only romantic bonds, but also parent-child
relationships, formed by gays and lesbians."
Courts and legislatures claim in principle to have repudiated the privileging
of men over women and different-sex over same-sex couples in the legal regu-
lation of the family. But in parentage law, such privileging remains. As the ex-
amples above suggest, those who break from traditional norms of gender and
4. Ordinarily, only legal parents have standing to seek custody. Nonetheless, to varying degrees
across jurisdictions, nonparents may seek custody in exceptional circumstances.
5. See Doe v. Doe, 7 10 A.2d 1297 (Conn. 1998).
6. See Russell v. Pasik, 178 So. 3d 55, 59-60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
7. While some statutes regulating gestational surrogacy use the term "gestational carrier," this
Article uses the term "gestational surrogate."
8. See A.G.R. v. D.R.H., No. FD-o9-oo1838-o 7 , 20o9 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3250 (Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. Dec. 23, 2009).
9. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 44o U.S. 268 (1979) (striking down gender-based distinction in alimo-
ny); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (striking down gender-based distinction in estate ad-
ministration).
10. See, e.g., Devine v. Devine, 398 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1981) (striking down presumption of ma-
ternal custody on sex-equality grounds).
ii. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 26oo-ol (2015).
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sexuality-women who separate motherhood from biological ties (for instance,
through surrogacy), and women and men who form families with a same-sex
partner -often find their parent-child relationships discounted.12 Accordingly,
this Article explores what it means, in the world of marriage equality, to build a
system of parental recognition that fully integrates families headed by same-sex
couples in the ways that Obergefell contemplates. And it connects questions of
sexual orientation to questions of gender, aspiring to parental recognition that
allows women, in not only same-sex but also different-sex couples, to assume
nontraditional parenting roles. It does so by situating the contemporary legal
treatment of family formation through ART within a longer history of parental
recognition.1
Biological and social factors have long shaped the law of parental recogni-
tion. The common law tied parenthood to marriage and thus made parentage a
legal, rather than biological, determination. Pursuant to the marital presump-
tion (also known as the presumption of legitimacy), when a married woman
gave birth to a child, the law recognized her husband as the child's father. This
presumption channeled intuitions about biological paternity, but it could also
conceal deviations from biological facts - allowing men to avoid questions of
paternity and ensuring the child's legitimacy. In contrast to the marital child,
the "illegitimate" child traditionally existed outside a legal family.14 The com-
mon law's organization of parentage through marriage reflected and enforced a
gender-hierarchical, heterosexual order-giving men authority over women
and children inside marriage and insulating men's property from claims to in-
heritance by children born outside marriage.
Slowly, American law departed from the harshest aspects of its common-
law origins. Legislatures and courts began to recognize a legal relationship be-
tween a mother and her "illegitimate" child-granting the mother custody and
bestowing on the child rights to support and eventually inheritance. In con-
trast, fathers of "illegitimate" children had financial obligations imposed on
12. Scholars have examined distinct aspects of ART, including donor insemination and surroga-
cy, but have rarely attended to the interlocking regulation of various forms of ART, particu-
larly along lines of parental recognition. For an important account of families with "donor-
conceived children,' see NAOMI CAHN, THE NEw KINSHIP: CONSTRUCTING DONOR-
CONCEIVED FAMILIES (2013). For the leading treatment of changes in approaches to surroga-
cy, primarily in the context of heterosexual family formation, see Elizabeth S. Scott, Surroga-
cy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109 (2009).
13. A growing body of scholarship explores questions of ART, parental recognition, and same-
sex family formation. For leading examples, see Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the
Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REv. 649 (2008); Courtney Megan Cahill, Reproduction
Reconceived, 101 MINN. L. REv. 617 (2016); and Jacobs, supra note 1.
14. See infra Section I.A.
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them less as a consequence of a legal family relationship and more as an effort
to privatize support. Even as American law came to mitigate some of the effects
of "illegitimacy," the government continued to place substantial legal impedi-
ments on nonmarital parents and children well into the twentieth century.
By the late 196os and early 1970s, in the wake of increasing efforts to hold
unmarried fathers financially accountable and to protect the rights of nonmari-
tal children, the Court intervened by recognizing nonmarital parent-child rela-
tionships on constitutional grounds. Biological connection served as an explicit
basis for constitutional protection, for both mother-child and father-child rela-
tionships." Yet even as the Court renounced "illegitimacy" and dismantled le-
gally enforced gender hierarchy within marriage, it produced a new form of
gender differentiation in parenthood-which it justified by resort to reproduc-
tive biology. At the moment of birth, the nonmarital child - unlike the marital
child- had one legal parent: the mother. Gestation and birth evidenced the
biological fact of maternity and furnished a relationship to the child that justi-
fied legal recognition. An unmarried man, in contrast, needed to demonstrate
commitment to the parent-child relationship, in addition to his genetic connec-
tion. Of course, gestation provides a unique relationship to the child that is not
only biological but functional. But in a series of cases, the logic of reproductive
biology authorized more far-reaching social and legal differences between
mothers and fathers -situating women, but not men, as naturally responsible
for nonmarital children. Judges and lawmakers liberalized a parentage regime
that had been deliberately organized around the gender-hierarchical, hetero-
sexual status of marriage, yet continued to approach parentage within a gen-
der-differentiated, heterosexual paradigm.
Against this legal backdrop, courts and legislatures in the late twentieth and
early twenty-first centuries began to address parent-child relationships formed
through a range of reproductive technologies. 16 They determined parentage in
ways that turned increasingly on social, and not simply biological, grounds -
not only for men but for women, and not only for different-sex but for same-
sex couples. Concepts of intentional and functional parenthood gained traction
in both judicial and statutory reasoning addressing a range of family configura-
tions."
15. See infra Section I.B.
16. See Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REv. 1185
(2016) (situating recognition for lesbian and gay parents within shifts toward both marriage
equality and intentional and functional understandings of parentage across all families).
17. See id.
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Yet even as courts and legislatures have acted to conform parentage law to
more recent egalitarian commitments, their attempts have been partial and in-
complete. By tracing the evolution of modern parentage law, this Article shows
how judges and lawmakers reason about parenthood in ways that carry for-
ward legacies of exclusion embedded in frameworks of parental recognition
forged in earlier eras. The account presented here tracks parental recognition
across jurisdictions, bodies of law, family configurations, and forms of ART,
showing how courts and legislatures draw distinctions between motherhood
and fatherhood, different-sex and same-sex couples, biological and nonbiologi-
cal parents, and marital and nonmarital families. Mapping regulation in this
way reveals how the recognition of some parents but not others on social
grounds reflects and perpetuates inequality based on gender and sexual orien-
tation." With biological connection continuing to anchor nonmarital
parenthood, unmarried gays and lesbians struggle for parental recognition.
With the gender-differentiated, heterosexual family continuing to structure
marital parenthood, the law assumes the presence of a biological mother in
ways that burden nonbiological mothers in different-sex couples, as well as
nonbiological fathers in same-sex couples.
To vindicate the parental interests of women and of gays and lesbians, this
Article urges greater emphasis on parenthood's social dimensions. Same-sex
family formation features a parent without a genetic or gestational connection
to the child; therefore, treating same-sex parents as equals demands recogni-
tion on social grounds. An approach that simply provides for equal treatment
based on biological criteria would continue to marginalize those who parent
with a same-sex partner, as well as women who defy conventional gender
norms by separating the biological fact of maternity from the social role of
motherhood.19 The law has traditionally connected women to motherhood as
18. While the precise relationships between gender and sexuality this Article uncovers have not
been identified in existing scholarship, important work in family law attends to questions of
gender and sexuality in the law of parental recognition and ART. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Ap-
pleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples
Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227 (20o6); Marla J. Hollandsworth, Gay Men Creating Families
Through Surro-Gay Arrangements: A Paradigm for Reproductive Freedom, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER &
L. 183 (1995); Joslin, supra note 1; Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have To Adopt
Her Own Child: Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 201 (2009).
ig. For the leading account of the equal treatment position, see Garrison, supra note 1. Garri-
son's interpretive approach would apply "the law governing sexual conception and the im-
plicit assumptions about parentage and family on which that law is based" to ART. Id. at
842. This approach, she argues, "treats all would-be parents equally, without regard to their
choice of a method for becoming a parent. It does not depend on any particular vision of
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biological destiny, and thus crediting the social aspects of motherhood is neces-
sary to value the parenting work of women who break from conventional roles.
This Article's analysis suggests the desirability of social grounds for paren-
tal recognition from the perspective of not only parents but children. Nonethe-
less, it does not aim to articulate an ideal model of parental recognition, nor
does it defend social grounds for parental recognition based on a best-interests-
of-the-child standard.20 Of course, courts and legislatures would rarely protect
parental interests in ways they see as harmful to children. Yet unlike a custody
determination, which turns on a child's best interests, parentage is generally
guided by the parental interest.2 1 There are compelling reasons to keep parent-
age from devolving purely into a question of best interests. Indeed, views about
gender and sexuality have historically influenced custody determinations in
ways that have frustrated not only children's interests in ongoing relationships
with their parents, but also parents' expectations of nondiscriminatory treat-
ment.2 2
After elaborating the meaning of equality in the context of parental recog-
nition, this Article seeks to reorient family law in ways that protect the parent-
child relationships of women and same-sex couples by grounding recognition
more fully and evenhandedly in social contributions to parenting. Reform
efforts will occur primarily at the state level. State legislatures can restructure
parentage law in ways that credit parenthood's social dimensions, and state
family life or parental prerogatives, except insofar as that vision has been accepted elsewhere
within family law and policy." Id. at 920.
20. Moreover, this Article does not make an affirmative case for ART over other forms of family
formation. Nonetheless, in seeking to reform family law so that parental recognition emerg-
ing out of existing practices of ART aligns with equality principles, this Article identifies a
distinctive relationship between ART -specifically, the creation of nonbiological parent-
child bonds -and the equal standing of women and of same-sex couples. While the empha-
sis on nonbiological bonds finds common ground with arguments for greater access to
adoption, it is important to note that some scholars view liberal ART policies as undermin-
ing adoption. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Intergenerational Justice for Children: Restructuring
Adoption, Reproduction, and Child Welfare Policy, 8 LAw & ETHIcs HUM. RTs. 103, 111 (2014)
(arguing that "reproduction policy worldwide encourages privileged people to create new
children rather than consider adopting existing unparented children").
21. See David D. Meyer, The Constitutionality of "Best Interests" Parentage, 14 WM. & MARY BILL
RTs. J. 857, 857 (20o6). For an approach that would more explicitly turn on children's inter-
ests, see Elizabeth Bartholet, Guiding Principles for Picking Parents, 27 HAlV. WOMEN'S L.J.
323, 335-37 (2004).
22. See Nan D. Hunter & Nancy D. Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and
Litigation Strategy, 25 BUFF. L. REv. 691 (1976); Clifford J. Rosky, Like Father, Like Son: Ho-
mosexuality, Parenthood, and the Gender of Homophobia, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 257 (2009).
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courts can apply parentage principles to recognize as legal parents those who
have committed to the work of parenting.
Nonetheless, reform will likely require constitutional oversight. While
scholars have addressed constitutional limitations on government regulation of
family formation through ART,23 the issues of parental recognition uncovered
in this Article gesture toward a set of constitutional questions in both equal
protection and due process that will take years to fully emerge and develop.
Although constitutional claims will likely first arise in state courts under state
law, federal courts may eventually revisit constitutional commitments to paren-
tal equality and liberty articulated in earlier eras.24 This Article closes by con-
sidering the constitutional paths that might lead courts to recognize parents in
ways that align with emergent equality principles and accordingly protect pa-
rental relationships on social, and not merely biological, grounds.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. While its focus is on developments be-
ginning in the late twentieth century, Part I begins at a much earlier point to
show parenthood's foundation in the institution of marriage. It then turns to
the repudiation of "illegitimacy," focusing on the recognition of unmarried bio-
logical fathers who demonstrated a commitment to the parental relationship.
Both approaches reflected and enforced gender differentiation and heterosexu-
ality in parenthood.
Part II turns to the more recent - and ongoing - epoch of liberalization pro-
voked by ART. It provides the first comprehensive account of contemporary
regulation of parental recognition in the context of ART. It brings together
multiple forms of ART, demonstrating how law treats parent-child relation-
ships formed through donor insemination, IVF, and gestational surrogacy. This
Part covers a range of family configurations, including both different-sex and
23. Constitutional attention has focused primarily on the right to procreate, rather than on the
right to be a parent. See, e.g., JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE
NEw REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1994); Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Procreative Pluralism,
30 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 22, 25 (2015); Radhika Rao, Constitutional Misconceptions,
93 MICH. L. REV. 1473 (1995) (reviewing ROBERTSON, supra). Recent constitutional work on
parental recognition and ART has attended most extensively to same-sex parenting. See, e.g.,
Peter Nicolas, Straddling the Columbia: A Constitutional Law Professor's Musings on Circum-
venting Washington State's Criminal Prohibition on Compensated Surrogacy, 89 WASH. L. REv.
1235, 1256-57, 1260 (2014).
24. See infra Section IV.C. In fact, the path toward same-sex marriage suggests that develop-
ments at the state level ultimately may shape constitutional understandings of the family at
the federal level. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Backlash Politics: How Constitutional Litigation
Has Advanced Marriage Equality in the United States, 93 B.U. L. REv. 275 (2013); Douglas
NeJaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of Nonmarital Recognition and Its Relation-
ship to Marriage, 102 CALIF. L. REv. 87 (2014).
2270
126:2260 2017
THE NATURE OF PARENTHOOD
same-sex couples, marital and nonmarital families, and biological and nonbio-
logical parents. And it surveys the law across jurisdictions, identifying posi-
tions that represent majority views or clear modern trends, rather than focus-
ing on less common statutory and judicial approaches. Part II occasionally
references Appendices to this Article that catalog the current state of the law
with respect to parental recognition in the context of ART. Ultimately, Part II's
detailed analysis of the contemporary law of parentage makes clear the unap-
preciated status-based effects of the current regime.
Part III uncovers the practical and expressive harms inflicted within this re-
gime and shows that these harms are not evenly distributed. Instead, they recur
in ways that exclude those who break from traditional norms of gender and
sexuality that govern reproduction, parenting, and the family. Part IV considers
ways to ameliorate these harms and promote equality based on gender and
sexual orientation. It shows how emergent equality commitments lead law to
value the social dimensions of parenthood more transparently, extensively, and
consistently. It offers ways to reconstruct parentage, through both legislation
and adjudication, primarily as a family law matter but also as a constitutional
matter. Finally, the Conclusion shows how the reforms envisioned here may
lead toward yet another shift in the law of parental recognition -a system of
multiple-parent recognition.
I. MARRIAGE, BIOLOGY, AND PARENTHOOD
As this Part shows, the common law organized parenthood around mar-
riage and, in doing so, enforced a gender-hierarchical, heterosexual order. In-
side marriage, the marital presumption purported to channel biological pater-
nity but could hide biological facts to maintain the husband's parental status
and the child's legitimacy. Outside marriage, even as local authorities sought to
extract support from parents of "illegitimate" children, parent-child relation-
ships lacked legal recognition. Only slowly did the law come to regard the "ille-
gitimate" child as part of a legal family. Reform efforts in the mid-twentieth
century, aimed at both the rights of nonmarital children and the financial re-
sponsibilities of unmarried fathers, precipitated a wave of constitutional liber-
alization beginning in the late 196os. The Court repudiated key elements of the
common-law regime and protected the parental relationships of unmarried
biological parents. Nonetheless, the Court preserved a gender-differentiated,
heterosexual approach to parentage, justifying differences in the legal treat-
ment of mothers and fathers by resort to sex-based differences in reproductive
biology.
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A. Parenthood, Marriage, and "Illegitimacy"
The Anglo-American legal system initially understood parentage as a rela-
tionship defined through marriage. The marital presumption, or presumption
of legitimacy, recognized the mother's husband as the child's legal father.25 At
English common law, overcoming the presumption required showing that "the
husband be out of the kingdom of England ... for above nine months, so that
no access to his wife can be presumed."2 6 As this factual showing suggests, the
presumption purported to reflect biological parenthood.2 7
Nonetheless, the law assumed, but did not in fact require, blood ties. In-
stead, the marital presumption both facilitated parental recognition that de-
parted from biological facts and cut off claims to parental recognition based on
biological facts. If the child was conceived through an extramarital relationship
with another man, the marital presumption allowed the husband to pretend he
was the biological and thus legal father.28 Indeed, traditionally neither the hus-
band nor wife were permitted to testify to the husband's "nonaccess," meaning
that the couple themselves could not penetrate the presumption with incon-
sistent biological facts.29 A jury "could not legally find against ... legitimacy,
except on facts which prove, beyond all reasonable doubt, that the husband
could not have been the father."so As a Massachusetts court observed more re-
cently, "The effect of the common law presumption of legitimacy was, in many
instances, to prevent the fact finder from reaching the true issue in the case."
By allowing the marital presumption to hide situations in which the hus-
band was not in fact the biological father, the law ensured the child's "legitima-
cy."32 At common law, a child born outside a marital relationship was deemed
25. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *457.
26. Id.
27. See Joanna L. Grossman, Parentage Without Gender, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 717,
720-21 (2016).
28. See In re Findlay, 170 N.E. 471, 473 (N.Y. 1930) ("At times the cases seemed to say that any
possibility of access, no matter how violently improbable, would leave the presumption ac-
tive as against neutralizing proof.").
29. Goodright v. Moss (1777) 98 Eng. Rep. 1257, 1257; 2 Cowp. 591, 592.
30. Phillips v. Allen, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 453, 454 (1861).
31. C.C. v. A.B., 550 N.E.2d 365, 371 (Mass. 1990).
32. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 201-02 (1985).
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the child and heir of no one (filius nullius)." Traditionally, the "illegitimate"
child, as historian Michael Grossberg explains, "had no recognized legal rela-
tions with his or her parents, particularly not those of inheritance, mainte-
nance, and custody."34 Nonetheless, support for "illegitimate" children became
a feature of the common-law system in both England and America, as poor
laws empowered local government to force parents to financially support their
"illegitimate" children." Still, financial support and legal parentage remained
distinct concepts, with officials able to "compel support but not family mem-
bership."3 6
The common-law system reflected and enforced a gender-hierarchical or-
der." Given the legal doctrine of coverture, marriage subordinated women to
men in both the spousal and parenting relationship. The husband assumed au-
thority over his wife," and possessed "an almost unlimited right to the custody
of their minor legitimate children."" The father's rights were rooted in a prop-
erty-based understanding of parenthood. As Grossberg explains, children's
"services, earnings, and the like became the property of their paternal masters
33. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at *458; 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW
*212; see also Kent v. Barker, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 535, 536 (1854) ("It is well settled ... that at
common law the words 'child' and 'children' mean only legitimate child and children.").
34. GROSSBERG, supra note 32, at 197.
3s. See R.H. HELMHOLZ, 1 THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAws OF ENGLAND 561 (2004); Jacobus
tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status,
Part I, 16 STAN. L. REV. 257, 283-84, 312 (1964). In England, this support duty originally
arose under canon law, which imposed a natural-law duty on parents to support their chil-
dren-a duty originally enforced in ecclesiastical courts. See HELMHOLZ, supra, at 56o-61.
Given difficulties proving paternity, determinations often flowed from "proof 'by presump-
tions and conjectures."' Id. at 56o. On evidentiary techniques in early paternity trials in
America, see generally Kristin A. Olbertson, "She Stedfastly Accused Him in the Time of Her
Travail": Women's Words and Paternity Suits in 18th-Century Massachusetts, 19 CARDOZO J.L. &
GENDER 41 (2012).
36. GROSSBERG, supra note 32, at 198.
37. See HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN & WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 90 (2000) ("[A] father gained
'the unquestioned right to [children's] custody, control and obedience.' Meanwhile, the
mother, as nothing but a wife, was left without any rights at all." (quoting Graham v. Ben-
net, 2 Cal. 503, 5o6-07 (1852))); see also GROSSBERG, supra note 32, at 196 (explaining how
the law of legitimacy "had been constructed to protect family lineage and resources, and to
promote matrimony").
38. See NANCY F COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 11-12 (2000).
39. GROSSBERG, supra note 32, at 235; see also State v. Paine, 23 Tenn. (4 Hum.) 523, 536 (1843)
("The wife, by the common law, has no right to the children against the husband.").
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in exchange for life and maintenance."40 And the system of marital parentage
ensured transmission of wealth across generations of men.41
Outside marriage, women routinely cared for their "illegitimate" children,
even as the parental relationship traditionally lacked legal status.4 2 While the
American system reflected its English roots,4 3 early in the nation's history legis-
latures and courts began to extend limited legal protections to "illegitimate"
children.44 As Grossberg documents, law "turn[ed] the customary bonds be-
tween the bastard and its mother into a web of reciprocal legal rights and du-
ties."4 5 Mothers possessed legal custody of their "illegitimate" children, and "il-
legitimate" children gained legal rights to support-and eventually
inheritance -from their mothers.4 6 This nineteenth-century American innova-
tion reflected not recognition of women's autonomy but rather the "cult of do-
mesticity" that valued women's "maternal instinct."4 7
Fathers of "illegitimate" children occupied a different position. Whereas
reforms relating to the mother-child relationship focused on legal rights and
family recognition, paternity hearings endeavored to enforce financial obliga-
tions for the sake of protecting public funds.4 8 With financial support seen as
"a male obligation," local authorities sought to hold men liable for their non-
40. GROSSBERG, supra note 32, at 235.
41. The estate included the wife's earnings and property (in which the husband gained a devisa-
ble interest if the marriage produced children). See COTT, supra note 38, at 12; George L.
Haskins, Curtesy in the United States, oo U. PA. L. REV. 196, 196-97 (1951). The gradual
adoption of Married Women's Property Acts in the nineteenth century altered this assump-
tion. See FLETCHER W. BATTERSHALL, THE LAw OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE STATE OF
NEWYORK 366-67 (1910).
42. Cooley v. Dewey, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 93, 98 (1826). The child could be taken from the mother
and placed for adoption. See STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: FROM OBEDIENCE
TO INTIMACY OR How LOvE CONQUERED MARRIAGE 257 (2005). Adoption itself constituted a
nineteenth-century revolution in parenthood. Yet, into the twentieth century, courts priori-
tized "blood relations" over "adoptive ones" and thus maintained adoption "as a custody de-
vice more than a total transfer of family membership." See GROSSBERG, supra note 32, at 278.
43. GROSSBERG, supra note 32, at 197-98.
44. See id. at 201. American law also departed from strict English common law rules-and
adopted rules with civil-law and ecclesiastical origins -in ways that expanded the space of
legitimacy. Examples include recognition of common law marriage, legitimation by subse-
quent marriage, and preservation of legitimacy in cases of annulment. See id. at 201-04.
45. See id. at 207.
46. See id. at 207-12.
47. Id. at 209.
48. See id. at 215-18.
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marital children.49 Notably, in an age before reliable biological evidence, pater-
nity often turned simply on the parties' testimony.so
Even with significant reform in favor of "illegitimate" children over the
course of the nineteenth century, the importance of legitimacy remained.
While many states provided mechanisms by which men could confer rights on
their nonmarital children," parity with marital children proved elusive.52 Pa-
ternal inheritance in particular remained out of reach." Well into the mid-
twentieth century, some states required unmarried fathers to engage in elabo-
rate proceedings simply to have legally protected relationships with their non-
marital children.54 As a leading reformer of "illegitimacy" commented, the law
remained "an uncertain mixture of old English common law tempered with oc-
casional flashes of modern thought -limited, narrow statutes which are di-
rected at only selected aspects of illegitimacy."
B. Parenthood's Liberalization: The Rise of Biological Authority
In the second half of the twentieth century, reformers endeavored with
greater success to protect the rights of nonmarital children to both care and
support and, relatedly, to hold unmarried fathers financially responsible for
their children. With these efforts gaining traction in the 196os, the Court in-
tervened to remedy some of the wrongs perpetrated by a common-law regime
rooted in marital privilege. It made biological connection an explicit basis for
paternal rights in ways that did not merely supplement, but in some circum-
stances rivaled, marriage.5 6 Yet even as the Court eradicated longstanding ine-
qualities, it preserved gender differentiation in parentage, appealing to differ-
49. See id. at 215.
50. See id. at 216.
51. See, e.g., ALA. CODE S 27-11 (1940).
52. GROSSBERG, supra note 32, at 228-33.
s3. Id. at 221.
54. See In re Stanley, 256 N.E.2d 814, 815 (Ill. 1970). As the government explained in Stanley,
"Illinois requires the petitioner and others similarly situated to subject themselves to a legal
proceeding .... [that] approximates an adoption or guardianship proceeding instituted by a
person bearing no blood relationship to the child and in which the best interest showing is
required." Brief for Respondent at 31, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (No. 70-5014),
1971 WIL 133736, at *31.
55. Harry D. Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society: A Proposed Uniform Act on Illegit-
imacy, 44 TEX. L. REv. 829, 831 (1966).
56. See Katharine K. Baker, Legitimate Families and Equal Protection, 56 B.C. L. REv. 1647, 1649-50
(2015).
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ences in reproductive biology to justify legal differences between mothers and
fathers.
1. Unmarried Fathers, Biological Connection, and Social Performance
By the late 196os, the Court assumed an important role in further disman-
tling the common-law system of "illegitimacy."" As the Court began to recog-
nize the constitutional rights of unmarried fathers in the 1970s, the biological
relationship provided its starting point." The biological father was uniquely
situated to claim the constitutional right to be a legal parent. Yet the Court em-
phasized social contribution as the means to achieve a protected liberty inter-
est. ' Only the unmarried biological father who "demonstrates a full commit-
ment to the responsibilities of parenthood" gained constitutional protection.60
The Court's decisions bolstered legislative advocacy that sought to recog-
nize, with greater consistency across states, both rights and obligations flowing
from nonmarital parent-child relationships.6 1 Pushed by these constitutional
decisions, states reformed their family law systems. The 1973 Uniform Parent-
age Act (UPA), which many states adopted, endeavored to extend legal protec-
tion "equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status
of the parents."62 The UPA, and the state statutes that followed suit, provided a
number of "presumption[s] of paternity" through which to recognize father-
child relationships. 63 Marriage continued to provide a path to parentage. 64
Other presumptions applied to unmarried men, recognizing a man as a father
if "he acknowledges his paternity of the child in a writing filed with the [gov-
ernment]" or if "he receives the child into his home and openly holds out the
child as his natural child." 65 Based on the assumption that biological paternity
generally produced legal fatherhood, these various paternity presumptions
57. Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968).
58. See Stanley, 405 U.S. 645.
59. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
6o. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261.
61. Harry Krause, the leading figure in favor of national legislative efforts, proposed a uniform
act in a 1966 publication. See Krause, supra note 55, at 832-41.
62. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 2 (UNIF. LAw COMM'N 1973).
63. Id. 5 4.
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were rebuttable through blood test evidence.66 Of course, biological evidence
did not simply allow men to refute parental status; it also allowed the govern-
ment to impose financial obligations on resistant fathers. While the law ordi-
narily required an unmarried man seeking to establish his parental status to
take affirmative steps,67 biological connection could provide the sole basis for
imposing duties.68 Referencing Congress's plans to establish "a national system
of federally assisted child support enforcement," the UPA drafters expressed
their expectation that "blood test evidence will go far toward stimulating vol-
untary settlements of actions to determine paternity."69
Biological claims to fatherhood eventually conflicted with marital claims.
The unmarried father, armed with his biological connection, attempted to dis-
place the mother's husband, who, even without a biological connection,
claimed parenthood based on the marital presumption. When asked to inter-
vene in ways that would disturb marriage's ability to hide biological facts, the
Court resisted. In its 1989 decision in Michael H. v. Gerald D., a fractured Court
upheld application of California's conclusive marital presumption, thus pre-
venting an unmarried biological father, with whom the mother had an extra-
marital relationship, from asserting parentage against the wishes of the mother
and her husband.70 After explaining that "California law, like nature itself,
makes no provision for dual fatherhood,"" Justice Scalia's plurality opinion
protected the nonbiological parent-child relationship formed by the husband. 72
By limiting the constitutional rights of unmarried biological fathers - including
those, like Michael H., who had formed relationships with their biological
children -the Court preserved the marital presumption's ability to conceal bio-
66. Id. §§ 4(b), 12.
67. See Leslie Joan Harris, The Basis for Legal Parentage and the Clash Between Custody and Child
Support, 42 IND. L. REv. 611, 624-26 (2009). Some states require strong showings of paren-
tal conduct when biological fathers challenge the child's placement for adoption by the
mother. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Anderson, 624 S.E.2d 626, 626 (N.C. 20o6) (holding
that because the biological father "merely offered support but did not provide the actual fi-
nancial support mandated under [state law] . . . his consent to the adoption is not re-
quired").
68. See DOLGIN, supra note 1, at 110 (distinguishing "cases in which unwed biological fathers
have been held responsible for supporting their biological offspring despite the absence of
any social relationship between the father and his biological child").
69. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 12 cmt. (UNIF. LAw COMM'N 1973).
70. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
71. Id. at 118 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 119 ("California declares it to be ... irrelevant for paternity purposes whether a child
conceived during, and born into, an existing marriage was begotten by someone other than
the husband and had a prior relationship with him.").
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logical facts. Thus, the Court protected purely social forms of parenthood in-
side marriage."
Nonetheless, the emphasis on biological paternity crept into marital
parenthood. In contrast to California's conclusive marital presumption affirmed
in Michael H., many states, as well as the UPA, made the marital presumption
rebuttable.74 Eventually, across a number of states, husbands could disestablish
paternity through biological evidence, wives could challenge their husband's
parental status, and unmarried men could seek to rebut the marital presump-
tion.7 1 In many states, the reliability of biological evidence and the recognition
of unmarried fathers rendered the marital presumption more explicitly biologi-
cal in ways that departed from its common-law origins.76
By the late twentieth century, a range of demographic, scientific, and politi-
cal developments had led family law to focus even more intently on ascertain-
ing biological fatherhood.7 7 With the rapid rise of nonmarital childbirth and
the increased sophistication of paternity testing, the federal government en-
gaged in far-reaching efforts to identify fathers of nonmarital children and im-
pose financial obligations on them.78 To comply with federal legislation aimed
at increasing child support collection, states adopted a procedure to encourage
unmarried fathers to identify themselves immediately upon the child's birth to
not only attain rights but also undertake obligations. With voluntary acknowl-
edgments of paternity (VAPs), a man (and the child's biological mother) at-
tested to his status as the biological father.
73. Earlier decisions had also protected social bonds within marriage, as rejection of unmarried
fathers' claims cleared the way for adoption by stepfathers. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
248 (1983); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
74. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2002); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4
(UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1973).
75. See Theresa Glennon, Somebody's Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Presumption of
Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 547, 571-85 (2000).
76. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage, Parentage, and Child Support, 45 FAM. LQ. 219,
221-22 (2011).
77. See Katharine K. Baker, The DNA Default and Its Discontents: Establishing Modern Parenthood,
97 B.U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 15-16), http://ssm.com/abstract=2755741
[http://perma.cc/R23W-MW9P].
78. See Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support Enforcement,
and Fatherless Children, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 325, 344-50 (2005); see also NANCY E. DOWD,
REDEFINING FATHERHOOD 114-21 (2000).
79. See, e.g., GA. DEP'T PUB. HEALTH, PATERNITY ACKNOWLEDGMENT-FORM 3940, 2
(June 2016), http://dph.georgia.gov/sites/dph.georgia.gov/files/Patemity%2oAcknowledge
ment%20(Form%203940).pdf [http://perma.cc/VD8J-24JT] ("The father should not
sign ... unless he is confident that he is the biological father of this child.").
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The revised UPA, promulgated in 2000 and amended in 2002, responded
to "federal mandates" by building out a more elaborate system of paternity
identification.so It maintained a number of paternity presumptions resembling
those in the 1973 version," but did even more than its predecessor to prioritize
biological facts in paternity adjudication. As the drafters explained,
" [n] owadays, genetic testing makes it possible in most cases to resolve compet-
ing claims to paternity."82 The revised UPA dedicated an entire article to "ge-
netic testing"" and sought to "establish[] the controlling supremacy of admis-
sible genetic test results in the adjudication of paternity."84
The revised UPA also integrated the VAP procedure through an extensive
set of provisions." Going beyond federal regulations, which did not expressly
"require that a man acknowledging paternity must assert genetic paternity of
the child," the revised UPA sought "to prevent circumvention of adoption laws
by requiring a sworn assertion of genetic parentage of the child."86 Under the
revised UPA's mechanism, "[tihe mother of a child and a man claiming to be
the genetic father of the child may sign an acknowledgment of paternity with in-
tent to establish the man's paternity." 7 VAPs are now the most common way
that legal fatherhood is established for nonmarital children."
2. Gender Diferentiation in Parenthood
The developments charted up to this point revolved around men's parental
status and disputes over fatherhood. At common law, married mothers were le-
gal mothers to their children. Courts and legislatures eventually recognized le-
8o. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory n. at 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2002).
81. Id. § 204.
82. Id. § 204 cmt.
83. Id. art. 5.
84. Id. § 631 cmt. Earlier, the Court had held that indigent defendants in paternity actions were
constitutionally entitled to blood tests at the expense of the government. See Little v. Streat-
er, 452 U.S. 1 (1981).
85. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 301-02, 304, 312.
86. Id. art. 3 cmt.
87. Id. § 301 (emphasis added).
88. See Leslie Joan Harris, Voluntary Acknowledgments of Parentage for Same-Sex Couples, 20 J.
GENDER Soc. PoL'Y & L. 467, 469 (2012). In 2015, 1,186,223 of 1,512,329 nonmarital children
had parentage established by VAP. Office of Child Support Enf't, Preliminary Report: FY
2o15, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. 77 (2016), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default
/files/programs/css/fy2o15_preliminary.pdf [http://perma.cc/X8YL-R-BFW].
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gal bonds between mothers and their "illegitimate" children," but continued to
treat nonmarital mother-child relationships less favorably than their marital
counterparts. In fact, the Court initiated its repudiation of "illegitimacy" in
1968 with two cases involving mother-child relationships.90
Still, the parental status of women was rarely in dispute. The mother-child
relationship was established by proof of giving birth.91 Maternity was under-
stood as a conclusive fact92 - not a disputed status that could be rebutted.9 '
Generally, a mother's status could be divested only by her own relinquishment
or an adjudication of unfitness. 94
As Serena Mayeri's important historical work shows, as the Court forged
constitutional sex-equality doctrine in the 1970s and 198os, it generally resisted
claims that the differential treatment of unmarried mothers and fathers consti-
tuted impermissible sex discrimination. 5 The Court repudiated the purposive
forms of gender subordination embodied in the law of coverture and "illegiti-
macy," but turned to reproductive biology to authorize gender differentiation in
parenthood. While the Court demanded social performance of parenthood
from unmarried fathers claiming constitutional protection, for women the so-
cial aspects of parenthood were assumed to flow inevitably from the biologi-
cal.96 Because gestation established not merely a biological but also a social
89. See GROSSBERG, supra note 32, at 207-15.
go. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73
(1968).
91. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 3 (UNIF. LAw COMM'N 1973); John Lawrence Hill, What
Does It Mean To Be a "Parent"? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 353, 370 (1991) (" [T]his principle reflects the ancient dictum mater est quam gestation
[sic] demonstrat (by gestation the mother is demonstrated).").
92. See, e.g., In re M.M.M., 428 S.W. 3d 389 (Tex. App. 2014) (holding the maternity of the ges-
tational mother to be unrebuttable by genetic testing).
93. See In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3 d 714, 723 (Tenn. 2005) (observing that "the parentage statutes
generally fail to contemplate dispute over maternity" and that "the statute providing for an
order of parentage is concerned solely with the establishment of paternity"); In re M.M.M.,
428 S.W. 3d 389; cf UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4 (b) (providing that a presumption of paternity
may be rebutted).
94. See, e.g., In re Baby, 447 S.W. 3 d 807, 829-30 (Tenn. 2014) (discussing how a mother's paren-
tal rights can only be terminated based on abuse and neglect, consent to adoption, or relin-
quishment); see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 25 (addressing the procedure for termination of
parental rights if a mother relinquishes her child).
95. See Serena Mayeri, Foundling Fathers: (Non-)Marriage and Parental Rights in the Age of
Equality, 125 YALE L.J. 2292, 2372 (2016).
96. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind?: Redefining the Parent-Child Relationship
in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1011, 1048 (2003).
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connection to the child, the mother, unlike the father, had a relationship with
the child at the moment of birth. The requirement that unmarried fathers
"grasp[] [the] opportunity" to form a parent-child relationship to have a con-
stitutionally protected interest appeared justified by men's lack of pre-birth
connection to the child." As the Court stated in Lehr v. Robertson: "The mother
carries and bears the child, and in this sense her parental relationship is clear.
The validity of the father's parental claims must be gauged by other
measures."98
Nonetheless, the Court resorted to reproductive differences between wom-
en and men to authorize more far-reaching social and legal differences between
mothers and fathers. Women became mothers automatically- and thus had
child-rearing responsibilities imposed on them -while men often escaped pa-
rental obligations." And for those men who desired parental rights, the Court
relied on biological differences in ways that discounted their parental contribu-
tions after the child's birth.100 As Sylvia Law argues, "[T] he facts of the cases
reveal the inaccuracy of the stereotypes asserted by the various Justices as 'bio-
logical fact."'"o
Consider Parham v. Hughes, in which the Court upheld a Georgia statute
that allowed the mother, but not the father, of an "illegitimate" child to sue for
wrongful death of the child.102 The father had not undertaken the procedures
required to formally legitimate the child, but he had signed the child's birth
certificate, contributed to the child's support, and regularly visited with the
child. 03 The Court rejected the father's equal protection claim because "moth-
ers and fathers of illegitimate children are not similarly situated. . . . Unlike the
mother of an illegitimate child whose identity will rarely be in doubt, the iden-
tity of the father will frequently be unknown."104 For the Court, biological
differences between women and men-differences that may be relevant to
97. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983).
98. Id. at 260 n.16 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U. S. 380, 397 (1979)).
99. See Martha E Davis, Male Coverture: Law and the Illegitimate Family, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 73,
80-82 (2003). Marriage was imagined to tie fathers to their children, but no similar ar-
rangement assured commitments from unmarried fathers. See Mayeri, supra note 95, at 2381.
ioo. See Albertina Antognini, From Citizenship to Custody: Unwed Fathers Abroad and at Home, 36
HARv. J.L. & GENDER 405, 410 (2013) (explaining that the Court's "decisions consistently re-
flect an assumption that the unwed father is absent and the unwed mother is present -not
just at birth but in the child's life thereafter").
101. Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 992 (1984).
102. 441 U.S. 347, 348-49, 359 (1979) (plurality opinion).
103. Id. at 349.
104. Id. at 355.
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Imowing the biological parent's identity-justified legal distinctions between
mothers and fathers, even where the father's identity was clear and he had
formed a parental relationship with the child. as
The gendered distinctions countenanced in the 1970s and 198os reemerged
with greater force in the immigration context in subsequent decades. By the
start of the twenty-first century, the Court turned to reproductive biology to
justify a gendered order of parentage with respect to citizenship status -
specifically for nonmarital parent-child relationships. While marital children
enjoyed rights to citizenship based on mother-child and father-child ties, non-
marital children's rights were restricted based on the sex of their citizen parent.
This system reflected and enforced views about both the legitimacy of nonmar-
ital family formation and the roles of women and men with respect to their
nonmarital children.
First in Miller v. Albrightl06 and then in Nguyen v. INS,107 the Court consid-
ered the constitutionality of a statutory scheme making it more difficult for a
nonmarital child born abroad to claim citizenship when the citizen parent is the
father. 1s Where the citizen parent is the mother, the child acquires the moth-
er's nationality status at birth.'09 But the citizen father, in addition to proving a
biological connection, must take additional, post-birth steps -legitimation of
the child, a written acknowledgement of paternity, or an adjudication of pater-
nity- to evidence the social bonds of parenthood. 0
In Miller, a deeply fractured Court refused to hold the statutory provisions
unconstitutional."' Justice Stevens announced the Court's judgment but deliv-
ered an opinion joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist.112 The opinion rea-
soned that the anti-stereotyping principle implicated in the Court's leading sex-
equality precedents, many of which involved family-based rights and responsi-
ios. Id. at 353-57. The Court rejected the father's due process claim because the case involved a
right to damages after a child's death, rather than "the freedom of a father to raise his own
children." Id. at 358-59.
io6. 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
107. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
io8. In Fiallo v. Bell, the Court had rejected an equal protection claim to an immigration scheme
excluding nonmarital father-child relationships from preferential status. 430 U.S. 787, 799-
800 (1977).
109. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (2012). Section 1409(c) additionally requires that "the mother ha[s] pre-
viously been present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuous
period of one year." Id.
110. Id. § 1409(a).
Inl. 523 U.S. at 424.
112. Id. at 423.
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bilities, was "only indirectly involved in this case.""' Instead, Justice Stevens
relied on Lehr, which upheld the differential treatment of unmarried mothers
and fathers,114 and concluded that "biological differences between single men
and single women provide a relevant basis for differing rules governing their
ability to confer citizenship on children born in foreign lands."1 5
Resolving the constitutional issues left open in Miller, a sharply divided
Court in Nguyen found no equal protection violation, largely because " [f] athers
and mothers are not similarly situated with regard to the proof of biological
parenthood."116 The Court explained: "Given the proof of motherhood that is
inherent in birth itself, it is unremarkable that Congress did not require the
same affirmative steps of mothers.""' But the Court translated differences in
the biological dimensions of parenthood into differences in the social dimen-
sions: "The mother knows that the child is in being and is hers and has an ini-
tial point of contact with him. There is at least an opportunity for mother and
child to develop a real, meaningful relationship."1  But for the father, "[t]he
same opportunity does not result from the event of birth, as a matter of biolog-
ical inevitability. . . .""' In the earlier cases on unmarried fathers, a sex-based
reproductive difference - gestation - could be understood to create a different
parent-child relationship at birth. Now, that difference justified far-reaching
distinctions in the post-birth relationships of unmarried mothers and fathers.
While the Court had warned that physiological differences cannot justify
policies that reflect or perpetuate generalizations about the distinct capacities of
women and men,12 0 the Nguyen Court rejected the argument that the differen-
tial treatment of mothers and fathers reflected "a stereotype that women are
more likely than men to actually establish a relationship with their children."121
Over a strong dissent, the Court viewed the immigration regulations as simply
reflecting biological facts.12 2 just as in earlier cases, the Court's gender-
113. Id. at 442.
114. Id. at 441.
115. Id. at 445. For criticism, see Kristin Collins, Note, When Fathers' Rights Are Mothers' Duties:
The Failure of Equal Protection in Miller v. Albright, lo9 YALE L.J. 1669 (2000).
uS. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 63 (2001).
117. Id. at 64.
118. Id. at 65.
1ig. Id.
120. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533-34 (1996).
121. 533 U.S. at 69.
122. As Reva Siegel has shown, because the Court reasons about reproductive regulation "as a
form of state action that concerns physical facts of sex rather than social questions of gen-
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differentiated treatment of parent-child relationships discounted the social per-
formance of biological fathers.123 The father in Nguyen, after all, had parented
his child for most of the child's life.124 The decision relied on an approach to
parenthood forged in previous decades,125 but subjected unmarried biological
fathers to even more demanding standards in the immigration context. 126
Conflict over sex-based distinctions in immigration continues. This term,
the Court is considering a challenge to a law that placed more onerous residen-
cy requirements on unmarried fathers.127 Under the law at issue in Morales-
Santana v. Lynch, a nonmarital child born abroad to a citizen mother enjoyed
citizenship at birth if the mother resided in the United States (or U.S. posses-
sion) for at least one year at some point prior to the child's birth.128 But if the
citizen parent is the father, a child attained citizenship at birth only if the father
resided in the United States (or U.S. possession) for a total of ten years, at least
five of which must occur after age fourteen.129 While the statute has been
amended, a similar distinction persists in modern immigration law, though
der" it often neglects "the possibility that such regulation may be animated by constitution-
ally illicit judgments about women." Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Per-
spective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 264
(1992).
123. For criticism, see Kerry Abrams & R. Kent Piacenti, Immigration's Family Values, loo VA. L.
REv. 629, 705-o6 (2014); Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship
and the Legal Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134 (2014); and Laura
Weinrib, Protecting Sex: Sexual Disincentives and Sex-Based Discrimination in Nguyen v. INS,
12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 222 (2003).
124. 533 U.S. at 57 (explaining how the child came to the United States before he turned six and
was raised by his father).
125. See Antognini, supra note loo, at 410, 435-40; Katharine B. Silbaugh, Comment, Miller v.
Albright: Problems of Constitutionalization in Family Law, 79 B.U. L. REv. 1139, 1153 (1999).
126. See Abrams & Piacenti, supra note 123, at 634 (finding that "as a descriptive mat-
ter .... immigration and citizenship law generally use more stringent standards for deter-
mining parentage than state family law").
127. See Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520, 524, 532-33 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S.
Ct. 2545 (2016) (No. 15-1191). But see Flores-Villar v. United States, 564 U.S. 210 (2011) (per
curiam) (affirming, by an equally divided Court, the Ninth Circuit's determination that the
differing residency requirements do not violate Equal Protection because the requirements
are rationally related to the government's interest in establishing a link between the citizen
father, illegitimate child, and the United States). At the time this Article was finalized, the
Court had not issued its decision in Morales-Santana.
128. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 309(c), Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163, 238-39
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (1952)).
129. Id. § 301(a)(7), 66 Stat. 163, 236 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (1952)); see also id. §
309(a), 66 Stat. 163, 238-39 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)).
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with a shorter physical-presence requirement for fathers. 3 o The government
has defended the law challenged in Morales-Santana based in part on a conten-
tion about parentage law: that, for a nonmarital child, the mother and not the
father is "typically" the only legal parent at the moment of birth.1 3' But that
says nothing of the actual parent-child relationships that develop after birth.
Here, the father legitimated the child by marrying the mother when the child
was eight. 132 Yet that legitimation is insufficient to confer citizenship in light of
the pre-birth residency requirements.
Of course, these immigration cases involve only unmarried parents, reflect-
ing the law's continued division between marital and nonmarital
parenthood.1 3 3 The immigration system has perpetuated views not only about
the gender-based roles of women and men with respect to their nonmarital
children, but also about the place of nonmarital parents and children. Both the
gender- and marriage-based forms of differentiation in the immigration cases
reflect understandings that structured the Court's earlier cases with respect to
family law. Yet the immigration cases have relied more extensively on gender
differentiation in parenthood and have done so in ways that are more punitive
to nonmarital parents and children.
II. ASSISTED REPRODUCTION AND PARENTHOOD'S MODERN
LIBERALIZATION
For centuries, individuals who aspired to parenthood as a meaningful life
project had their desires frustrated. Women who could not become pregnant or
carry a pregnancy to term, as well as men who suffered from infertility, would
live without the families they imagined. Adoption became widespread over the
course of the twentieth century and offered a path to parenthood for some, but
many either had their attempts rejected by restrictive adoption regimes or
simply decided to forego parenting without the possibility of biological chil-
dren.
In the late twentieth century, assisted reproductive technologies (ART)
offered new hope to these individuals and, in the process, transformed practic-
130. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (2012), with id. § 1409(c).
131. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14-15, Lynch v. Morales-Santana, 136 S. Ct. 2545 (2016)
(No. 15-1191), 2016 WL 11570o6, at *14-15.
132. See Morales-Santana, 804 F.3 d at 524.
133. See Serena Mayeri, Marital Supremacy and the Constitution of the Nonmarital Family, 103 CA-
LIF. L. REv. 1277 (2015); Melissa Murray, What's So New About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM.
U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 387 (2012).
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es of family formation.134 Married heterosexual couples who in previous gener-
ations would have gone without children found opportunities for parenthood
through ART.1"s Use of donor sperm had for decades allowed women with in-
fertile husbands to have children -often without anyone but the doctor know-
ing that the child was not biologically related to the husband. 13 6 Now, women
who themselves struggled with infertility found hope in a variety of new tech-
niques. In vitro fertilization (IVF), in which fertilization occurs outside the
woman's body, allowed many women to carry and bear their own genetic chil-
dren.1 17 By separating gestation from genetics, IVF also facilitated new practic-
es of egg donation and gestational surrogacy."'
The use of ART soared in the first part of the twenty-first century."' Ap-
proximately sixty thousand live births resulted from IVF in 2014, a fifty percent
jump over the previous decade.140 The number of children born with donor
134. See Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 28 (2008). Research shows that women experiencing in-
fertility exhibit significant psychological distress. See Tara M. Cousineau & Alice D. Domar,
Psychological Impact of Infertility, 21 BEST PRAC. & RES. CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLO-
GY 293, 293-94 (2007); A.D. Domar et al., The Psychological Impact of Infertility: A Comparison
with Patients with Other Medical Conditions, 14 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLO-
GY 45, 49 (1993).
135. Recent estimates suggest that around six percent of married couples in the United States
experience infertility. See Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, National Survey of Family Growth:
Infertility, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nsfg/key
-statistics/i.htm#infertility [http://perma.cc/V3WN-T2QW].
136. See Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A Close Look at Artificial
Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1035, 1072 (2002).
137. See John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the
New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 942-43 (1986). The first IVF child was born in
1978, but it took years before the procedure became more successful and accessible.
138. See SARAH FRANKLIN, BIOLOGICAL RELATIVES: IVF, STEM CEILS, AND THE FUTURE OF KINSHIP
(2013); CHARiS THOMPSON, MAKING PARENTS: THE ONTOLOGICAL CHOREOGRAPHY OF RE-
PRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (2005). With the assistance of an egg donor, infertile women
could become mothers to children they carried and birthed. And women who could not car-
ry a pregnancy but desired a child with a genetic link to themselves or their husbands found
hope in gestational surrogacy. Unlike a traditional surrogate, a gestational surrogate carries a
child genetically related to another woman - either the intended mother or an egg donor.
139. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2005 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
SUCCESS RATES: NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS 61 fig.49 (Oct. 2007),
http://www.cdc.gov/art/Archived-PDF-Reports/20o5ART5o8.pdf [http://perma.cc/7NKM
-EBSR].
140. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 139, at 11 (reporting 38,910 births
resulting from ART cycles in 2005); NAT'L CTR. FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION &
HEALTH PROMOTION, 2014 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY NATIONAL SUMMARY RE-
PORT 3 (Oct. 2016), http://www.cdc.gov/art/pdf/2o14-report/art-2014-national-summary
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gametes grew,141 as did the number born to gestational surrogates.14 While
married different-sex couples were the first to use ART, others eventually
turned to ART to form less traditional families. Single women used donor in-
semination to become mothers, while gays and lesbians engaged in donor in-
semination, IVF, and surrogacy to have children.143 As the social meaning and
-report.pdf [http://perma.cc/RZ62-8BRS] (reporting 57,323 births resulting from ART cy-
cles in 2014); see also NAT'L CTR. FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH
PROMOTION, 2013 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT 49
(Oct. 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/art/pdf/2013-report/art_2013_national summary-report
.pdf [http://perma.cc/MYUS-87Z5] (noting an upward trend in infants born using ART).
141. Between five thousand and ten thousand live births with donor eggs occur annually. Com-
pare NAT'L CTR. FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH PROMOTION, 2012 ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT 47 (Nov. 2014), http://www
.cdc.gov/art/pdf/2012-report/national-summary/art_2o12national-summary report.pdf
[http://perma.cc/SC7K-PN2C] (noting approximately 5,600 births based on data regarding
only fresh donor-egg embryos), with National Summary Report, SOC'Y FOR ASSISTED RE-
PROD. TECH. (2016), http://www.sartcorsonline.com/rptCSR PublicMultYear.aspx [http://
perma.cc/4ZMP-87HU] (in an organization representing 90 percent of ART clinics in the
U.S., estimating that its members started approximately 9,ooo IVF cycles with fresh and
frozen donor-egg and embryos, resulting in about 2,500 live births). Accurate data on chil-
dren conceived with donor sperm are not available. One recent survey suggests approxi-
mately 4,000 to 5,ooo births per year. See Sperm Banking Background Fundamentals - Statistics
& Limitations, CRYOGENIC LABORATORIES (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.cryolab.com/blog/?p
=842 [http://perma.cc/WM3E-UEWL].
142. Reliable data on gestational surrogacy are not available, but the rise in the number of chil-
dren born through the process is clear. See S. A. Grover et al., Analysis of a Cohort of Gay Men
Seeking Help with Third-Party Reproduction, 98 FERTILITY & STERILITY (Supplement) S4 8,
S48 (2012). Limited data from the Centers for Disease Control and the Society for Assisted
Reproductive Technology indicate "an exploding market, one that nearly doubled from 2004
to 2008, producing a total of 5,238 babies over just four years." See Magdalina Gugucheva,
Surrogacy in America, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS 7 (2010), http://www.councilfor
responsiblegenetics.org/pagedocuments/LAeVeJoAlM.pdf [http://perma.cc/H537-QF9T].
143. See MAUREEN SULLIVAN, THE FAMILY OF WOMAN (2004); Dorothy A. Greenfeld & Emre Seli,
Gay Men Choosing Parenthood Through Assisted Reproduction: Medical and Psychosocial Consid-
erations, 95 FERTILITY & STERILITY 225, 225 (2011). While approximately twenty percent of
same-sex-couple households include children, these children may be biological, stepchil-
dren, or adopted. Gary J. Gates, LGBT Parenting in the United States, WILLIAMS INST.
1 (Feb. 2013), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGBT-Parenting
.pdf [http://perma.cc/86S6-R4KB]. ART has become more common as fewer same-sex
couples raise children from previous different-sex relationships and more form "intentional
or planned LGB-parent families." Abbie E. Goldberg et al., Research Report on LGB-Parent
Families, WILLIAMS INST. 5 (July 2014), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content
/uploads/1gb-parent-families-july-2o14.pdf [http://perma.cc/23Y7-2H44].
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practical import of ART shifted, questions of parental recognition began to im-
plicate emergent commitments to gender and sexual-orientation equality.144
This Part examines the law's response to parent-child relationships formed
through ART, bringing together developments across jurisdictions and involv-
ing a range of family arrangements made possible by donor insemination, IVF,
and gestational surrogacy. In some states, family law has aggressively attempt-
ed to adapt to developments in parenthood by broadly facilitating family for-
mation through ART and legally recognizing a range of nonbiological par-
ents.145 But the focus here is on a wider swath of jurisdictions, where law has
rendered some individuals legal parents to their children while leaving others
legal strangers. 146 Accordingly, having surveyed the law across all jurisdictions,
144. Whereas different-sex couples often use ART to form biological parent-child relationships,
same-sex couples often use ART to form less traditional family bonds, defying the hetero-
sexual, gendered, and biological norms of parenting. In the 198os and 199os, powerful cri-
tiques of ART raised equality concerns with respect to sex, race, and class. See, e.g., GENA
COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE 2-3 (1985); JANICE G. RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOMBS 30-31
(1993); BARBARA ICATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD 22-23 (1989); Dorothy Rob-
erts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 209, 210 (1995). Those critiques focused largely on
heterosexual family formation and the prioritization of what Dorothy Roberts called "the
genetic tie." See id. at 213 (exploring "how race, along with gender, continues to determine
the meaning of the genetic tie"). Even as practices of ART emphasize biological connections,
they also destabilize the importance of biological contributions - and do so most powerfully
with single and same-sex parenting. Accordingly, an understanding of how ART has facili-
tated family formation that challenges traditional norms may suggest the need to qualify
equality-inflected critiques of ART. Indeed, this Article's relatively affirmative treatment of
ART finds common ground with Roberts's critique of ART specifically with respect to the
call to "reconceive the genetic tie as a nonexclusive bond that forms the basis for a more im-
portant social relationship between parents and children." Id. at 214. Importantly, the point
here is not to suggest that equality concerns no longer support critiques of ART, but rather
to show how equality concerns also came to animate pro-ART efforts. For other work in this
vein, see Cahill, supra note 13, at 683-85; Martha M. Ertman, What's Wrong with a Parenthood
Market? A New and Improved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REv. 1, 37 (2003) ("One
important effect of new family forms is that they increase agency for women and gay people
generally by undermining patriarchal understandings of family.").
145. See Janet L. Dolgin, An Emerging Consensus: Reproductive Technology and the Law, 23 VT. L.
REv. 225, 226 (1998).
146. In the vast majority of situations involving ART, the various parties agree on who should
parent the child. Courts need not decide on conflicting claims between those with biological
and social claims to recognition. Instead, an individual who seeks parentage on social
grounds does so in circumstances in which another individual with a biological connection
does not seek parentage. In other words, the intended parent understands herself as a par-
ent, and the gestational surrogate or gamete donor does not. Yet law may assign parentage
in ways that diverge from these shared understandings.
In a relatively small number of cases, the parties disagree, or disagreement emerges
over time. Law may then assign parentage in ways that match some of the parties' wishes
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this Part attempts to capture approaches that are representative, focusing on
majority positions and clear modern trends, rather than attending to less com-
mon statutory regimes and judicial decisions. 14 7
The account presented here is structured around a set of related distinc-
tions that shape legal recognition: marital and nonmarital parent-child rela-
tionships, biological and nonbiological parent-child relationships, motherhood
and fatherhood, and different-sex and same-sex couples.148 It shows how, even
as principles of gender and sexual-orientation equality have animated shifts in
parental recognition, parentage law continues to draw distinctions that carry
forward legacies of inequality embedded in frameworks forged in earlier eras.
As Part I explained, the common law organized parentage around the gen-
der-hierarchical relationship of marriage. The marital presumption historically
facilitated the parental recognition of men who were not in fact biological fa-
thers. When, in the second half of the twentieth century, the Court intervened
to protect nonmarital parent-child relationships on constitutional grounds, it
made biological connection necessary for legal recognition. Yet biological con-
nection operated differently for mothers and fathers. For the Court, gestation
and birth inevitably produced legal motherhood. Unmarried biological fathers,
in contrast, were required to demonstrate the social bonds of parenthood to
have legally protected rights. Inside marriage, men could achieve legal
parenthood without biological parenthood. Outside marriage, men could assert
biological parenthood but still lack legal parenthood. For women, in contrast,
biological and legal parental ties traveled together, both inside and outside
marriage." 9
As this Part shows, the gender-differentiated logic of both the common-law
approach and its constitutional repudiation have structured law's response to
but not others. Given that this Part focuses substantially on litigated cases, it includes some
cases involving disagreement; but these cases represent only a sliver of families formed
through ART.
147. The legal landscape includes both legislation and adjudication. While statutes demonstrate
developments in the law, cases provide a fuller picture of the reasoning that shapes the law
of parental recognition. In addition, given that legislatures in most states have been slow to
respond to ART, judicial decisions have been critical drivers of legal change in this area.
Nonetheless, this Part does not include the kinds of parentage judgments that some trial
courts have been willing to issue without explicit statutory or judicial authority.
148. To deliberately form legally recognized dual-parent families, same-sex couples engage in
ART or adoption (either jointly or through adoption by one parent of the other parent's
child). Accordingly, for same-sex couples, attention to ART encompasses the mode of family
formation - nonadoptive parentage - that is the focus of this Article.
149. See DOLGIN, supra note 1, at 1o8 ("Biology, in short, gives men options .... Mothers, wed or
unwed, do not have the same choices.").
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ART. When the law accommodated the use of donor insemination by married
different-sex couples, it openly acknowledged and expanded marriage's capaci-
ty to derive legal fatherhood purely from social arrangements. Courts and leg-
islatures treated the man married to the biological mother as the child's father.
While legal fatherhood's nonbiological capacity inside marriage expanded,
legal motherhood largely remained a biological status -even as ART compli-
cated motherhood's biological basis. A woman who gives birth to a child con-
ceived with a donor egg is a legal parent; the biological facts of gestation and
birth, along with her intention to be the child's mother, render her the legal
mother. Similarly, a woman who uses her own egg but engages a gestational
surrogate to carry the child is a legal parent; the genetic contribution and her
intention to be the child's mother render her the legal mother. Social aspects of
parenthood now shape determinations of motherhood, but, unlike fatherhood,
not in ways that dislodge parental recognition from biological connection.
When a woman both engages a gestational surrogate and uses a donor egg, the
law often fails to treat her as a legal mother. As this Part makes clear, men
without biological ties attain parentage by virtue of marriage to the biological
mother, but women without biological ties do not attain parentage by virtue of
marriage to the biological father.
The common law organized parentage around a legal relationship -
marriage -that was not only gender-hierarchical but also exclusively hetero-
sexual. As Part I explained, when courts and legislatures endeavored to protect
nonmarital parent-child relationships, they turned explicitly to biological con-
nection as a basis for parental recognition. But tethering parenthood to biologi-
cal ties perpetuates the exclusion of same-sex couples, who necessarily include
a parent without a gestational or genetic connection to the child.
Marriage has intervened in ways imagined to remedy the struggles of
same-sex couples.so Indeed, the Court in Obergefell focused on parenthood,
specifically listing "birth ... certificates; ... and child custody, support, and
visitation" as "aspects of marital status" that would now be open to same-sex
couples."' Yet, as this Part shows, the law has accommodated same-sex parent-
ing within a framework shaped by the gender-differentiated, heterosexual fam-
ily- recognizing nonbiological parents in married same-sex couples to the ex-
tent they satisfy criteria used to identify legal fathers. Women, not men, in
same-sex couples gain access to parentage through marriage. The woman mar-
150. See, e.g., Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E. 3 d 488, 504 (N.Y. 2016) (Pigott, J., concur-
ring) (claiming that with marriage equality, " [s]ame-sex couples are now afforded the same
legal rights as heterosexual couples and are no longer barred from establishing the types of
legal parent-child relationships that the law had previously disallowed").
151. Obergefellv. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015).
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ried to the biological mother can be recognized as the legal parent by virtue of
her marriage. Men in same-sex couples find themselves in the same position as
women in different-sex couples. Neither can attain parentage by virtue of mar-
riage to the biological father, and both struggle for parental recognition in the
absence of a biological connection to the child.
Ultimately, this Part's treatment of parental recognition and ART reveals a
critical dynamic: courts and legislatures continue to structure the legal family
around a biological mother. Biological fathers can be replaced-by either wom-
en or men who make purely social claims to parental recognition-yet biologi-
cal mothers remain necessary. Within this regime, women who separate moth-
erhood from biological ties and men who parent with a same-sex partner often
go without legal recognition. To uncover this dynamic, this Part begins with
donor insemination and then moves through family formation made possible
by IVF, concluding with egg-donor gestational surrogacy.
A. Donor Insemination
The first and most basic form of assisted reproduction, donor insemina-
tion, forced law to confront situations in which the biological and social dimen-
sions of parenthood point in different directions. While the identity of the bio-
logical and legal mother was clear, law struggled with determinations of who, if
anyone, would be the child's second parent. Ultimately, courts and legislatures
expanded the marital presumption's capacity to obscure biological facts in favor
of social arrangements that privileged marriage. With donor insemination, law
treated the man married to the biological mother as the child's father.
As this Section shows, same-sex family formation eventually injected con-
temporary questions of equality into the regulation of donor insemination, as
women in same-sex couples sought legal recognition for the nonbiological
mother. In the absence of adoption by the nonbiological mother, parental
recognition largely emerged from presumptions of parentage applicable only to
married couples; the birth mother's legal spouse could be recognized as a legal
parent regardless of sex or sexual orientation. But outside marriage, same-sex
couples continued to struggle for parental recognition; the nonbiological
mother would rarely be recognized as the child's legal parent at the time of the
child's birth. For those outside marriage, biological connections continued to
structure parental recognition -rendering same-sex couples, who are not simi-
larly situated to different-sex couples with respect to biological parenthood, es-
pecially vulnerable.
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1. Diferent-Sex Couples, Marriage, and Nonbiological Fathers
Donor insemination, which law first confronted within the marital family,
exposed the confused state of the marital presumption, which assumed biologi-
cal paternity but could recognize relationships that deviated from biological
facts. Donor insemination made such deviations deliberate, even if not plainly
visible.
Courts and lawmakers initially responded by condemning donor insemina-
tion as a threat to the "natural" family and rejecting application of the marital
presumption. Because the woman conceived with semen from another man,
she was thought to have committed adultery, and the resulting child was con-
sidered "illegitimate."152 This logic remained rooted in men's entitlements, and
specifically concerns with "the possibility of introducing into the family of the
husband a false strain of blood.""'
Despite this hostile legal backdrop, the practice of donor insemination be-
came more widespread. Beyond the couple and their doctor, few knew that a
child was conceived with donor sperm. Judges and lawmakers eventually re-
sponded and, by the mid-196os and early 1970s, began to expressly treat the
husband of a woman who conceived with donor sperm as the child's "lawful"
father.154 Following the 1973 UPA, most states adopted statutory provisions
providing that marriage to the mother and consent to assisted reproduction
yielded parental recognition for the husband.' The husband's consent
demonstrated his willingness to introduce another man's "blood" into his fami-
ly line. At the same time, his recognition allowed the state to assure the child's
support from private sources. 15 6
Since most states, as well as the original UPA, limited donor-insemination
provisions to married couples, those provisions merely replicated the marital
presumption's logic."' In fact, in the many states that failed to enact donor-
152. See Doornbos v. Doornbos, 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (Ill. Super. Ct. 1954), appeal denied, 12 111. App.
2d 473 (1956); see also George P. Smith, II, Through a Test Tube Darkly: Artificial Insemination
and the Law, 67 MICH. L. REV. 127, 136 (1968).
153. See Allen D. Holloway, Artificial Insemination: An Examination of the Legal Aspects, 43 A.B.A. J.
1089, 1092 (1957).
154. See 1967 Olda. Sess. Laws 498 (codified at OiLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 551-53 (2014)); People v.
Sorensen, 437 P.2d 4 9 5 , 498 (Cal. 1968).
155. See, e.g., 1982 Idaho Sess. Laws 862 (codified at IDAHO CODE § 39-5405 (2016)).
156. See Sorensen, 4 3 7 P.2d 4 9 5 (finding criminal nonsupport).
157. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Between the Binaries: Exploring the Legal Boundaries of Nonanon-
ymous Sperm Donation, 49 FAM. L.Q. 93, 94 (2015). Even Harry Krause, the leading propo-
nent of removing marital-status distinctions in the regulation of parent-child relationships,
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insemination statutes, the husband of a woman giving birth to a child con-
ceived with donor sperm is presumed the child's legal father simply by virtue of
the marital presumption.' Marriage had always served as an imperfect proxy
for biological paternity. But by explicitly accepting donor insemination, law
embraced social fatherhood in ways that rendered marriage not a proxy but a
substitute for biological paternity.
2. Same-Sex Couples, Marriage, and Nonbiological Mothers
By the 198os and 199os, donor insemination furnished lesbian couples a
relatively accessible path to child-rearing. Excluded from marriage, same-sex
couples inhabited a nonmarital parentage regime that mostly turned on biolog-
ical connections. Since only one of the women would have a biological connec-
tion to the child, the other found herself a legal stranger upon the child's birth.
For many years, courts in most states refused to provide comprehensive legal
recognition to the nonbiological mother.5 9 Over time, in an effort to provide
some protections to same-sex parents, some states furnished legal recognition
to nonbiological mothers even in the absence of second-parent adoption. 160 Yet
even in these states, legal recognition did not arise at the child's birth and in-
stead required some period of parenting.161
By the 2000s, access to marriage became the chief test of equality for same-
sex couples, and was understood to protect not only their romantic bonds but
also their parent-child relationships. As same-sex couples gained entry to mar-
riage - first on a state-by-state basis, and then nationwide with Obergefell - they
began to press claims to parental recognition by virtue of their marital relation-
ships. Marriage, of course, had shown the capacity to allow individuals to
achieve parentage on social rather than biological grounds. While only men,
not women, had received parental recognition without a biological connection,
judges and lawmakers soon accommodated married women.
favored limiting ART to married couples and opposed commercial surrogacy. See Harry D.
Krause, Artificial Conception: Legislative Approaches, 19 FAM. LQ. 185, 197-200 (1985).
158. See NeJaime, supra note 16, at 1245 n-354.
159. As Susan Dalton observed, courts in California, for instance, granted "legal parent status to
non-biological fathers [in different-sex couples] while refusing similar status to non-
biological mothers [in same-sex couples]." Susan E. Dalton, From Presumed Fathers to Lesbi-
an Mothers: Sex Discrimination and the Legal Construction of Parenthood, 9 MICH. J. GENDER &
L. 261, 262-63 (2003).
16o. See NeJaime, supra note 24.
161. See infra note 182. But see Shineovich v. Kemp, 214 P.3d 29, 40 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (applying
donor-insemination statute to unmarried same-sex couples).
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Courts and legislatures adapted donor-insemination regulations governing
married different-sex couples to married same-sex couples. Provisions recog-
nizing the mother's husband as the legal father can similarly treat the mother's
wife as the "natural," and thus legal, parent. 162 While Appendix A shows that
only about a third of states with donor-insemination statutes currently main-
tain gender-neutral provisions,163 courts that have considered the issue in other
states have, almost without exception, applied these statutes to married same-
sex couples. 164
In many states, such application has been aided by explicit gender-
neutrality directives modeled on the UPA. The original UPA provides that in
actions "to determine the existence or nonexistence of a mother and child rela-
tionship[,] [i]nsofar as practicable, the provisions ... applicable to the father
and child relationship apply." 165 The revised UPA includes a similar directive,
stating that the provisions "relating to determination of paternity apply to de-
terminations of maternity." 16 6 While the UPA drafters viewed "cases involving
disputed maternity [as] extraordinarily rare, 16 7 same-sex couples tested the
reach of these gender-neutrality directives. With marriage equality, courts be-
gan to treat the nonbiological mother like a legal "father." Gender neutrality
furthered principles of not only sex but also sexual-orientation equality.
Strikingly, specific donor-insemination statutes have become in some ways
ancillary, as states have simply applied the marital presumption to lesbian cou-
ples. 168 A New York court, for instance, determined that common-law and
statutory presumptions of parentage must be interpreted in a "gender-neutral"
manner in light of the onset of marriage equality, and so concluded that "the
child of either partner in a married same-sex couple will be presumed to be the
child of both, even though the child is not genetically linked to both par-
162. See Della Corte v. Ramirez, 961 N.E.2d 6oi, 603 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012); see also Nejaime,
supra note 16, at 1244 1-353 (giving further examples of states extending parentage provi-
sions to same-sex spouses of women).
163. See infra Appendix A (listing twelve gender-neutral donor insemination statutes); Appendix
B (listing thirty-eight state donor-insemination statutes).
164. See infra Appendix A. But see Smith v. Pavan, 505 S.W.3 d 169 (Ark. 2016) (declining to rec-
ognize same-sex spouses of women on Arkansas birth certificates).
i6. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 21 (UNIF. LAw COMM'N 1973).
166. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § io6 (UNIF. LAw COMM'N 2002).
167. Id. § 1o6 cmt.; see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 21 cmt. (UNIF. LAw COMM'N 1973) (declaring
that "it is not believed that cases of this nature will arise frequently").
168. See infra Appendix A; see also Nejaime, supra note 16, at 1242-48 (describing states' different
levels of receptivity to applying the marital presumption to same-sex spouses).
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ents. 16 9 As Appendix A shows, some state legislatures have revised not only
their donor-insemination provisions but also their marital presumptions to
recognize that the person married to the "woman giving birth" or the "natural
mother" is presumed to be the child's legal parent. 170 In these states, the mari-
tal presumption, long capable of hiding contrary biological facts, expressly em-
braces purely social aspects of parenthood.1 7 1 If law is not pretending that the
individual presumed to be the parent is the biological parent, it no longer
seems necessary that that individual be a man. Now, parenthood for both men
and women can derive from marriage to the biological mother.
While many of these developments emerged solely as a matter of family
law, constitutional equality commitments also drove judicial decisions applying
the marital presumption to same-sex couples. After Obergefell, courts have held
that donor-insemination provisions must allow the biological mother's wife to
be treated as the child's natural parent, just like a husband would be. 1 72 Several
courts have also held that equal protection requires the general marital pre-
sumption to apply to lesbian couples.17 1
Nonetheless, the reach of the marital presumption is far from settled.174
Even though courts considering the issue have largely required application of
the marital presumption to lesbian couples, some state governments continue
to defend parenthood as a biological fact and assert that the marital presump-
tion serves as a proxy for biological parenthood. Yet these states have allowed
married men in different-sex couples to use the presumption to derive legal fa-
169. Wendy G-M v. Erin G-M, 985 N.Y.S.2d 845, 860-61 (Sup. Ct. 2014). Other New York courts
have provided less clear guidance on the presumption's application. See, e.g., Q.M. v. B.C.,
995 N.Y.S.2d 470, 474 (Fam. Ct. 2014) ("It is this court's view that the Marriage Equality
Act does not require the court to ignore the obvious biological differences between husbands
and wives .... Thus [the law] ... does not preclude differentiation based on essential biol-
ogy.").
170. Fewer than ten states have legislated explicitly in this way as a means of addressing same-sex
couples. See infra Appendix A. While a few additional states maintain a statutory marital
presumption that does not include gender-specific language, these provisions predate mar-
riage for same-sex couples and were not enacted to address same-sex family formation.
171. See NeJaime, supra note 16, at 1240-49.
172. See, e.g., Roe v. Patton, No. 2:15-cv-00253-DB, 2015 WL 4476734 (D. Utah July 22, 2015)
(holding on federal constitutional grounds).
173. See, e.g., Henderson v. Adams, No. 1:15-cv-oo22o-TWP-MJD, 2016 WL 3548645 (S.D. Ind.
June 30, 2016) (holding on federal constitutional grounds); McLaughlin v. Jones, No. 2 CA-
SA 2016-0035, 2016 WL 5929205 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2016) (same); Gartner v. Iowa
Dep't of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335 (Iowa 2013) (holding on equal protection grounds
based on lowa's state constitution). But see Smith v. Pavan, 505 S.W.3 d 169 (Ark. 2016).
174. See NeJaime, supra note 16, at 1245-46.
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therhood of children conceived through donor insemination.1 7 ' Now, when
confronted with same-sex couples who make deviations from biology obvious,
these states have struggled to frame this nonbiological application to different-
sex couples as an exception to be minimized, rather than extended.
Courts generally have responded skeptically to these resistant states. For
example, a federal district court in Indiana recently considered a number of
cases in which state officials expressly told married same-sex couples they could
not both be listed on the birth certificate and that the nonbiological mother
would have to adopt her child. 1 76 Repudiating the state's actions, the court
ruled that Indiana cannot offer mothers with different-sex spouses the "legal
fiction" facilitated by the marital presumption but withhold that "legal fiction"
from mothers with same-sex spouses. 177 The marital presumption had become
a critical site for the promotion of sex and sexual-orientation equality.
3. Donor Insemination Outside Marriage
For married couples using donor insemination, the law has increasingly
recognized their claims to parentage. Both nonbiological fathers in different-
sex couples and nonbiological mothers in same-sex couples attain parentage by
virtue of marriage to the biological mother. While parentage inside marriage
has tracked individuals' expectations about their parent-child bonds, parentage
outside marriage in the context of donor insemination often has not.
As Appendix B shows, most states draw marital-status distinctions in their
treatment of donor insemination. Spouses, not unmarried partners, are recog-
nized as legal parents of children conceived with donor sperm.17 ' Further, un-
der the original UPA and the laws of many states, sperm donors are divested of
rights and responsibilities only if they donate sperm for use by a married wom-
an.1 7 ' The nonrecognition of unmarried nonbiological coparents and the legal
recognition of sperm donors both complicate ART for unmarried individuals
and threaten the stability of nonmarital families.
175. See, e.g., Henderson, 2016 WL 3548645 at *9.
176. Id. at *4.
177. Id. at *13.
178. Whether through explicit legislation or a lack of legislation, this is the case in more than for-
ty states. See infra Appendix B. Fewer than ten states have explicit provisions allowing for
the unmarried partner's recognition. (These are the states in Appendix B with a statute
regulating donor insemination and no mark in the first column. See infra Appendix B.).
179. This remains the case in more than half the states, with only about fifteen states explicitly
providing that a man who donates sperm to a woman who is not his wife is not the child's
legal father. See infra Appendix B.
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The nonrecognition of nonbiological unmarried parents is particularly
problematic for same-sex couples, who are not similarly situated to different-
sex couples as a matter of biological parenthood. Same-sex couples necessarily
include a parent without a gestational or genetic tie to the child,18 0 and thus are
especially vulnerable in a parentage regime where recognition turns on biologi-
cal connection. Yet courts have generally held that laws meet equality commit-
ments as long as a nonbiological lesbian coparent in an unmarried same-sex
couple is treated the same as a nonbiological father in an unmarried different-
sex couple."' In most jurisdictions, neither of these individuals ordinarily en-
joys parentage without adoption.182
Lacking statutory or equitable paths to recognition, the unmarried
coparent, even after years of parenting, generally finds no relief in constitution-
al doctrine.' For instance, in Russell v. Pasik, a lesbian couple had four chil-
dren with the same donor sperm, with each woman giving birth to two chil-
dren.184 They raised the children together for years, but after the couple's
relationship dissolved, only the biological parent-child relationships enjoyed
legal recognition. The Florida appellate court rejected the argument that each
iso. To be clear, that parent may have a biological relationship because of a relative's gamete do-
nation or gestational role, but does not have a legally cognizable gestational or genetic con-
nection.
181. See In re Madrone, 350 P.3d 495, 5ol (Or. Ct. App. 2015) (reasoning that because the donor-
insemination statute "would not apply to an opposite-sex couple that made that choice [not
to marry], it follows that the statute also should not apply to same-sex couples that make
the same choice"); State ex rel. D.R.M., 34 P.3 d 887, 892-93 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (reason-
ing that the nonbiological lesbian mother "is not being treated differently than an unmarried
man under similar facts" and is therefore not being denied equal protection "based
on ... gender or sexual orientation"); see also Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E. 3 d
488, 504 (N.Y. 2016) (Pigott, J., concurring) (asserting that "an unmarried individual who
lacks a biological or adoptive connection to a child [born outside marriage] does not have
standing ... regardless of gender or sexual orientation").
182. More than half of the states have mechanisms - equitable or statutory- that allow an un-
married nonbiological parent to obtain custody or visitation. See infra Appendix C. At times,
these paths provide only some parental rights, or fail to treat the unmarried nonbiological
parent as standing in parity with the legal parent. These state mechanisms also usually re-
quire an extensive period of parenting, thus leaving the unmarried nonbiological parent a
stranger at the time of the child's birth and for some significant period afterwards. Further,
they ordinarily require a judicial determination, leading unmarried nonbiological parents to
rely on courts to obtain custody or visitation.
183. Once a nonbiological parent qualifies as a legal parent as a family law matter, she has consti-
tutional parental rights, S.Y. v. S.B., 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 2011), but this
is distinct from the idea that the nonbiological parent has a constitutional interest in being
recognized as a parent.
184. Russell v. Pasik, 178 So. 3d 55, 55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
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woman had constitutionally protected rights with respect to each child.' The
court acknowledged the significance of the social performance of parenthood,
explaining that "the act of assuming parental responsibilities and actively car-
ing for a child is sufficient to develop constitutional rights in favor of the par-
ent."1 8 6 But, recalling the earlier cases on unmarried fathers, it then explained
that this path to parental rights springs only from biology: " [It is the biological
connection between parent and child that 'gives rise to an inchoate right to be a
parent that may develop into a protected fundamental constitutional right
based on the actions of the parent."'1 17 Each woman enjoyed a legally protected
relationship only with the children to whom she gave birth.
Equality for same-sex couples had been channeled through marriage and
its ability to legally recognize nonbiological fathers. Most states grafted the two
legal regimes that had formed to regulate parentage - marriage and biology-
onto donor insemination and thus sharply differentiated between marital and
nonmarital families. A man, and now a woman, can be a legal parent of a child
conceived with donor sperm if that man or woman is married to the biological
mother. In an effort to protect nonmarital parent-child relationships that had
been excluded by the common law's marital order, courts and legislatures had
turned explicitly to biological connection as a basis for parental recognition.
But tethering parenthood to biological ties perpetuates same-sex couples' ex-
clusion. The unmarried mother's partner, with neither a biological nor marital
basis for parental recognition, will ordinarily be a legal stranger upon the
child's birth, even if she intends to parent the child and does in fact parent the
child.
B. In Vitro Fertilization, Egg Donation, and Gestational Surrogacy
While donor insemination challenged the relationship between the biologi-
cal fact of paternity and the social role of fatherhood, IVF, in which the egg is
fertilized outside the woman's body, challenged the relationship between the
biological facts of maternity- gestation and genetics-and the social role of
motherhood.' By separating gestation from genetics, IVF made biological
connection itself a more complex marker of parenthood. The biological fact of
185. See id. at 6o.
186. Id. (quoting D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320, 338 (Fla. 2013)).
187. Id.
188. See DOLGIN, supra note 1, at 3 (arguing that "it is no longer possible to judge questions about
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motherhood had always followed seamlessly from birth, but now a woman
could give birth to a child genetically related to another woman. Of course,
many women used IVF in ways that allowed them to give birth to their own
genetic children. But the technology also facilitated important new practices -
egg (and embryo) donation, gestational surrogacy, and "co-maternity" -that
divided biological maternity across two women.
Courts and legislatures, this Section shows, navigated these new situations
in ways animated by commitments to gender and sexual-orientation equality.
Women, they recognized, could attain legal motherhood based on birth or ge-
netics, and, correspondingly, could separate the physical facts of pregnancy and
birth from the social role of motherhood. The legal status of motherhood fol-
lowed not simply from the biological fact of maternity but from the social per-
formance of parenthood. Not only could women in different-sex couples
achieve parental recognition based on birth or genetics, but women in same-sex
couples could each achieve parental recognition by having one woman be the
genetic mother and the other be the gestational mother. Nevertheless, even as
social markers of parenthood became critical to legal determinations of moth-
erhood, a biological connection -whether gestation or genetics - remained crit-
ical to legal motherhood. Law continued to ground motherhood, unlike father-
hood, in a biological tie.
1. Donor Eggs and Birth Mothers
The use of donor eggs or embryos did not ordinarily provoke controversy.
Since the woman giving birth was the intended mother, others would rarely
know she was not genetically related to the child. When disputes arose, they
often occurred upon dissolution of a relationship, when the birth mother's
husband or partner (and the child's biological father) attempted to use the
mother's lack of genetic connection to deny her parental status.
As courts and legislatures approached these conflicts, social factors that had
begun to shape legal fatherhood in the regulation of donor insemination pro-
vided guidance. Consider a representative case from Tennessee."' Cindy and
Charles, an unmarried couple in their mid-forties, decided to have children to-
gether.o Cindy, who already had children, was concerned about the viability
of her eggs and thus turned to donor eggs and IVE."' After Cindy gave birth to
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triplets, she and Charles raised the children together.19 2 When the couple later
broke up, Charles attempted to use Cindy's lack of genetic connection to de-
prive her of parental rights.19
The Tennessee Supreme Court rejected his argument. In recognizing Cindy
as the legal mother, the court focused on the fact that both she and Charles in-
tended that she be the children's legal mother. The court looked to the state's
donor-insemination statute to support its consideration of intent, explaining
how that statute "confers parental status on a husband even though the child
conceived in his wife via artificial insemination is not necessarily genetically re-
lated to him."194 So too could Cindy, not genetically related to the children, be
their legal mother. Other courts analogized egg (and embryo) donation to
sperm donation, 95 and, as Appendix D shows, many states codified this re-
sult-divesting egg and embryo donors of parental rights and rendering the
intended (birth) mother the legal mother. 196
Nonetheless, there was an important difference between Cindy and a man
whose wife conceives with donor sperm. The birth mother who uses donor
eggs still claims a biological, even if not genetic, connection to the child. As the
Tennessee court noted, Cindy claimed maternity based on the biological mark-
er relied upon in the common law-birth. And that fact was critical to the
court's judgment.' 9 Indeed, parentage laws across the country continue to
provide that maternity may be established by giving birth. 98 Unlike men
whose wives use donor insemination, women using donor eggs turn to intent
as a supplement to, rather than substitute for, biological markers of
parenthood. For these women, gestation and birth constitute biological mater-
nity, and thus form the basis of a claim to parentage. Intention-a social crite-
rion-supports parental recognition that follows from this biological connec-
tion. 1 9 9
192. Id. at 718.
193. Id. at 718-19.
194. Id. at 728.
195. See, e.g., Okoli v. Okoli, 963 N.E.2d 730, 734 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012).
196. See infra Appendix D.
197. In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3 d at 729 (concluding that "gestation is an important factor for estab-
lishing legal maternity").
198. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.02 (LexisNexis 2015) ("The parent and child relation-
ship between a child and the child's natural mother may be established by proof of her hav-
ing given birth to the child. . . .").
199. See McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 480-81 (App. Div. 1994) (holding that when
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2. Gestational Surrogacy and Genetic Mothers
In contrast to the relatively few disputes involving donor eggs, the use of
IVF in surrogacy provoked greater controversy by disturbing the foundational
assumption that the woman giving birth is the child's mother. When surrogacy
first attracted national attention with New Jersey's infamous Baby M case2 00 in
the 198os, the focus was on traditional surrogacy, in which the surrogate is both
the child's gestational and genetic mother. Courts and commentators attended
to the rights of the surrogate, not the nonbiological intended mother.20 1 The
intended mother was simply a legal stranger who, even if surrogacy were ac-
cepted, would have to adopt the child.20 2
After the New Jersey Supreme Court repudiated surrogacy in Baby M,
many state legislatures considered- and some passed- bans on the practice.203
At that time, sex-equality arguments animated the rejection of surrogacy.204
Judges and lawmakers, as well as scholars and activists, worried about the ex-
ploitation of women, the commodification of women's reproductive capacity,
and the deprivation of biological mothers' rights.205
As Elizabeth Scott has shown, views on surrogacy shifted over time for sev-
eral reasons. Some women's rights advocates pulled back after seeing argu-
ments against surrogacy invoked to restrict women's reproductive rights more
generally.20 6 Empirical work presented a more complicated picture of surrogacy
in the United States, one that bore little resemblance to predictions of coercion
and exploitation.207 And, most critically, the introduction of gestational surroga-
200. In re Baby M, 53 7 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
201. See, e.g., id. at 1241; Anita L. Allen, Privacy, Surrogacy, and the Baby M Case, 76 GEO. L.J. 1759,
1764 (1988).
202. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1241-46 (focusing on the status of the surrogate mother
and the biological father, and assuming that even if the surrogacy agreement were accepted,
the intended mother would have to adopt the child).
203. See Scott, supra note 12, at 117-20.
204. See COREA, supra note 144; MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES: THE TROU-
BLE WITH TRADE IN SEX, CHILDREN, BODY PARTS, AND OTHER THINGS (1996); ROTHMAN,
supra note 144. But see Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood: The Challenge for Feminists, in
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POLITICS AND PRIVACY 167, 179 (Larry Gostin ed., 1990).
205. See Doe v. Attorney General, 487 N.W.2d 484,487 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); MARTHAA. FIELD,
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 25-32 (1988); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 1oo
HARv. L. REV. 1849, 1925-36 (1987).
206. See Scott, supra note 12, at 144 (" [I]t became clear that support for restrictions on surrogacy
undermined pro-choice advocacy.").
207. See Hillary L. Berk, The Legalization of Emotion: Managing Risk by Managing Feelings in Con-
tracts for Surrogate Labor, 49 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 143 (2015); Olga B.A. van den Akker, Psycho-
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cy, in which the woman giving birth is not genetically related to the child, dra-
matically reshaped the regulatory framework and social norms governing sur-
rogacy.208 Not only did the surrogate have no genetic connection to the child,
but the intended mother could be the genetic mother. In response, courts soon
drew distinctions between traditional and gestational surrogacy in ways that
suggested that sex-equality commitments required acceptance of the practice.
In its landmark 1993 decision in Johnson v. Calvert,2 09 the California Su-
preme Court recognized a child's genetic intended mother as the legal mother,
over the objection of the gestational surrogate. The court articulated a doctrine
of intentional parenthood that would reverberate across the country.2 10 After
concluding that "both genetic consanguinity and giving birth [are] means of
establishing a mother and child relationship," the court reasoned that "when
the two means do not coincide in one woman, she who intended to procreate
the child-that is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she
intended to raise as her own-is the natural mother under California law."211
An intent-based rule, the court concluded, would "best promote certainty and
stability for the child."2 12
In the years that followed, other states recognized intended mothers as le-
gal mothers if they were also genetic mothers.213 Consider a case from Massa-
chusetts. Marla Culliton was "incapable of bearing and giving birth to a child
without unreasonable risk to her health."2 14 She and her husband, Steven, en-
tered into an arrangement with Melissa Carroll, a single woman who agreed to
serve as a gestational surrogate. The embryos gestated by Melissa were created
from Steven's sperm and Marla's ova, thus allowing the Cullitons to have their
own biological children. 215 All three parties sought the same relief in court, ask-
ing that Marla, and not Melissa, be recognized as the legal mother.2 16
social Aspects of Surrogate Motherhood, 13 HuM. REPROD. UPDATE 53 (20o6). Nonetheless, sur-
rogacy in other countries may raise greater concerns. See, e.g., AMRITA PANDE, WOMBS IN LA-
BOR: TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL SURROGACY IN INDIA (2014).
208. See Scott, supra note 12, at 139-42.
209. 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 783.
213. See, e.g., Nolan v. LaBree, 52 A. 3d 923 (Me. 2012); Culliton v. Beth Isr. Deaconess Med. Ctr.,
756 N.E.2d 1133 (Mass. 2001).
214. See Culliton, 756 N.E.2d at 1135 (quoting the gestational surrogacy contract in this case).
215. See id.
216. Id. at 1136.
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In an earlier case, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had required
adoption by an intended mother in circumstances involving traditional surro-
gacy.217 Yet with the new scenario presented by the Cullitons, the court ruled
that adoption would not be required in circumstances of gestational surrogacy
where the intended mother is the genetic mother.2 18 Marla would be the legal
mother, and Melissa would not.
Ordinarily, the child born to an unmarried woman-here, Melissa-would
not be a child of a marriage. But Marla's genetic connection changed that calcu-
lus. "While the twins technically were born out of wedlock," the court ex-
plained, they "were conceived by a married couple [and] [iin these circum-
stances the children should be presumed to be the children of marriage."2 19
Marla did not attain parentage by virtue of her marriage to Steven, the biologi-
cal father. Rather, Marla's genetic connection allowed her to claim legal moth-
erhood, and thus to claim the children as children of the marriage. With gesta-
tional surrogacy, a child could qualify as a "child of the marriage" based on the
mother's genetic connection, even if she did not give birth to the child.
Taken together, the emerging legal regulation of gestational surrogacy and
egg donation made motherhood a contested biological, social, and legal status.
Either gestation or genetics can be the basis of motherhood, and neither gesta-
tion nor genetics is itself necessary to motherhood. A woman can be a legal
mother when she gives birth to a child genetically related to another woman
(an egg donor), and a woman can be a legal mother when she is genetically re-
lated to a child carried by another woman (a gestational surrogate).22O
With the expansion of women's reproductive and parental options, moth-
erhood became contingent on social factors. Faced with two women who could
claim a biological tie to the child-one gestational, the other genetic-courts
turned to intent to determine which biological mother was the legal mother.
While the role of intent in some ways mirrored determinations of legal father-
hood in the donor-insemination context, the legal mother still enacted
parenthood biologically- either as a genetic progenitor or through pregnancy
and birth.22 1 Law could preserve motherhood as a biological status, even as it
217. See R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 796 (Mass. 1998).
218. See Culliton, 756 N.E.2d at 1137-38.
219. Id. at 1137.
220. Express statutory or appellate authority for the genetic intended mother's parental status
exists in a majority of states. See infra Appendix E. In other states, trial-court decisions (not
considered here) may also provide this result.
221. See Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional
Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGs L.J. 597, 621 (2002).
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resorted to social factors to determine its legal status. While social factors sup-
planted biological ties in the donor-insemination context, here they merely
supplemented biological factors.
The shifts charted above occurred as a matter of state parentage law. But in
those states that resisted shifts in maternity provoked by ART, courts turned to
state and federal constitutional law to credit the claims of genetic intended
mothers who had engaged a gestational surrogate. Sex equality, courts rea-
soned, required recognition of women who are genetic, but not gestational,
mothers. In particular, parentage for married genetic mothers followed from the
earlier recognition of unmarried biological fathers. In 1994, in Soos v. Superior
Court, a woman "unable to have children because of a partial hysterectomy"
had her eggs removed and fertilized with her husband's sperm and then en-
gaged a gestational surrogate to carry the pregnancy.222 The Arizona court ac-
cepted her challenge to the state's commercial-surrogacy prohibition, explain-
ing that, unlike a man, "[a] woman who may be genetically related to a child
has no opportunity to prove her maternity and is thereby denied the oppor-
tunity to develop the parent-child relationship."223
A similar result emerged in Utah in 2002. In J.R. v. Utah, a federal district
court found that giving conclusive effect to the maternity presumption based
on birth violated equal protection by treating "the genetic/biological father"
differently than "the genetic/biological mother."2 24 For the court, the genetic
intended mother was analogous to the unmarried father protected constitu-
tionally in the 1970s.2 2 5 By denying her the opportunity to establish parentage
based on her genetic tie and instead deeming the gestational surrogate the legal
mother, Utah's surrogacy regulation violated the woman's fundamental paren-
tal rights.226
For some, not only recognition of the intended genetic mother, but also
nonrecognition of the gestational surrogate, promoted sex equality. As a concur-
ring opinion in Soos observed:
[The gestational surrogate's] contract is to carry the child, not to nur-
ture or raise it. The [anti-surrogacy] statute thrusts these burdens on
her as a duty well beyond her contract . . . . [Bly automatically giv-
ing custody of the child to the surrogate, the statute ignores the very re-
222. 897 P.2d 1356, 1357-58 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
223. Id. at 1360.
224. 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1272 (D. Utah 2002).
225. Id. at 1285 (citing cases on unmarried fathers).
226. Id. at 1289.
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al possibility . . . that the gestational mother has probably no inter-
est whatsoever in raising the child .
Resonating with equality concerns audible in abortion rights jurisprudence, the
concurrence impugned the state's surrogacy ban for compelling a woman to as-
sume the social role of motherhood based on the physical fact of pregnancy.22 8
Strikingly, the recognition of genetic mothers as legal mothers -and the
corresponding nonrecognition of gestational surrogates - made reproductive
biology less central to legal parenthood, and thus reduced the salience of a key
justification for gender-differentiated parental recognition. As Part I showed,
when the Court repudiated the common law of "illegitimacy," it placed a pre-
mium on biological connection and differentiated between mothers and fathers
by resort to reproductive biology. Now, in the age of ART, the premium on bio-
logical connection aided the genetic intended mother, who claimed a constitu-
tional interest in parenthood that sprung from her genetic connection to the
child. Like the biological father from the 1970s, the genetic intended mother
grasped the opportunity to be a parent that her biological connection afforded.
Yet, by focusing on the rights of genetic intended mothers, courts cleaved
the biological process of reproduction from the legal status of motherhood,
thus weakening the justification for differences between motherhood and fa-
therhood. The genetic intended mother was like the unmarried biological fa-
ther. At the same time, the woman who gave birth -who had always been the
legal mother - no longer necessarily attained that status. The law's accommo-
dation of ART pulled back on the gender-differentiated understanding of
parenthood that the constitutional repudiation of "illegitimacy" had authorized
in the name of reproductive biology.
Developments in New York illustrate this point. In 1992, a court had reject-
ed the idea that maternity could be adjudicated in the context of gestational
surrogacy where the intended mother was the genetic mother; motherhood
was a biological fact grounded in birth.22 9 But courts in the state eventually al-
lowed for maternity determinations for genetic intended mothers. They moved
in this direction by applying sex-equality principles to questions of parental
227. 897 P.2d at 1361 (Gerber, J., concurring).
228. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992); see also Reva B. Siegel,
The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions,
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 1051 (pointing to Casey's "insistence that abortion regulation not
enforce the gender-stereotypical understandings of the separate spheres tradition").
229. See Andres A. v. Judith N., 591 N.Y.S.2d 946, 950 (Fan. Ct. 1992).
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recognition.2 3 0 In 2011, a court explained: "The issue here is not . . . whether
there is a distinction between males and females in the birth process, as there
most assuredly is one. Rather, the issue . . . is whether there is an impermissible
gender-based classification between parents after the birth of the child."23 1 Ges-
tational surrogacy's separation of gestation and genetics exposed the ways in
which biological differences in reproduction had naturalized legal differences in
parenthood. Now, sex-equality principles animated the rejection of reproductive
biology as a justification for gender-differentiated parental recognition.
3. Co-Maternity and Same-Sex Couples
The parental recognition of women who separated gestation from genetics
furthered commitments to equality based not only on sex but also on sexual
orientation. Some lesbian couples used IVF to produce "co-maternity," in which
one partner carries a child conceived with the other partner's egg. While co-
maternity cases arose only in a handful of states, the courts that addressed the
question found that the birth mother and genetic mother each qualified as legal
parents, even if on different facts they would be surrogates or egg donors.
Each woman could make a statutory claim to motherhood based on a bio-
logical criterion, and each could point to social factors -such as intent, family
formation, and parental conduct -to translate the biological fact of maternity
into the legal status of parentage.2 32 Even when courts ruled on statutory rather
than constitutional grounds, they understood their decisions to promote the
equal status of same-sex couples and their children.2 33 Recognition of two
mothers aligned both with gender-neutrality principles in state parentage
230. See Doe v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 782 N.Y.S.2d iso (Sup. Ct. 2004) (allowing postbirth relief
without adoption, provided the intended mother demonstrates that she is the genetic moth-
er).
231. T.V. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Health, 929 N.Y.S.2d 139, 152 (App. Div. 2011).
232. See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 681 (Cal. 2005) (reasoning that thoughJohnson declared
that a child can have "only one natural mother," a child can have two natural mothers in the
context of same-sex couples); St. Mary v. Damon, 309 P.3 d 1027, 1029, 1035 (Nev. 2013) (re-
versing the district court's ruling that the birth mother was a surrogate and instructing the
district court to "consider the parentage statutes with respect to [women's] testimonies re-
garding their intent in creating the child and the nature of their relationship to one anoth-
er").
233. See St. Mary, 309 P.3 d at 1033.
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codes and with commitments to sexual-orientation equality expressed in legis-
lation recognizing the rights of same-sex couples.2 34
Constitutional principles also protected the genetic mother's parental inter-
ests. Courts found that preventing her from proving maternity constituted im-
permissible sex or sexual-orientation discrimination,23 5 and deprived her of a
protected liberty interest generated by her biological connection.23 6 The genetic
mother was like the unmarried biological father recognized by the Court in the
1970s. By virtue of her biological tie, she was uniquely situated "to grasp the
opportunity" to be a parent.2 3 7
C. Egg-Donor Gestational Surrogacy
This Part has shown how courts and legislatures responded to ART in ways
animated by emergent commitments to sex and sexual-orientation equality, yet
did so by reasoning within frameworks of parental recognition organized
around marital and biological relationships. With donor insemination, judges
and lawmakers elaborated the capacity of legal fatherhood inside marriage to
capture social parent-child relationships. Men, and eventually women, derived
parentage by virtue of marriage to the biological mother. But outside marriage,
intended parents found themselves excluded. Nonbiological coparents - a regu-
lar feature of same-sex-couple-headed families- struggled to gain parental
rights.
With IVF, courts and legislatures again responded in ways that furthered
equality principles. Women, in both different-sex and same-sex couples, could
achieve parenthood without giving birth or in the absence of a genetic connec-
tion to the child. Yet even as judges and lawmakers muddied understandings of
maternity in both marital and nonmarital families - looking to social factors to
make legal determinations of parentage-they preserved biological under-
234. See id. at 1032-33 (noting that "the Legislature has recognized that the children of same-sex
domestic partners bear no lesser rights to the enjoyment and support of two parents than
children born to married heterosexual parents").
235. See D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320, 343 (Fla. 2013) (holding that a statute defining "com-
missioning couple" as the intended "mother and father" impermissibly discriminated
against same-sex couples based on sexual orientation); In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879
N.Y.S.2d 677, 688 (Sur. Ct. 2009) (finding that the court lacked jurisdiction to invalidate the
law as unconstitutional but nonetheless explaining that "provisions permitting the biological
('putative') father of a child born out of wedlock to establish parental status while excluding
the genetic mother from the same opportunity is a constitutionally prohibited gender-based
classification").
236. D.M.T, 129 So. 3d at 336-37.
237. Id. at 337-38 (quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983)).
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standings of motherhood. Intended mothers pointed to their own biological
connection to the child, whether gestational or genetic, to claim maternity.
From this perspective, surrogacy's normalization had not resulted from a
new perspective on the nonbiological intended mother, but rather from her
disappearance. The intended mother from Baby M had been replaced by the
genetic intended mother from Johnson-a woman who could combine
parenthood's biological and social dimensions. As this Section shows, intended
parents who engaged two women -an egg donor and a gestational surrogate -
struggled to capitalize on the law's acceptance of gestational surrogacy. Accord-
ingly, the remainder of this Part focuses on failed claims to parental recogni-
tion.
This Section first shows how, in situations involving different-sex couples,
courts and legislatures failed to see the nonbiological intended mother, who
lacked a genetic or gestational connection to the child, as a legal mother. The
intended mother who could claim a genetic, but not gestational, tie to the child
had successfully analogized herself to a genetic father. Now, the intended
mother with neither a genetic nor gestational tie to the child attempted to anal-
ogize herself to the man whose wife gives birth to a child conceived with donor
sperm. Within the gendered logic of the marital presumption, however, judges
and lawmakers refused to allow her to derive parentage by virtue of marriage to
the biological father or on the basis of her consent to assisted reproduction.
And while reproductive biology no longer justified gender-differentiated par-
entage when courts and legislatures confronted genetic intended mothers who
had engaged gestational surrogates, it reemerged as a basis on which to reject
the sex-equality claims of nonbiological intended mothers denied parental
recognition.
After addressing egg-donor gestational surrogacy involving different-sex
couples, this Section turns to male same-sex couples, who increasingly relied
on gestational surrogacy to have children. Nonbiological fathers in same-sex
couples found themselves in a similar position to nonbiological mothers in
different-sex couples. Female same-sex couples had seized on marriage as a
pathway to recognition for the nonbiological mother, but male same-sex cou-
ples found little help in the rules of marital parentage. While the nonbiological
mother in a same-sex couple derives parentage by virtue of marriage to the bio-
logical mother, the nonbiological father in a same-sex couple does not derive
parentage by virtue of marriage to the biological father. In most states, nonbio-
logical fathers in same-sex couples cannot establish parentage without adop-
tion, even when they are married.
Observing the treatment of both nonbiological mothers in different-sex
couples and nonbiological fathers in same-sex couples brings to the surface a
key feature of the modern parentage regime: the law continues to organize the
2308
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family around a biological mother. This aspect of parentage law has troubling
implications in terms of both gender and sexual orientation.
1. Different-Sex Couples and Nonbiological Mothers
As Appendix E shows, in a minority of states, surrogacy statutes and appel-
late decisions expressly recognize nonbiological mothers engaging in egg-
donor gestational surrogacy as parents without requiring them to adopt their
children.23 8 The intended parents can be the legal parents at birth, and neither
the surrogate nor the donor has parental rights. But family law regimes in most
states have not developed in this way. Instead, while genetic mothers can attain
parentage without adoption, women without a biological or genetic connection
ordinarily cannot.23 9 The gestational surrogate, who is not the legal mother
when the intended mother is the genetic mother, is the legal mother when the
intended mother uses a donor egg.
Compare two decisions from Indiana. In In re Infant R., the court allowed
the gestational surrogate to disestablish maternity when the intended mother
was also the genetic mother.240 Whereas the trial court had denied the request
because "the birth mother is the legal . .. mother," the appellate court reversed
in light of the state's "interest in correctly identifying a child's biological moth-
er."241 in a subsequent case, In re Infant T, the court refused to disestablish a
gestational surrogate's maternity when the biological father's wife -the intend-
ed mother -was not genetically related to the child and instead had used an
egg donor.242 The court concluded: "It would not be in the best interests of the
child, and would be contrary to public policy, to allow the birth mother to have
238. Fifteen states have explicit statutory or appellate authority recognizing a nonbiological in-
tended parent using egg-donor gestational surrogacy. See infra Appendix E. Some state stat-
utes remain limited to different-sex couples. See infra Appendix E.
239. In at least eleven states, it is clear that the nonbiological intended parent must adopt the
child, either because of a legislative directive, see, e.g., IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 641-99-15(144)
(2016); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2718 (2016); NEB. STAT. ANN. § 25-21,200 (West 2016), or be-
cause of case law, see, e.g., In re Paternity & Maternity of Infant T., 991 N.E.2d 596 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2013); In re Parentage of a Child by T.J.S. & A.L.S., 54 A.3 d 263 (N.J. 2012) (per curi-
am). In the remaining states without statutory guidance or negative case law, adoption
would presumably be required because of the operation of the governing parentage rules.
See infra Appendix E. Trial courts in some states, though, have provided parentage judg-
ments to nonbiological intended parents. See Nicolas, supra note 23, at 1245 (" [S]urrogacy in
these states occurs in the shadows . . . .").
240. In re Paternity & Maternity of Infant R., 922 N.E.2d 59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
241. Id. at 6o-61.
242. In re Paternity & Maternity of Infant I, 991 N.E.2d at 6oo.
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the child declared a child without a mother."243 Of course, there was a mother
to raise the child-but one without a gestational or genetic connection to the
child.244
While the Indiana cases focused on the status of gestational surrogates,
nonbiological intended mothers have joined surrogates to challenge this re-
gime. Consider developments in New Jersey in the decades since Baby M. In
the context of gestational surrogacy, New Jersey allows adjudication of parent-
age for genetic intended mothers but continues to require adoption by nonbio-
logical intended mothers.24 5 In In re Parentage of a Child by TIJS. & A.L.S., a
married woman, "unable to carry a child to term[,] . . . turned to the process of
in vitro fertilization," in which her husband's sperm fertilized the ova of an
anonymous donor, and the resulting embryos were carried by a gestational sur-
rogate.24 6 The intended parents sought a declaration of parentage from the
court, and were joined by the gestational surrogate. Neither the intended
mother nor the surrogate wished to resort to adoption, and instead desired a
timely assignment of rights and responsibilities in ways that reflected their ex-
pectations.24
In 2011, the New Jersey appellate court held in TJS. that the intended
mother could not establish parentage because state law provides for a declara-
tion of maternity only for a woman who is "biologically" or "gestationally" re-
lated to the child.24 8 Unlike fathers, who would be presumed legal parents
based on their marriage to the biological mother, mothers could not derive par-
entage from marriage to the biological father. Accordingly, the parentage law
"requires adoption to render [the intended mother] the mother of [the
child]. "249
The TJ S. appellate court rejected the nonbiological intended mother's con-
stitutional challenge to her treatment based on reasoning that reflects the bio-
logical, gender-differentiated framework erected in the constitutional repudia-
243- Id-
244. Id. at 601; see also In re Adoption of Male Child A.F.C., 491 S.W.3 d 316, 317 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2014) (holding that the mother entered on the birth certificate is the woman who delivers
the child).
245. See N.J. CT. R. § 5:14-4 (2017) (allowing a parentage order without adoption by genetic in-
tended parents); A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 7 7 2 A.2d 948, 954 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) (issu-
ing a parentage judgment, after a waiting period, to the genetic mother without adoption).
246. 54 A.3 d 263, 270 (N.J. 2012) (Albin, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 270-71.
248. In re Parentage of a Child by T.J.S. & A.L.S., 16 A.3 d 386, 391 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
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tion of "illegitimacy." The court turned down the nonbiological mother's due
process claim, explaining that she "does not have parental rights to the
child ... because of the absence of any biological or gestational connection to
the child."250 Rejecting her equal protection claim-which depended on her
comparison to nonbiological fathers in the donor-insemination context-the
court simply declared that "the complained of disparate treatment is not
grounded in gendered constructions of parenthood but in actual reproductive
and biological differences."25 1 By collapsing the biological aspects of reproduc-
tion with the social aspects of parenting, the court situated the state's regula-
tion of parenthood as an innocuous and natural response to the biological pro-
cesses of reproduction.
The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the decision in a 2012 per curiam
order.2 52 A concurring opinion justified the denial of parental recognition by
emphasizing the necessary relationship between motherhood and biology, rea-
soning that "the status of maternity is grounded on either a biological or genet-
ic connection to the child, failing which the Legislature has decreed that the
status can only be achieved through adoption."253 This regime did not offend
constitutional equality principles in the eyes of the concurring justice, who de-
clared, without elaborating, that the distinction between nonbiological fathers
(recognized by law) and nongenetic, nongestational mothers was justified by
"actual physiological differences between men and women."2 54
While legal fatherhood's nonbiological capacity inside marriage had ex-
panded, legal motherhood largely remained a biological status - albeit a more
complicated one. When a woman engages a gestational surrogate and uses a
donor egg, the law often fails to treat her as a legal mother. Unlike a married
father of a child conceived with donor sperm, she does not derive parentage by
virtue of consent to assisted reproduction or marriage to the biological father.
At the same time, the gestational surrogate, who avoids legal motherhood
when the intended mother is the genetic mother, now has legal motherhood
imposed on her.
250. Id. at 392.
251. Id. at 398.
252. In re Parentage of a Child by T.J.S. & A.L.S., 54 A. 3d 263, 263 (N.J. 2012) (per curiam).
253. Id. at 264 (Hoens, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-41(a)-
41(c) (West 2012)).
254. Id. (citing In re Parentage of a Child by TJ.S. &A.L.S., 16 A.3 d at 393).
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2. Same-Sex Couples and Nonbiological Fathers
Nonbiological mothers in different-sex couples are not the only ones who
struggle to achieve parentage when they engage in egg-donor gestational sur-
rogacy. Nonbiological fathers in same-sex couples do as well. Gay male couples
engaging in gestational surrogacy necessarily include a nonbiological intended
parent. Of course, the nonmarital parentage regime organized around biologi-
cal connection disadvantages same-sex couples relative to different-sex couples.
But, as this Part has shown, marriage offered relief to lesbian couples. Given
the family-based equality that marriage equality is assumed to furnish -and
given judicial statements that "the child of either partner in a married same-sex
couple will be presumed to be the child of both"2 55 - one might expect male
same-sex couples to also gain dual parentage by virtue of marriage. Much fol-
lows simply from the determination that a child is "a child of the marriage."
Parties to the marriage, even if not biologically related to the child, have stand-
ing to assert parental rights, including rights to custody.
Yet, without a biological mother in the marriage, male same-sex couples do
not technically have marital children. Parentage presumptions applicable to
same-sex couples replicate the gender-differentiated rules applicable to differ-
ent-sex couples. Presumptions of parentage for the second parent, even when
they apply to both women and men, relate to that person's marriage to "the
woman giving birth"25 6 or the "natural mother."25 7 Accordingly, a woman can
derive parentage by virtue of her marriage to the biological mother, as parental
regulation in lesbian couples makes clear. But a man can only derive parentage
by virtue of marriage to the biological mother, not the biological father. With-
out biological ties, men in same-sex couples and women in different-sex cou-
ples find themselves in the same position: neither can establish parentage
without adoption.
The scant case law on the status of nonbiological fathers in same-sex cou-
ples affirms the gestational surrogate's legal parentage and authorizes the non-
biological father's nonrecognition. Around the same time that the New Jersey
courts denied recognition to the nonbiological mother in TJ.S., they also de-
nied recognition to a nonbiological father in a same-sex couple who had en-
255. Wendy G-M v. Erin G-M, 985 N.Y.S.2d 845, 861 (Sup. Ct. 2014).
256. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1881(1) (2016).
257. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(a) (West 2014). Of those states that have made the marital
presumption gender-neutral, all but Washington have done so such that it applies to female
but not male couples. See, e.g., id.; 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46 / 204 (West 2016); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:2(V) (2014).
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gaged in egg-donor gestational surrogacy. In A.G.R. v. D.R.H., a same-sex
couple who were married under California law and registered domestic part-
ners under New Jersey law sought to have biologically related children.258 One
man's sperm was used to fertilize donor eggs, and the other man's sister served
as the gestational surrogate. 25 9 The surrogate sought parental rights after con-
flict developed with her brother and his partner. By the time the court was set
to determine whether the gestational surrogate was a legal parent, the two men
were parenting the children. In fact, the nonbiological father was the primary
caretaker.26 0 Yet the court treated the nonbiological intended father as a non-
parent and instead credited the gestational surrogate's claim to parental recog-
nition. Strikingly, the court found immaterial the distinction between tradi-
tional and gestational surrogacy-the very distinction that had reshaped the
law in cases involving a genetic intended mother. After quoting the rejection of
surrogacy in Baby M, a traditional surrogacy case, the court asked, "Would it
really make any difference if the word 'gestational' was substituted for the word
'surrogacy' in the above quotation?"2 61 It quickly answered, "I think not."262
In the contemporary regulatory landscape, it would be exceedingly difficult
to maintain this position where the genetic mother is the intended mother. In
that context, in most jurisdictions (including New Jersey26 3 ), the difference be-
tween gestational and traditional surrogacy marks the difference between par-
ent and nonparent status. Yet, for the nonbiological gay father, the surrogate's
gestation- increasingly immaterial where the intended mother is the genetic
mother -produces legal motherhood and justifies the denial of his parental sta-
tus. Like nonbiological intended mothers in different-sex couples, nonbiologi-
cal intended fathers in same-sex couples cannot claim parentage by virtue of a
relationship to the biological father. They must, if possible, adopt the child. As
Appendix E suggests, the treatment of male same-sex couples in New Jersey is
consistent with the approach of most other states.26 4
As with intended mothers in different-sex couples engaging in egg-donor
gestational surrogacy, intended fathers in same-sex couples have not launched
258. A.G.R. v. D.R.H., No. FD-o9-oo1838-o 7 , 20o9 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3250 (Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. Dec. 23, 2009).
259. Id. at *1-2.
260. A.G.R. v. D.R.H., No. FD-o9-oo1838-o 7 , at *13 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Dec. 13,
2011) (custody determination).
261. A.G.R., 20o9 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3250, at *12.
262. Id.
263. See supra text accompanying note 245.
264. See infra Appendix E; see also supra note 238 and accompanying text.
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successful constitutional challenges to their treatment. The nonbiological father
is not understood to possess a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
parenthood. And, since women and different-sex couples face similar hurdles,
the nonbiological father's treatment is not deemed to offend sex or sexual-
orientation equality principles.26 5
Ultimately, male same-sex couples are excluded by a parentage regime that
grounds parenthood in biological connection outside marriage and derives
nonbiological parenthood inside marriage only from marriage to a biological
mother. Ordinary parentage rules simply do not permit dual parentage for
male same-sex couples absent adoption.2 6 6 The few states that have allowed
this result have done so through a separate set of rules regulating gestational
surrogacy.2 6 7
3. Biological Mothers and the Legal Family
This Part's exhaustive examination of the law's regulation of parental rela-
tionships formed through ART reveals a critical dynamic: even in an age of sex
and sexual-orientation equality, courts and legislatures continue to treat biologi-
cal mothers as the parents from whom the legalfamily necessarily springs. This
treatment is rooted in the marital presumption and is carried forward by the
presumption's adaptation to ART. Traditionally, the woman giving birth is the
legal mother, and, if she is married, her husband is the legal father. Law has
adapted this reasoning to different-sex and same-sex couples using donor in-
semination. And this reasoning has reached different-sex and same-sex couples
using donor eggs and embryos when the intended mother is the birth mother.
The gendered, heterosexual legacy of marital parentage -parentage by vir-
tue of marriage to the woman giving birth -is justified by resort to the gen-
dered, heterosexual logic of reproductive biology. But law's accommodation of
ART reveals the instability of that very logic. Courts are willing to deviate from
the gendered logic of reproductive biology to recognize the genetic mother who
engages a gestational surrogate to carry her child. Within a regime that priori-
tizes biological ties, contemporary courts view the genetic mother like the bio-
265. See, e.g., Oleski v. Hynes, No. KNLFAo8400841 5, 2008 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1752, at *48
(Super. Ct. July 10, 2008) ("Since the gender . . . of the parent and the partner are im-
material, this is not a case raising issues of equal protection or invidious discrimination.").
266. Cf A.L.S. v. E.A.G., No. Alo-443, 2010 WL 4181449, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2010)
(explaining that a nonbiological father, "after paternity has been adjudicated, [cannot] raise
a presumption of paternity as against the child's biological mother").
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logical father protected by the Court in the 1970s. The differential treatment of
genetic mothers and fathers poses an equality problem. Yet, in considering the
claim of a nonbiological mother who engages in egg-donor gestational surro-
gacy, reproductive biology persists as a justification to reject her claim to paren-
tal recognition. Courts do not see an equality problem when law recognizes a
nonbiological father as a legal parent but withholds recognition from a nonbio-
logical mother.
In either of these cases, one could imagine courts invoking reproductive bi-
ology to justify the differential treatment of mothers and fathers. In fact, in
some of the earliest gestational surrogacy cases, courts rejected the claims of
genetic intended mothers based precisely on grounds of reproductive biology;
motherhood resulted from the specific act of birth.268 But today, courts dis-
claim reproductive biology as a basis to withhold recognition from a genetic
mother. Indeed, recall that in accepting gestational surrogacy, the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court deemed the children of the genetic intended
mother "children of [the] marriage."26 9 The mother's genetic -not gestation-
al-connection produced marital children. Yet a father's genetic connection
does not produce marital children, and therefore does not offer a route to par-
entage to a nonbiological mother. Reproductive biology continues to justify
treating the claims of nonbiological mothers differently than the claims of non-
biological fathers.
Same-sex couples, who are not similarly situated to different-sex couples
with respect to biological parenthood, remain particularly vulnerable in a non-
marital parentage regime organized around biological connection. Marriage
furnishes space for the legal recognition of nonbiological parents, but, with its
gender-differentiated legacy, offers relief to only some same-sex parents. Non-
biological parents in female same-sex couples attain parentage by virtue of
marriage to the biological parent, but this is not true in male same-sex couples.
For a man or woman married to a biological mother, biological connection is not
necessary for legal parenthood; that man or woman is deemed a legal parent by
virtue of marriage. But for a man or woman married to a biological father, the
lack of a biological connection excludes that individual from legal parenthood.
From this perspective, it becomes clear that the shift toward nonbiological
parenthood has occurred along only one axis: legal "fatherhood" can capture
nonbiological parenthood, but legal "motherhood" cannot. And the collapse of
gendered parental statuses has occurred in only one direction: women can be
268. See Andres A. v. Judith N., 591 N.Y.S.2d 946, 946 (Fam. Ct. 1992).
269. See supra text accompanying note 219 (quoting Culliton v. Beth Isr. Deaconess Med. Ctr.,
756 N.E.2d 1133, 1137 (Mass. 2001)).
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legal "fathers," but men cannot be legal "mothers." On this view, biological
mothers are indispensable -essential to the legal family. In contrast, biological
fathers are replaceable -by men or women who have no biological connection
to the child.270
As this Part has shown, the law has traveled a great distance from the
common-law regime that defined parentage through the gender-hierarchical
and heterosexual institution of marriage. Yet even after waves of liberalization,
troubling asymmetries persist. The law continues to anchor parental recogni-
tion in biological connection and to organize the legal family around a biologi-
cal mother. This leads courts and legislatures to treat men's and women's claims
to parental recognition differently and to privilege different-sex over same-sex
couples. 2 71 The next Part focuses on the profound harms that this parentage
regime inflicts on those who break from traditional norms of gender and sexu-
ality.
III. SELECTIVE HARMS
Within the contemporary parentage regime, those who believe they are
parents on social grounds, including those who have been parenting their chil-
dren for many years, may be denied parental status. Of course, it is difficult to
imagine a system that satisfies all those who make claims to parental recogni-
tion. But it is especially troubling that the law rejects claims in ways that pre-
serve longstanding forms of inequality. This Part turns to the concrete burdens
imposed by the current regime and shows how the uneven distribution of
270. Cf Hollandsworth, supra note 18, at 214 ("[T]he legal system has created a paradigm for
reproduction that statutorily excludes a significant number of children born through donor
insemination from having a father. Yet, the same legal system will not allow the child to be
born without a mother.").
271. The results seem inadvertent in many jurisdictions, as courts and legislatures aspire to inclu-
sion and yet do so within frameworks that carry forward legacies of inequality. In other ju-
risdictions, the results appear more deliberate. This dynamic resonates with Reva Siegel's
account of preservation through transformation. See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No
Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1111
(1997); see also J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, io6 YALE L.J. 2313, 2326 (1997)
(" [S]tatus hierarchies can gain the support of legal norms either directly or indirectly. Legal
categories can map status distinctions and even help constitute them . .. [or] status hierar-
chies can manipulate or work around other kinds of legal distinctions to reproduce them-
selves in ever new forms.").
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those burdens reflects traditional judgments about gender, sexuality, and
parenthood.
A. The Practical and Expressive Harms of Nonrecognition
As a practical matter, lack of parental recognition shifts individuals out of
the ordinary parentage regime and into the adoption scheme.272 While for
some the adoption process may be relatively straightforward, for others it
brings risk and uncertainty. The process can be "lengthy and costly"273 and may
be prohibitively expensive for some parents.2 74 For those who can afford it,
they may, as one court observed, "hav[e] to wait as long as six months" to gain
custody of their child.275 The process itself can be intrusive, subjecting those
who have coparented for many years to invasive home studies.2 76 As a federal
court in Indiana observed in the context of same-sex parents, the nonbiological
parent "is required to undergo fingerprinting and a criminal background check
in addition to submitting her driving record [and] her financial profile."2 77 The
home study examining the couple's relationship "requires them to write an au-
tobiography and to discuss their parenting philosophy, and requires them to
open their home for inspection."2 78 The costs in Indiana can exceed $4,000.279
Resort to adoption harms not only parents but children. Given the timing
of adoption, those who believe they are parents lack parental rights at a par-
ticularly critical point -the beginning of the child's life. As one nonbiological
mother who had engaged in gestational surrogacy reported in legislative testi-
272. See generally Polikoff, supra note 18.
273. See Henderson v. Adams, No. 1:15-cV-oo22o-TWP-MJD, 2016 WL 3548645, at *io (S.D.
Ind. June 30, 2016).
274. See Sara Randazzo, Gay Custody Fights Redefine Legal Parenthood, WALL. ST. J. (June
1, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/gay-custody-fights-redefine-legal-parenthood-14648
18297 [http://perma.cc/GQV2-EQCN].
275. See Culliton v. Beth Isr. Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133, 1138 (Mass. 2001). Of course,
if they are coparenting with the biological parent, they would presumably reside with the
child.
276. See In re Adoption of Doe, 326 P.3 d 347, 349 (Idaho 2014) (noting that the nonbiological
mother in a same-sex couple had to undergo a home study as she sought to adopt children
she had been coparenting for more than ten years). This resonates with Bruce Ackerman's
focus on humiliation. See 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVI RIGHTS REVOLU-
TION 137-41 (2014).
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mony in Washington State: "I had no parental rights for the first five months
of [my daughter's] life."280 As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ob-
served, " [I] n the event of medical complications arising during or shortly after
birth," the intended parent would not have legal authority over the child's
treatment.28 1 "The duties and responsibilities of parenthood (for example,
support and custody) would lie with the gestational carrier," who "could be free
to surrender the [child] for adoption."2 82 Young children may struggle when
their parents' bonds are uncertain and insecure.283 As intended parents and a
gestational surrogate in New Jersey explained, adoption does not provide an
adequate substitute for parentage by operation of law "because the extended
legal process would place the legal status of the child in limbo."284 Children
may be harmed later in life as well. Older children whose parents must adopt
them may question the status and stability of their family.285
Many of those who believe they are parents on social grounds but are de-
nied legal recognition will successfully navigate the adoption process and
emerge, eventually, with legal rights to their children. The harms of the adop-
tion process, though, are not only material but also dignitary. Requiring adop-
tion in this setting communicates to the parent and child that they are not
family and, in this sense, "fails to account for the parent-child relationship that
280. See Jim Camden, Surrogacy Bill Expands Rights for Same-Sex Couples, SPOKESMAN-REv. (Mar.
16, 2011), http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2o11/mar/16/surrogacy-bill-expands-rights
-for-same-sex-couples [http://perma.cc/3BGY-Z4TX].
281. Culliton v. Beth Isr. Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133, 1139 (Mass. 2001).
282. Id. at 1138.
283. Attachment theory focuses on the importance of secure parent-child bonds in infancy. See 1
JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss: ATTACHMENT 215-19 (1969). While the original fo-
cus was on mother-child relationships, attachment theory eventually included multiple care-
givers. See JESSICA BENJAMIN, THE BONDS OF LOVE 209-10 (1988). Legal scholarship on the
parent-child relationship tracked this shift. See Peggy Cooper Davis, The Good Mother: A
New Look at Psychological Parent Theory, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 347, 354 (1996)
(noting the "emergence of a consensus within the human sciences that a child's security
comes not from a single, constant individual, but from a familiar milieu and a network of at-
tachments"); see also Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content ofBest Interests in Client-Directed
Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1505, 1517 (1996)
("[A] nother school of thought suggests that a permanent caregiver may be less important
than the family network surrounding the child.").
284. In re Parentage of a Child by T.J.S. & A.L.S., 16 A. 3d 386, 389 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2011).
285. Cf United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (stating that the Defense of Mar-
riage Act, which in part defined marriage -for the purposes of federal law -as being only
between different-sex couples, "makes it even more difficult for the children [of same-sex
couples] to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family").
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already exists in fact."286 Those parents with biological ties are seen as real par-
ents. Those without biological ties -even those engaging in the same forms of
ART - are cast as parental substitutes who must formally replace the biological
parents through adoption. As a California court explained: "Parents are not
screened for the procreation of their own children; they are screened for the
adoption of other people's children."2 8 7 Resort to adoption is based on the no-
tion that "a child who is born as the result of artificial reproduction is some-
body else's child from the beginning."288
Of course, it is not only those who believe they are parents on social
grounds that are harmed. The law may recognize a gestational surrogate as a
legal mother, even though she neither desires such recognition nor actually
forms a parental relationship.28 9 Law may also impose parental responsibilities
on a sperm donor if he donates sperm for the insemination of an unmarried
woman, 290 even if he and the mother agreed that he would not be a parent and
even if he is not acting as a parent.2 9 1 just as the decision to form a parent-child
relationship is enormously meaningful and consequential, so is the decision not
to form a parent-child relationship.29 2
Adoption requirements thus intervene in ways that reproduce normative
distinctions between biological and nonbiological parents.29 3 As Elizabeth Bar-
tholet has persuasively shown, the regulation of adoption expresses suspicion
of nonbiological parents in ways that support traditional views about the bio-
logical family.2 94 While Bartholet is skeptical of commercial surrogacy,295 her
insights on adoption shed light on contemporary approaches to gestational
286. J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1291 (D. Utah 2002).
287. In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 291 (Ct. App. 1998).
288. Id.
289. See Soos v. Superior Court of Ariz., 897 P.2d 1356, 1361 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (Gerber, J.,
concurring) (explaining how a statute prohibiting surrogacy "imposes the burden of moth-
erhood on a surrogate mother who almost certainly does not wish it and did not contract for
it").
290. See supra note 179 and accompanying text; see also Appendix B.
291. See, e.g., In re Paternity of M.F., 938 N.E.2d 1256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
292. See Dov Fox, Reproductive Negligence, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 149,185-89 (2017).
293. Traditional adoption models have even shaped the emergence of "embryo adoption" pro-
grams. See I. Glenn Cohen, Religion and Reproductive Technology, in LAW, RELIGION, AND
HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES (Holly Fernandez Lynch et al. eds., forthcoming 2017) (on
file with author).
294. See ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION AND THE POLITICS OF PARENTING
(1993).
295. See Bartholet, supra note 20, at 111.
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surrogacy. In surrogacy cases featuring nonbiological intended parents, courts
express concerns about "strangers" raising children unrelated to them.2 9 6 They
invoke adoption as a check on nonbiological parents' fitness2 9 7 - even though
fitness is not employed as a check on biological parents using ART. The point
here is not that the government lacks an interest in children's welfare that justi-
fies attention to parental fitness; instead, it is that the government deploys this
interest selectively. The check on parental fitness does not apply whenever ges-
tational surrogacy is involved- that is, whenever the woman giving birth sur-
renders the child-but rather only when the intended parent is not the genetic
parent.
While adoption will ultimately yield legal parentage for some, it may be
impossible for others, meaning that legal recognition remains out of reach.
Terminating the rights of the individual presumed by law to be the parent may
not be feasible.29 8 Or, the relationship to the legal parent may end, leaving the
nonbiological parent at the mercy of her former partner.2 99 Or, the parents may
not be married and may live in a state that allows only stepparent, and not sec-
ond-parent, adoption. 00
Some parents, ignorant of the need to adopt their own child, may not even
pursue adoption. This is especially likely when both parents, whether married
or not, are listed on the child's birth certificate, and thus mistakenly believe
they have been definitively identified as legal parents."o1 It is also likely when
the nonbiological parent is married to the biological parent and believes she at-
tains parentage by virtue of the marriage.
For instance, a woman may believe that if her husband is the biological fa-
ther, she would be the legal parent. Consider a traditional surrogacy case from
Connecticut. In Doe v. Doe, when the couple divorced, the biological father
claimed that his wife was not the child's legal mother because she never adopt-
ed the child, even though she raised the child for fourteen years and the surro-
296. See Oleski v. Hynes, No. KNLFAo8400841 5 , 2008 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1752, at *42 (Super.
Ct. July 10, 2008) ("If the children here were one day old, and [the gestational surrogate]
then [was] turning them over to a stranger, no court in the world would approve that trans-
fer solely on the basis of her contract with that third party, and without any evidence as to
whether such a transfer accommodated the children's interests.").
297. See id. at *41-42.
298. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 784 (Cal. 1993).
299. See, e.g., Russell v. Pasik, 178 So. 3d 55, 60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
300. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Luke, 64o N.W.2d 374, 382-83 (Neb. 2002).
301. As Nancy Polikoff explains in her work on parental recognition in same-sex couples, while a
birth certificate "is only evidence of parentage, not definitive proof, it is the one piece of
commonly accepted evidence." Polikoff, supra note 18, at 238-39.
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gate's rights had long been terminated.302 The Connecticut Supreme Court-
constrained by a biologically grounded, gender-specific marital presumption -
held that even though the child was conceived and born during the marriage,
she was not a "child of the marriage" because the wife was not the biological
mother."30 Lack of a biological tie would not have prevented the husband from
making parental claims upon divorce if his wife were the biological mother, but
the wife's lack of a biological tie -even when accompanied by years of parental
conduct -placed her outside the bounds of the parentage regime.
Without legal recognition, parent-child relationships may be destroyed.
Again, consider Russell v. Pasik, in which an unmarried lesbian couple used the
same donor sperm to have four children, with each woman giving birth to two
children.30 4 Even though, as the court explained, " [t] he four children were
raised by both women jointly as a family unit,"Os Russell was able to unilateral-
ly end the relationship between Pasik and the two children to whom Pasik did
not have a biological connection.306 The parent-child relationships were legally
severed, left to the whims of Russell, the biological mother.
This approach undermines children's wellbeing.o In Russell, the children
themselves were harmed by the loss of their parent and their siblings, since
each woman would leave the relationship with rights to only her biological
children. Law generally seeks to protect and promote stable and continuing pa-
rental relationships for children. 0 s Yet here the law threatens such relation-
ships.
302. 71o A.2d 1297, 1300 (Conn. 1998).
303. Id. at 1315-16.
304. 178 So. 3d at 57.
305- Id.
306. Id. at 60-61.
307. As Anne Alstott's work emphasizes, law generally makes "parental exit" difficult so as to pro-
tect the interests of children. See ANNE L. ALSTOTT, No EXIT 45 (2004). Yet here law know-
ingly severs existing bonds of willing parents.
308. Scholars have long recognized the importance of psychological parent-child bonds. Law has
been heavily influenced by the foundational work on children's best interests and psycholog-
ical parenthood elaborated by Joseph Goldstein, Albert Solnit, Anna Freud, and Sonja Gold-
stein. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 11-12, 16, 19 (1996)
(emphasizing the importance of the psychological parent regardless of biological connec-
tions and elaborating the concept of "common-law adoptive parent-child relationship [s]").
Psychological parent theory influenced Robert Mnookin's seminal work on custody. See gen-
erally Robert H. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Inde-
terminacy, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (1975). While some scholars focused on a single
parent-child relationship, others allowed for multiple bonds. See Davis, supra note 283, at
362.
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Courts themselves appear to recognize the gravity of the problems encoun-
tered within the current regime and attempt to avoid the most immediate and
severe consequences. The court in Doe, for instance, interpreted state statutes
to allow the nonbiological mother to assert a third-party claim to custody based
on the child's welfare.' The parental relationship could continue even as the
mother was denied parental status.
In cases where the family remains intact, courts have resorted to custody
determinations that in practice protect the nonbiological parent's bond.1 o For
example, after recognizing the biological father and the gestational surrogate as
the legal parents in A. G.R., the New Jersey court vested primary custody in the
biological father-and, therefore, his same-sex partner as well.' The nonbio-
logical father, the court observed, "is essentially a stay at home dad."312 The
custody determination, rather than the parentage determination, allowed this
arrangement to persist. The man who formed a parent-child relationship on
social but not biological grounds lived in the house with the legal parent grant-
ed primary custody, but he received no legal recognition himself. His relation-
ship was less secure, dependent on continued cohabitation with the biological
father. Even then, his lack of recognition could, as other nonlegal parents re-
port, pose ongoing practical problems, for instance when he had "to sign some-
thing for the kids from school or at the doctor's office." 1
The harms of nonrecognition are not only practical but expressive. Courts
routinely term those who serve as parents but lack biological ties "non-
parents"31 - casting them as third parties who are otherwise strangers to the
family. As one gay father put it, "People always ask, 'Who are you? Are you his
309. Doe v. Doe, 710 A.2d 1297, 1318 (Conn. 1998).
310. In the earliest contested surrogacy case, Baby M, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized
the surrogate as the legal mother but granted primary custody to the father-and thus
placed the child in the home of the intended parents. The custody determination rendered
the nonbiological mother the child's mother in practice. In re Baby M, 5 3 7 A.2d 1227, 1260-61
(N.J. 1988). Once the child turned eighteen, she had her mother legally adopt her. Allison
Pries, Whatever Happened to Baby M?, RECORD (Jan. 5, 2010, 7 :57 AM), http://archive.north
jersey.com/news/whatever-happened-to-baby-m-1.975840 [http://perma.cc/7SVL-8V22].
311. A.G.R. v. D.R.H., No. FD-o9-oo1838-o 7 , at *13 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Dec. 13, 2011).
312. See id.
313. GERALD P. MALLON, GAY MEN CHOOSING PARENTHOOD 65 (2004) (quoting an anonymous
father); see also Henderson v. Adams, No. 1:1 5-cv-002200-TWP-MJD, 2016 WL 3548645, at
*1o (S.D. Ind. June 30, 2016) (" [H] aving only one legal parent ... affects many daily activi-
ties . . . .").
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dad?' Legally, we are not family, but in reality we are.""' Legal treatment may
shape parental experiences. In qualitative studies of gay men parenting, those
parents lacking legal status not only experienced "less validation and support
from the outside world," but also reported feeling "insecure about [their] role
in the family."3 16 They found nonrecognition "demeaning"" and reported
frustration with "being the invisible dad.""'
B. Sexuality- and Gender-Based Judgments
As Russell, Doe, and A. G.R. suggest, the burdens imposed on social parent-
child bonds are not distributed evenly. Those who break from traditional
norms governing gender, sexuality, and family-by not marrying, by separat-
ing motherhood from biological ties, or by forming a family with a same-sex
partner -are channeled into adoption or denied parental status in ways that
others are not. Often, courts and legislatures engage in genuine but failed at-
tempts to protect the rights of women and of same-sex couples. At times,
though, the regulation of ART and the law of parental recognition serve as sites
for active resistance to gender and sexual-orientation equality.
1. Biology, Marriage, and Sexual Orientation
As Part I explained, courts and legislatures expressly protected biological
relationships to repair the wrongs perpetrated by a system of marital privilege.
Unmarried parents could derive parental rights from their biological connec-
tion. But parenthood's liberalization protected parent-child relationships that
came out of heterosexual family formation. While nonbiological parent-child
relationships are legally vulnerable as a general matter, some families are more
likely than others to experience this vulnerability. As New York's highest court
recently acknowledged, "Under the current legal framework, which emphasizes
biology, it is impossible - without marriage or adoption - for both former part-
ners of a same-sex couple to have standing [to seek custody], as only one can
be biologically related to the child.""' For same-sex couples, the focus on bio-
315. MALLON, supra note 313, at 78.
316. Id. at 77; see also ABBIE E. GOLDBERG, GAY DADS 83 (2012).
317. GOLDBERG, supra note 316, at 83 (quoting an anonymous father).
318. MALLON, supra note 313, at 78 (quoting an anonymous father); see also SUZANNE JOHNSON &
ELIZABETH O'CONNOR, THE GAY BABY BOOM: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GAY PARENTHOOD 173-74
(2002).
319. Brooke S.B., 61 N.E. 3d at 498.
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logical connection works in conjunction with marital privilege to marginalize
their nonmarital families.
Even as marriage has offered space for some same-sex couples' nonbiologi-
cal ties, biological ties retain importance within the gender-differentiated
framework of marital parentage. And some seek to expand and entrench bio-
logical norms in ways that threaten same-sex parents both inside and outside
marriage. Biological connection can present itself as a natural and innocuous
parenting norm, but appeals to biological parenthood can both incorporate and
mask judgments about same-sex family formation.
Consider advocacy against ART by the Institute for American Values
(IAV), the organization headed by leading social conservative advocate David
Blankenhorn.3 20 Elizabeth Marquardt, the director of IAV's Center for Marriage
and Families, argues that because "two persons in a same-sex couple cannot
both be the biological parents," research demonstrating the benefits of children
being raised by a "biological mother and father" is relevant to debates over "same-
sex marriage and parenting."32 1 For Marquardt, the biological and social di-
mensions of parenthood should be united. She opposes "family forms that
even before conception intentionally deny children a relationship with their bi-
ological father or mother."322 Importantly, Marquardt accepts ART to create
families in which a mother and father raise a child biologically related to each
of them-for instance, gestational surrogacy where the genetic mother is the
intended mother. She carefully preserves ART deployed in service of the tradi-
tional family with a biological mother and father, while rejecting ART that dis-
turbs that paradigm by facilitating families headed by same-sex couples.323
This view finds expression in the law. After Obergefell, for example, Louisi-
ana authorized gestational surrogacy but only in limited circumstances -when
"the parties who engage the gestational surrogate not only are married to each
other, but also create the child using only their own gametes."324 As the law ex-
320. See DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA 177 (1995) (opposing donor insemination
and linking it to skepticism about lesbian parenting); see also Elizabeth Marquardt et al.,
My Daddy's Name Is Donor: A New Study of Young Adults Conceived Through Sperm
Donation, INST. AM. VALUES (2010), http://americanvalues.org/catalog/pdfs/DonorFINAL
.pdf [http://perma.cc/X22N-GS33].
321. Elizabeth Marquardt, One Parent or Five: A Global Look at Today's New Intentional Families,
INST. AM. VALUES 25-26 (2011), http://americanvalues.org/catalog/pdfs/one parent or
-five.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y5D4-6HT2].
322. Id. at 6.
323. For a critique of the case against ART, see Courtney Megan Cahill, The Oedipus Hex: Regu-
lating Family After Marriage Equality, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 183 (2015).
324. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2718 (2016).
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pressly states, only those "intended parents can bypass the current need to go
through extended proceedings to adopt their own child."325 The law authorizes
gestational surrogacy-and its separation of pregnancy from motherhood-in
ways that necessarily exclude same-sex couples, even when they are married. In
this regime, it is not sex-based reproductive differences that matter but biologi-
cal ties that allow for the maintenance of the gender-differentiated, heterosexu-
al family.326
As the Louisiana legislation suggests, arguments from biological parenting
can entail both a rejection of same-sex family formation and an appeal to dual-
gender parenting.3 27 Families headed by same-sex couples fail as "motherless"
and "fatherless."3 28 These views,329 which were expressed but repudiated in the
conflict over same-sex marriage, retain purchase in conflicts over parenting.3 3 0
In fact, they have become a potent way to resist the implications of marriage
equality.33 1
325. Id.
326. The continued exclusion of same-sex couples resonates with Ackerman's account of "institu-
tionalized humiliation." See ACKIERMAN, supra note 276, at 140.
327. See Douglas NeJaime, Marriage, Biology, and Gender, 98 IowA L. REv. BuLL. 83, 90-94
(2013). Notably, some arguments for greater ART regulation prioritize biological connection
but embrace same-sex family formation. See CAHN, supra note 12, at 133, 159.
328. See Marquardt, supra note 321, at 17, 27; see also Lynn D. Wardle, Global Perspective on Procrea-
tion and Parentage by Assisted Reproduction, 35 CAP. U. L. REv. 413, 453 (20o6) (criticizing the
"increasing use of ART to produce children to be raised deliberately without a mother and a
father").
329. See, e.g., Brief of loo Scholars of Marriage as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 28-
30, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574); see also
Ryan T. Anderson, Marriage: What It Is, Why It Matters, and the Consequences ofRedefining It,
HERITAGE FOUND. 3 (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.heritage.org/marriage-and-family/rep
ort/marriage-what-it-why-it-matters-and-the-consequences-redefining-it [http://perma.cc
/ZKS5-2H 7U] ("There is no such thing as 'parenting.' There is mothering, and there is fa-
thering, and children do best with both.").
330. See Cahill, supra note 13, at 642 n.117; NeJaime, supra note 16, at 1243-48.
331. See David Blankenhorn, Opinion, How My View on Gay Marriage Changed, N.Y. TIMES (June
22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2o12/o6/23/opinion/how-my-view-on-gay-marriage
-changed.html [http://perma.cc/CNM2-W4M9] (attempting to find common ground on
same-sex marriage but urging "both gays and straight people" to agree that "children born
through artificial reproductive technology [should have] the right to know and be known by
their biological parents"). On this point, see Douglas NeJaime, Griswold's Progeny: Assisted
Reproduction, Procreative Liberty, and Sexual Orientation Equality, 124 YALE L.J. F. 340, 341
(2015).
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2. Marriage, Biology, and Gender
Approaches to ART - and specifically gestational surrogacy - suggest that,
even as courts and legislatures liberalized motherhood and recognized same-
sex parenting, they sustained biologically grounded, gender-differentiated
views of parenthood. Nonbiological mothers in different-sex couples and non-
biological fathers in same-sex couples struggle for parental recognition, even
when they are married to the biological parent. If these parents fail to adopt their
children, they may be deemed legal strangers even after raising the children.
These dynamics may reflect judgments about women who separate mother-
hood from biological connection, as well as men who fill roles traditionally de-
manded of women.
Those who are invested in gender-based family roles and their biological
basis often oppose surrogacy regardless of its form. Both traditional and gesta-
tional surrogacy challenge the connection between the physical fact of pregnan-
cy and the social role of motherhood.3 32 Through this lens, surrendering the
child, even when the woman is not genetically related, "is contrary to the natu-
ral instincts of motherhood.""' But most states have departed from this view
and instead have increasingly accommodated gestational surrogacy where the
intended mother is the genetic mother. That woman is the legal mother, and
the gestational surrogate is not.
Gestation and birth -the sex-based reproductive features that licensed legal
distinctions between motherhood and fatherhood- no longer inevitably pro-
duce the social role of motherhood. Genetics -itself not a sex-based reproduc-
tive difference -can ground legal motherhood. Yet in most states, the surro-
gate's nonrecognition occurs only when the intended mother is the genetic
mother. With egg-donor gestational surrogacy, birth reemerges as necessarily
producing legal motherhood-with no change in the surrogate's role or in the
intentions of the parties.
332. See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 96, Cook v. Harding, No. 2:16-CV-00 7 42 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2016),
2016 WL 424998 ("The bonding process between the pregnant mother and the children she
carries during the nine months of pregnancy is the same physical process and experience,
whether or not the mother is genetically related to the children."); Jennifer Lahl, Commercial
Surrogacy: Stop It orJust Regulate It?, PUB. DiSCOURSE (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.thepublic
discourse.com/2o15/1o/158o1/ [http://perma.cc/7HM4-XR7P] (arguing for prohibitions on
all forms of surrogacy based in part on the claim that "[s]urrogacy demands that mother
and child not bond, a very important part of human reproduction that safeguards the physi-
cal and psychological well-being of both mother and child").
333. Complaint, supra note 332, ¶ 105.
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Consider Soos, where the court required Arizona to recognize the genetic
mother as the legal mother and ordered nonrecognition of the gestational sur-
rogate.334 Indeed, the concurring opinion pointed out how the surrogacy ban
foisted motherhood on the gestational surrogate based solely on the physical
fact of pregnancy.' Yet Arizona law continues to distinguish egg-donor gesta-
tional surrogacy. The absence of a genetic intended mother blocks the gesta-
tional surrogate's attempt to avoid legal motherhood, and the intended mother
must adopt the child.3 36
Even in the face of legislation that appeared to authorize egg-donor gesta-
tional surrogacy, the state of Connecticut sought to require termination of a
gestational surrogate's parental rights and subsequent adoption by the nonbio-
logical intended parent. 3 In unsuccessfully defending its position at the Con-
necticut Supreme Court, the state made the uncontroversial observation that "a
mother contributes to the development of the child in her womb.""" But it
then linked the physical contribution of the surrogate to an inevitable legal sta-
tus of motherhood-because the gestational surrogate "form[s] a bond with
[the child in her womb]," her "role in bringing the child into the world is suffi-
ciently consequential to require her registration." 3 Connecticut defended its
refusal to recognize nonbiological intended parents by appealing to the connec-
tion between pregnancy and motherhood. Yet, in that very litigation, the state
admitted that it did not oppose parentage judgments when the intended parent
was the genetic mother.3 40
If the biology of reproduction can be detached from the social role of moth-
erhood, it is difficult to maintain distinctions between the two forms of gesta-
tional surrogacy. The law's differential treatment of genetic intended mothers
and nonbiological intended mothers suggests that biological connection gener-
ally - whether gestation or genetics - creates maternal attachments. At stake is
the maintenance of motherhood as a biological status -not the specific rela-
tionship between pregnancy and motherhood.
334. Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356, 1360-61 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
335. See id. at 1361 (Gerber, J., concurring).
336. The surrogacy ban, which declares the surrogate the legal mother, remains in effect except to
the extent deemed unconstitutional in Soos. Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (2007).
337. See Reply Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 3-4, Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A. 3d 783 (Conn.
2011) (No. 18482).
338. Id. at 14.
339. Id.
340. See id. at 3-4. The State's position was rejected in Raftopol, 12 A.3 d at 804, in which the Con-
necticut Supreme Court recognized a biological father's same-sex partner, and not the gesta-
tional surrogate, as a legal parent.
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The act of surrogacy challenges the "maternal instinct," and instead sug-
gests that a mother's attachment is constructed. The genetic intended mother,
whom law recognizes, can maintain a connection between the biological and
social aspects of motherhood, even if not through pregnancy. The nonbiologi-
cal intended mother, in contrast, renders maternal attachment the product of
social arrangements, rather than biology.34 1 The surrogate and the nonbiologi-
cal intended mother reveal the mother-child bond to be in important ways like
the father-child bond-volitional and constructed.342
Through this lens, the law of parental recognition may reflect stereotypes
that view the social role of motherhood as flowing naturally from biological
ties.343 A mother's biological tie to her child-established most often through
gestation but also through genetics-both defines and limits her parental sta-
tus.3" While the legal status of motherhood derives solely from biological con-
nections, biological connections may, but need not, determine the legal status
of fatherhood.34 5 One can be a father purely on social grounds if, for instance,
341. The nonbiological intended mother also defies gender-based roles by separating mother-
hood from biological reproduction. Attorneys in Baby M portrayed the intended mother, de-
spite her multiple sclerosis, as an ambitious, career-driven woman who delayed and avoided
childbearing and thus produced her own dilemma. See Trial Brief on Behalf of Defendants
Mary Beth and Richard Whitehead at 4, In re Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1987) (No. FM25 314-86E) ("The Sterns by agreement did not even attempt to conceive
a child until Mrs. Stem finished college, medical school and her residency. By the time she
finished her residency in the year 1981, she was 36 years old. Thereafter, Mr. and Mrs. Stern
have never attempted to conceive a child."). Such characterizations also appear in contempo-
rary arguments against surrogacy. See, e.g., Sharon Greenthal, Social Surrogacy: A Scary
Trend in Pregnancy, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 21, 2014, 11:53 AM), http://www.huffing
tonpost.com/sharon-greenthal/social-surrogacy-a-scary-_b_5179121.html [http://perma.cc
/KUC4-RTGE] (expressing shock at "women who don't want pregnancy to interfere with
their career trajectory" and wondering "what kind of mothers they'll be once they've been
handed their surrogate-grown children" and whether they will "take a day off from their
precious careers to tend to a baby that needs them").
342. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 334 (1988)
(" [S]urrogacy arrangements may help to dilute the stereotype of the woman in the nuclear
family whose role is confined to that of mother and homemaker. . . .").
343. On the anti-stereotyping principle, see Mary Anne Case, "The Very Stereotype the Law Con-
demns": Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 1447 (2000); and Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex
Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 83 (2010).
344. For an argument that "genetic essentialism," which prioritizes the genetic mother over the
gestational surrogate, "traces its roots to patriarchal ideology" see Jennifer S. Hendricks,
Genetic Essentialism in Family Law, 26 HEALTH MATRIX 109, 120 (2016).
345. As Karen Czapanskiy argues, men volunteer for parenthood, while women are drafted into
it. See Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental Equality, 38 UCLA
L. REv. 1415, 1415-16 (1991). Of course, when the government attempts to establish paterni-
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he forms a family with the mother and the child.34 6 On this view, the mother
remains the parental figure who establishes the family, while the father is a sec-
ondary, optional parent, potentially supplementing but certainly not replacing
the mother.3 4 7
The law's construction of parenthood situates women as biologically con-
nected not only to reproduction but also to child-rearing34 8 -itself a form of
uncompensated labor that drastically shapes a woman's life opportunities.3 49
While biological fathers can be displaced by men and women who lack bio-
logical ties, the law attempts to ensure the biological mother's presence. From
this perspective, women- naturally, inevitably-bear the burdens of child-
rearing. 5 o
Views that tie motherhood to biology not only negatively affect women;
they also harm men by viewing fatherhood as derivative of motherhood and
secondary as a parental role."' While these stereotypes retain purchase within
various domains of family law,352 as well as outside of family law,5 3 they have
ty, it may impose fatherhood on men based on their biological connection. But even then,
the government seeks to impose support obligations, rather than child-rearing responsibili-
ties. See id. at 1418. This, too, may reflect stereotypes that situate women as caretakers and
men as breadwinners. Moreover, the government does not in practice make paternity com-
pulsory. See Cahill, supra note 13, at 687-88.
346. See, e.g., In re Sabrina H. v. Bright, 266 Cal. Rptr. 274, 276 (Ct. App. 1990) (emphasizing
the importance of identifying "fathers who have entered into some familial relationship with
the mother and child").
347. See Appleton, supra note 18, at 282 (explaining that "fatherhood remains, in significant part,
a 'secondary' or derivative relationship that requires an initial determination of the child's
first or 'primary' parent, the mother"); Dalton, supra note 159, at 289 (" [T]he mother-child
relationship is always seen as primary. The father-child relationships (whether based in bi-
ology or not) are always secondary.").
348. See Darren Rosenblum, Unsex Mothering: Toward a New Culture of Parenting, 35 HAIRv. J. L. &
GENDER 57, 73 (2012).
349. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REv. 737, 788-89 (1989); Siegel, supra
note 122, at 376.
350. See Hollandsworth, supra note 18, at 217-18.
351. Nancy Dowd urges a redefinition of fatherhood based on a "nurturing model,' Nancy E.
Dowd, Rethinking Fatherhood, 48 FIA. L. REv. 523, 532 (1996), and adopts the term "birth-
fathers" to capture social fatherhood, Nancy E. Dowd, Parentage at Birth: Birthfathers and So-
cial Fatherhood, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 909, 917-19 (20o6). See also Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1747, 1749 (1993) (using the term "generism" to reimagine the legal norms of family
and fathering as centered around nurturing).
352. See Holning Lau, Shaping Expectations About Dads as Caregivers: Toward an Ecological Ap-
proach, 45 HOFSTRAL. REv. 183 (2016).
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specific effects on parentage in same-sex couples. Female same-sex couples may
reaffirm gender stereotypes that see women as mothers and caretakers even as
they challenge heterosexual norms,354 but male same-sex couples disrupt
norms of both heterosexuality and gender that have structured family relation-
ships.' By forming a family that excludes a mother, these men position fa-
thers as primary parents -assuming the social role traditionally demanded of
women as a matter of biology.35 6
Gay men engaging in surrogacy challenge the centrality of the mother-child
relationship in ways that different-sex couples engaging in surrogacy do not.1 7
Their parental recognition, and the corresponding production of "motherless"
families, threatens gender differentiation -not merely biological sex differenti-
ation. Consider A. G.R., the New Jersey decision recognizing the gestational
surrogate, and not the nonbiological father, as a legal parent.' The court
quoted Baby M to support the unique importance of the mother-child relation-
ship, objecting that " [t] he surrogacy contract ... guarantees the separation of a
child from it[s] mother.""' A mother, on this view, is a necessary part of a
family. There was no other mother to fill the role left open by the surrogate.
Genetic intended mothers had emerged since Baby M's rejection of traditional
surrogacy as viable candidates to supplant the surrogate.3 6 0 But fathers engag-
ing in egg-donor gestational surrogacy simply could not replace the mother.
353. See Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 995 (2015) (show-
ing how naturalized notions of sex difference harm women and men at work).
354. See Cynthia Godsoe, Marriage Equality and the "New" Maternalism, 6 CALIF. L. REv. CIR. 145
(2015).
355. See GOLDBERG, supra note 316, at 11; cf E. Gary Spitko, From Queer to Paternity: How Primary
Gay Fathers Are Changing Fatherhood and Gay Identity, 24 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 195, 216
(2005).
356. See GOLDBERG, supra note 316, at 70; MALLON, supra note 313, at 130; cf Hollandsworth, su-
pra note 18, at 192 ("[G]ay men ... become the primary caretaker of the child, thereby as-
suming the role of the 'mother."'); Dara E. Purvis, The Sexual Orientation of Fatherhood, 2013
MICH. ST. L. REv. 983, 1004 ("[G]ay stay-at-home fathers begin to break the link between
caretaking and femininity."); Darren Rosenblum et al., Pregnant Man?: A Conversation, 22
YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 207, 215 (2010) ("I don't feel like I'm about to become a father. I feel
like I'm about to become a mother.").
357. See MALLON, supra note 313, at 99 ("The one subject that all the [gay] dads discussed at
length was the multitude of questions from people in the community about their child's
mother or lack thereof.").
358. A.G.R. v. D.R.H., No. FD-o9-oo1838-o 7 , 20o9 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3250 (Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. Dec. 23, 2009).
359. Id. at *11-12.
360. See supra text accompanying notes 209-210.
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Similar concerns emerge in cases involving single fatherhood. While donor
insemination and IVF have facilitated the creation of legally recognized single-
parent families for women, men struggle to form single-parent families
through ART. Like gay male couples, single fathers engaging in egg-donor ges-
tational surrogacy seek to displace mothers. Texas, for instance, allows gesta-
tional surrogacy (including egg-donor gestational surrogacy) for married
(different-sex) couples,36 1 but closes paths to single fatherhood through gesta-
tional surrogacy.36 A Texas appellate court refused to declare that the gesta-
tional surrogate with no genetic connection to the children is not a legal parent,
even though Texas law readily allows this result when a married different-sex
couple commissions a surrogate. The court noted that the biological father
"seeks a declaration that he is the sole parent and the children have no moth-
er."363 Given that the egg donor was not seeking motherhood, the court ex-
pressed concern that "[t]here is no other woman claiming to be the mother."364
Indeed, some courts have refused to allow women to relinquish parental rights
if no other woman is seeking to adopt the child.36 5
These results are troubling. They make paths to parenthood more difficult
and fraught for those who break from norms that have traditionally structured
family life, and they reiterate views about motherhood and fatherhood that
harm both women and men. To remedy these harms, the next Part considers
how to forge a parentage regime that vindicates gender and sexual-orientation
equality and thus more fully and consistently values the social bonds of
parenthood.
IV. RECONSTRUCTING PARENTHOOD
Even as the law has grown to accommodate an increasingly diverse range of
parental configurations, many who believe themselves to be parents on social
grounds -because they are the intended parent, function as a parent, or are
married to the biological parent at the time of the child's birth -discover that in
361. At the time of enactment, same-sex couples could not marry. It is unclear how Texas will
handle same-sex couples, though its provisions requiring that the "intended mother is una-
ble to carry a pregnancy to term" may be read to exclude male same-sex couples even when
they are married. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16o.7 56(b)(2) (West 2016).
362. See In re M.M.M., 428 S.W.3 d 389, 398 (Tex. App. 2014).
363. Id. at 392.
364. Id. at 392 n.i. But cf In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 126 (Md. 2007) (holding that it is
"within a trial court's power to order the [Maryland Division of Vital Records] to issue a
birth certificate that contains only the father's name").
365. See Hollandsworth, supra note 18, at 235-38.
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the eyes of the law they are in fact strangers to their children. These problems
cannot be wholly eliminated; courts and legislatures will continue to face diffi-
cult questions about when to recognize individuals as parents. Nonetheless, in
working through questions of parental recognition, solutions can be devised so
that the burdens do not fall systematically on those historically subject to exclu-
sion. This Part suggests how the law might better realize egalitarian commit-
ments in parentage, not only with respect to families formed through ART but
across the wider swath of families in contemporary society.
First, this Part sets out the principles to guide reform. Then, it illustrates
how such principles can shape family law reform, primarily through state legis-
lative action but also through judicial decisions. Finally, this Part contemplates
a future in which the parentage questions at the heart of this Article enter fed-
eral courts, and considers how courts might reason about those questions from
a constitutional perspective.
Of course, the role of federal courts in the law of parental recognition is far
from clear. Recent shifts in family law have featured federal courts playing a di-
alogic role. In the conflict over same-sex marriage, federal courts were critical
but were not the primary actors for many years.366 instead, change occurred at
the state level, as legislatures reformed family law regimes and courts applied
state constitutional principles to strike down laws restricting same-sex family
formation. Those developments shaped the constitutional stakes in conflicts
that would enter federal courts.367 So too in the domain of parentage may de-
velopments at the state level eventually produce and structure federal constitu-
tional conflict.
A. Equality Commitments and Recognition of Parenthood's Social Dimensions
There is broad consensus that the law of parental recognition should con-
form with principles of equality, but critical differences over the meaning of
equality in this setting persist. As this Article demonstrates, merely providing
equal treatment under existing rules does not furnish equality based on gender
and sexual orientation.3 68 instead, equality requires treating those traditionally
excluded from the parentage regime as full participants.3 69
What does it mean in the law of parental recognition to treat those who
break from conventional norms of gender and sexuality as belonging from the
366. See Eskridge, supra note 24, at 281-82.
367. See NeJaime, supra note 24, at 91-92.
368. For an illustration of an equal-treatment approach, see Garrison, supra note 1.
369. See Siegel, supra note 122, at 368-70.
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outset? In practical terms, equality requires law to value social as well as bio-
logical contributions in recognizing parents -and to do so in more transparent
and evenhanded ways. Proceeding in this way is necessary to ensure that wom-
en engaged in nontraditional acts of parenting and gays and lesbians forming
families with children-both of whom ground parental claims in social contri-
butions - have their parent-child relationships recognized and respected. 7 o
Same-sex family formation ordinarily features nonbiological parent-child
relationships. Accordingly, a parentage regime anchored in biological connec-
tion does not ensure equality for same-sex couples' families, even if it with-
holds legal recognition from nonbiological parents in both different-sex and
same-sex couples.' Instead, a parentage regime that treats lesbian and gay
parents as full participants opens social paths to recognition to both women
and men, in both different-sex and same-sex couples, both inside and outside
marriage.
A parentage regime rooted in the gender-differentiated frameworks of mar-
riage and biology also makes outsiders of women who parent children to
whom they are not biologically connected. Courts and legislatures often invoke
reproductive biology to justify the differential treatment of nonbiological
mothers and fathers -recognizing fathers, but not mothers, on social grounds.
But this approach reflects and reiterates traditional understandings of mother-
hood as women's natural destiny, and it excludes women who break from con-
ventional roles by separating the biological aspects of reproduction from the
social aspects of parenting.372 An approach to parentage driven by gender
370. Cf Martha Minow, All in the Family & in All Families: Membership, Loving, and Owing, 9 5 W.
VA. L. REV. 275, 304 (1992) (challenging "state standardization and social stigma directed
towards groups of people who depart from the state-sanctioned model of the family" and
arguing that "stability, nurturance and care should be promoted wherever possible, and
people committed to taking on these tasks should be encouraged to do so").
371. This resonates with Martha Minow's argument for "disentangling equality from its attach-
ment to a norm that has the effect of unthinking exclusion." MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL
THE DIFFERENCE 16 (1990).
372. See Law, supra note ioi, at loo8-o9; Siegel, supra note 122, at 370. Scholars have taken differ-
ent views on gender neutrality in the regulation of parenthood. Compare MARTHA ALBERT-
SON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH-
CENTURY TRAGEDIES 88-89 (1995) (objecting to the "popular gender-neutral fetish"), with
Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for Nonmarital Families, 67
STAN. L. REv. 167, 171-76 (2015) (arguing that more symmetrical treatment is necessary to
challenge the relationship between gender and care). Outside of parenthood, scholars have
taken different views on how law should take pregnancy into account. Compare Ann C.
Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J. 375, 377 (1981) (arguing that the law
should account for the "sex-unique aspects of procreation"), with Wendy W. Williams,
Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv.
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equality acknowledges that women and men are not similarly situated with re-
spect to reproductive biology, yet recognizes both women and men who parent
children to whom they are not biologically connected.
Such an approach protects not only parents but also children."' The de-
termination of legal parentage is generally driven by the parental interest, and
is not a determination based on the best interests of the child.374 Nonetheless,
children's welfare is a foundational principle in family law and clearly animates
approaches to parentage.17 1 Of course, difficult questions about children's in-
terests arise when the law allows individuals to make agreements about paren-
tal status, as it increasingly does in the context of ART. Nonetheless, vindicat-
ing equality commitments in the ways suggested here - and specifically
through recognition of parenthood's social dimensions - significantly promotes
the interests of children. In fact, courts that have made parentage determina-
tions that conform to principles of gender and sexual-orientation equality have
recognized how their decisions further "the state's interest in the welfare of the
child and the integrity of the family."3 76 Recognition of parents on social
L. & Soc. CHANGE 325, 325-28 (1985) (proposing a "rationale for the 'equal-treatment' ap-
proach to pregnancy"). Perspectives on sex equality that take contrasting views nonetheless
take issue with the invocation of biological differences, and pregnancy specifically, to justify
harmful gender-based judgments.
373. See Bartholet, supra note 21, at 335-39 (connecting protection of social parent-child bonds to
children's welfare).
374. As Glenn Cohen persuasively argues, best-interest arguments for the regulation of reproduc-
tion can mask troubling justifications, but for the regulation of parenthood, children's inter-
ests remain critical. Compare I. Glenn Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REv. 1187,
1189 (2012) (arguing that best-interest justifications are "a way of talking about the regula-
tion of reproduction that avoids confrontation with justificatory idioms that are disturbing,
controversial, and illiberal"), with I. Glenn Cohen, Regulating Reproduction: The Problem with
Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. 423, 426 (2011) (" [I]n countless ... areas of family law, the
protection of the best interests of existing children serves as a powerful organizing principle
that justifies state intervention.").
375. While this Article's approach to parentage primarily involves determinations of adult recog-
nition, it reorients that recognition in ways that align with children's well-being. On the
ways in which American law continues to reason in terms of parental rights instead of chil-
dren's interests, see Anne L. Alstott, Is the Family at Odds with Equality? The Legal Implications
of Equality for Children, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 5 (2008), which describes the tendency in "con-
stitutional law and state family law ... [to] privilege parental rights and disclaim any
affirmative state obligation to secure children's well-being."
376. In re Guardianship of Madelyn B., 9 8 A.3 d 4 9 4 , 500 (N.H. 2014); see also, e.g., Elisa B. v. Su-
perior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 669 (Cal. 2005) (recognizing the nonbiological mother as a par-
ent so as not to "deprive [the children] of the support of their second parent"); In re Parental
Responsibilities of A.R.L., 318 P.3d 581, 587 (Colo. App. 2013) (recognizing the nonbiologi-
cal mother based on "the compelling interest children have in the love, care, and support of
two parents, rather than one, whenever possible"); Chatterjee v. King, 280 P.3 d 283, 293
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grounds allows courts to protect, rather than sever, "strongly formed bonds be-
tween children and adults with whom they have parental relationships.""
Constitutional precedents on family recognition, including recent decisions on
marriage equality, also emphasize children's interests in nonbiological parent-
child relationships."'
In crediting parenthood's social dimensions, this approach does not suggest
that the law jettison biological connection as a basis for parentage. The aim
here is not to articulate an ideal model of parental recognition but rather to re-
form the law in ways that align with principles of equality. Moreover, this ap-
proach respects existing expectations about parental connections.' Given that
both genetic contribution and birth play powerful roles in common under-
standings of parenthood, law may continue to reflect the salience of biological
ties. Indeed, longing for biological parenthood leads many to engage in ART in
the first place.so Even those who create nonbiological relationships often seek
their own physical traits in sperm and egg donors."' The law need not deny
the salience of biological bonds to incorporate other indicia of parenthood.
Further, biological connections often lead individuals to form parent-child rela-
tionships. In this sense, biological ties - including not only gestation but genet-
(N.M. 2012) ("[T]he child's best interests are served when intending parents physically,
emotionally, and financially support the child . . . "). Of course, the state may also recognize
parents on social grounds in order to privatize dependency. This policy decision could fur-
ther an agenda that relieves the government of obligations to support its citizens. See Melis-
sa Murray, Family Law's Doctrines, 163 U. PA. L. REv. 1985, 1990 (2015) (noting that a "tradi-
tional function of the marital family [is] the privatization of support and care of children").
377. Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E. 3 d 488, 498 (N.Y. 2016) (quoting Debra H. v. Janice
R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 201 (N.Y. 2010) (Ciparick, J., concurring)). Equitable parent doctrines,
which have been critical to parental recognition on social grounds, often focus on the child's
interest. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1891(3) (2015) (allowing a court to "adju-
dicate a person to be a de facto parent if the court finds ... that the person has fully and
completely undertaken a permanent, unequivocal, committed and responsible parental role
in the child's life"); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 550 (N.J. 2000) ("[C]hildren have a strong
interest in maintaining the ties that connect them to adults who love and provide for
them.").
378. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 26oo-ol (2015); United States v. Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013).
379. See Garrison, supra note 1, at 842.
380. See Michael Boucai, Is Assisted Procreation an LGBTRight?, 2016 Wis. L. REv. 1065; Roberts,
supra note 144.
381. See LAURA MAMO, QUEERING REPRODUCTION 191-92 (2007); DEAN A. MURPHY, GAY MEN
PURSUING PARENTHOOD THROUGH SURROGACY 152-53 (2015); Petra Nordqvist, Out of Sight,
Out of Mind: Family Resemblances in Lesbian Donor Conception, 44 SOCIOLOGY 1128, 1133
(2010).
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ics -may provoke commitments of care and support that align with the vindi-
cation of social factors.
This approach suggests a continued role for marriage as well.382 Individuals
commonly understand parental relationships to coincide with marital bonds,
and marriage has long captured social, and not simply biological, parent-child
relationships." Marriage historically recognized social parent-child relation-
ships in service of a gender-hierarchical, heterosexual order, but today, mar-
riage may channel social parental ties in service of a more egalitarian society.
Much of the shift toward marriage equality was driven by the relationship be-
tween marriage and parenting advanced by same-sex couples themselves. Now,
same-sex couples assert compelling demands to parental recognition linked to
marriage.384 Still, even as marriage persists as a pathway to parentage, law
must ensure equality for nonmarital parents and children.' This requires so-
cial paths to parental recognition for unmarried parents.
Significant authority from family law and constitutional law supports the
equality principle articulated here. For example, lawmakers in states such as
California and Maine recently revised their parentage codes to ensure equality
for lesbian and gay parents and their children and to implement explicit and
consistent gender-neutral constructions.38 6 These reforms required more than
merely applying existing parentage rules on a facially neutral basis; they re-
quired reorienting parentage rules in ways that reflect the realities of same-sex
family formation and that value contributions of women who assume nontradi-
tional parental roles.3 8 In these states, lawmakers added paths to parentage
382. Of course, other scholars have made powerful arguments that marriage should not play a
role in parentage law. See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, The New "Illegitimacy": Winning Backward
in the Protection of the Children of Lesbian Couples, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 721,
722-23 (2012).
383. See Jana Singer, Marriage, Biology, and Paternity: The Case for Revitalizing the Marital Pre-
sumption, 65 MD. L. REV. 246, 266 (20o6) (arguing for the continued utility of the marital
presumption in protecting nonbiological relationships).
384. See NeJaime, supra note 16, at 1242-46.
385. The purpose of the parentage statute, as the Massachusetts high court recently recognized in
allowing an unmarried, nonbiological mother to establish parentage, "is to provide all
'[c]hildren born to parents who are not married to each other ... the same rights and pro-
tections of the law as all other children."' Partanen v. Gallagher, 59 N.E. 3 d 1133, 1138 (Mass.
2016) (quoting MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 209C, § 1 (2016)).
386. See NeJaime, supra note 16, at 1261-63; Nancy D. Polikoff, Marriage as Blindspot: What Chil-
dren with LGBT Parents Need Now, in AFTER MARRIAGE EQUALITY: THE FUTURE OF LGBT
RIGHTS 127,150 (Carlos A. Ball ed., 2016).
387. See NeJaime, supra note 16, at 1261-63.
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that turned on social factors and opened those paths to women and men, in
different-sex and same-sex couples, in marital and nonmarital families."'
Constitutional precedents also support this approach to equality. The
Court's injunction against gender stereotyping in United States v. Virginia,'" as
well as its protection of same-sex couples' marriage and parenting relationships
in United States v. Windsor3 90 and Obergefell,"' require treating women and gays
and lesbians as equally valued participants. Nonetheless, these precedents do
not definitively establish the implications of an equality principle in the parent-
ing context. In fact, it is not clear that courts would require the types of reforms
envisioned here under constitutional doctrine in its current form. Yet, as the
trajectory toward marriage equality illustrates, courts may work out the mean-
ing of equality over the course of many years and in dialogue with develop-
ments at the state level.
Accordingly, the next Section explores state-based family law reform, sug-
gesting how law might concretely address parentage when guided by commit-
ments to equality that require greater recognition of parenthood's social dimen-
sions. These reforms are meant to be illustrative and not exhaustive. The last
Section then points toward constitutional developments that may follow from
family law reform. The constitutional discussion draws on the case of marriage
equality to consider how courts might come to understand the requirements of
equal protection and due process so as to protect the social contributions of
parents, including women and same-sex couples.
B. Reorienting Parentage in Family Law
Statutory parentage regimes in most states remain rooted, to varying de-
grees, in distinct approaches to motherhood and fatherhood. While law has in-
creasingly allowed both men and women -with and without biological connec-
tions-to satisfy traditional presumptions of paternity, maternity remains
limited to women with a biological connection to the child. Accordingly, law
facilitates families without biological fathers but restricts families without bio-
logical mothers. Parentage law could move away from separate regulations of
388. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2016); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1923 (2015).
389. 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
390. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693-95 (2013).
391. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015). State courts also have reasoned about marriage and parenting in
ways that reflect the importance of regarding women and same-sex couples as full partici-
pants. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 431-32 (Conn. 2008);
Gartner v. Iowa Dep't of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335, 351 (Iowa 2013); Varnum v. Brien,
763 N.W.2d 862, 885 (Iowa 2009).
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maternity and paternity and instead work toward general regulation of parent-
age.392 This would permit a fuller recognition of the social bonds of
parenthood, for both men and women, in both different-sex and same-sex
couples, both inside and outside marriage."'
Biological connections- birth and genetics-would continue to demon-
strate parentage, but social factors would as well. Some obvious candidates in-
clude intent (especially relevant before conception and birth),39 function (rel-
evant in post-birth and longer-term scenarios), and family formation
(including, but not limited to, marriage)."' Any approach to parental recogni-
tion will credit the claims of some while rejecting the claims of others. When
biological and social factors point in different directions, the approach elabo-
rated here would recognize the social claim in some cases in which under cur-
rent law it would fail and would reject the biological claim in some cases in
which under current law it would prevail.
Some might object that the move toward social parenthood pushes law
away from administrable rules and toward individualized and contested deter-
392. As the following discussion suggests, some states provide models for this shift. For a
thoughtful perspective rejecting thoroughly gender-neutral parentage rules, see Appleton,
supra note 18, at 237-40.
393. While this Article does not explore changes to the adoption regime as a potential avenue of
reform, one could imagine making adoption less burdensome, at least in the circumstances
addressed here. Cf BARTHOLET, supra note 294, at 187. One could also imagine making
adoption a more general requirement for all parents. The latter approach would challenge
the notion that some individuals, but not others, have natural rights to parent particular
children. Cf BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 126 (1980) ("Infer-
tile citizens ... are no less entitled to fulfill their good than others who are differently en-
dowed by the genetic lottery.").
394. In cases involving ART, even those decisions reached on grounds other than intent often
align with an intent-based rule. See Mary Patricia Byrn & Lisa Giddings, An EmpiricalAnaly-
sis of the Use of the Intent Test To Determine Parentage in Assisted Reproductive Technology Cases,
5o Hous. L. REv. 1295, 1316-17 (2013). While devised first in the context of ART, intent-
based principles, perhaps surprisingly, might aid more vulnerable families. See Jacobs, supra
note 1, at 467.
395. Ideally, law would reward the work of parenting and thus prioritize functional criteria; such
criteria would align with this Article's focus on parenthood as a performative concept. But
parents and children have interests in establishing legal relationships at birth, and thus so-
cial factors must vary based on timing. Moreover, requiring parental conduct in the absence
of biological ties disadvantages same-sex couples, who have critical interests in establishing
the nonbiological parent's status at birth. See Nancy D. Polikoff, And Baby Makes ... How
Many? Using In re M.C. To Consider Parentage of a Child Conceived Through Sexual Intercourse
and Born to a Lesbian Couple, 1oo GEO. L.J. 2015, 2033 (2012). At that point, intent-
evidenced through consent to ART, written acknowledgment of parentage, or marriage to
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minations. Yet there are relatively clear and predictable ways of protecting so-
cial parenthood, ordinarily without delay or judicial involvement. This Part
suggests reforms that aim for relative certainty and predictability. Nonetheless,
to the extent that crediting parenthood's social dimensions leads law toward
more fine-grained, fact-specific assessments, this is not new.396 Courts have
long looked at social attachments and functional criteria in determining de fac-
to parental status. 97
1. The Marital Presumption
Presently all but one state maintain a marital presumption that derives a
spouse's parentage from marriage to "the woman giving birth"9 or "the natu-
ral mother."'99 While most states continue to refer to the man married to the
mother, a handful of states have revised their statutory marital presumptions to
recognize the person married to the mother.4 00 In these states, the marital pre-
sumption expressly applies to men in different-sex couples and women in
same-sex couples. Yet, only one state-Washington-has a marital presump-
tion that would also apply to women in different-sex couples and men in same-
sex couples. Washington's presumption provides that "a person is presumed to
be the parent of a child if . .. [t]he person and the mother or father of the child
are married to each other .. . and the child is born during the marriage. . . ."01
Guided by principles of equality, states could reform the marital presumption
396. Intentional and functional parenthood principles have been used by courts for many years
and have been extensively elaborated by scholars. For foundational contributions, see Hill,
supra note 91; Martha Minow, Redefining Families: Who's In and Who's Out, 62 U. COLo. L.
REV. 269 (1991); Polikoff, supra note 1; and Shultz, supra note 1. For synthesis of intentional
and functional principles, see Storrow, supra note 221.
397. See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161
(Wash. 2005). Indeed, some de facto parent statutes instruct courts to make assessments
about the quality and significance of the parent-child relationship. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (West 2015); D.C. CODE § 16-831.01 et seq. (2012). Courts also have distin-
guished between those serving in parent and nonparent roles. See, e.g., Argenio v. Fenton,
7 0 3 A.2d 1042 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (denying in loco parentis standing to a grandparent who
did not play a parental role). Nonetheless, there is a way in which the assessment of parent-
ing for purposes of parental recognition can reiterate gender stereotypes about the roles of
mothers and fathers, and specifically the caretaking norms associated with motherhood. On
the normalizing power of performative aspects of family law, see Clare Huntington, Staging
the Family, 88 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589 (2013).
398. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1881(1) (2015).
399. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 891-41 (West 2016).
400. See infra Appendix A.
401. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.116 (West 2016) (emphasis added).
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to apply in a fully gender-neutral manner. Washington's statutory language
provides a model - though one that could be altered in some ways.
Historically, the marital presumption could furnish parental recognition in
the absence of a biological relationship and deny recognition to those with bio-
logical ties. Law exploited and elaborated this feature of the marital presump-
tion as it accommodated ART. In an age of marriage equality and ART, the
marital presumption is not based on gendered, heterosexual, and biological as-
sumptions about reproduction and parenthood, but instead on social grounds
for parental recognition.402 On this understanding, it is not clear why male
same-sex couples cannot benefit from the presumption. Nor is it clear why
women without biological ties cannot attain parentage by virtue of marriage to
the biological father, just as men can attain parentage by virtue of marriage to
the biological mother.
Animated by equality principles that lead law to value the social bonds of
parenthood, the marital presumption could provide that the person married to
the biological parent at the time of the child's birth is the child's presumed par-
ent. While this type of provision would be relatively straightforward, it may
insufficiently protect the rights of women who give birth.403 That is, by auto-
matically furnishing a presumption to the wife of a biological father, it calls in-
to question the parental rights of the birth mother. Accordingly, lawmakers
might account for the interests of birth mothers by implementing a two-tiered
system of marital presumptions: first, the person married to the woman giving
birth at the time of the child's birth would be presumed the child's legal parent;
second, the person married to the genetic parent at the time of the child's birth
would be presumed to be the child's legal parent, if that person accepts the
child into his or her home and openly holds the child out as his or her child.
This approach would respect the gestational bonds of women, but at the same
time account for the parental bonds of women who separate motherhood from
biological connection. And male same-sex couples who have children together
would enjoy a nonadoptive path to dual parentage through marriage. Im-
portantly, such an approach would not necessarily render a nonbiological
mother in a different-sex couple or a nonbiological father in a same-sex couple
402. See NeJaime, supra note 16, at 1190, 1240-41.
403. Washington's presumption appears to be limited by the state's unchanged regulation of ma-
ternity. Washington law provides that the woman who gives birth is a legal parent. WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 26.26.101 (West 2016). In contrast, many other states provide merely that
the mother-child relationship may be established by proof of giving birth. Accordingly, in
Washington, the gender-neutral marital presumption might have significance for nonbio-
logical mothers in different-sex couples and nonbiological fathers in same-sex couples only
when the birth mother has already relinquished her rights or had them terminated.
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a legal parent, but would merely make that result possible by virtue of a system
of rebuttable presumptions.40 4 For the vast majority of parents, these changes
would be irrelevant.
Revisiting Doe, the Connecticut decision discussed in Part III, illustrates the
paradigmatic case in which this gender-neutral application of the marital pre-
sumption would matter. The mother there had parented her child for fourteen
years before the dissolution of her marriage. While the surrogate's rights had
long been terminated, the biological father-the mother's husband-pointed to
Connecticut's regulation of marital parentage to preclude his wife's legal status.
If she were the biological mother - whether gestational or genetic - she could
have claimed the child as a child of the marriage; her husband would have been
able to claim parental status even without a biological connection. But since she
was a nonbiological mother, the child was not a child of the marriage. A gen-
der-neutral marital presumption could resolve this problem and provide a way
to recognize the mother's status on social, rather than biological, grounds.
A gender-neutral marital presumption would promote not only sex but also
sexual-orientation equality. Notably, when Washington became the only state
to alter its marital presumption in this way,405 it did so as part of a broader
effort to protect the families formed by same-sex couples. The bill to amend
the parentage statutes followed from legal recognition of same-sex relation-
ships and sought to conform parentage law to such recognition.406 The bill was
sponsored by a legislator who had engaged in gestational surrogacy in Califor-
404. The circumstances in which biological evidence would rebut parentage presumptions must
be limited. See Polikoff, supra note 395, at 2027. For instance, where the parent is recognized
on nonbiological grounds, the court may decide that it is not appropriate to allow biological
evidence as grounds for rebuttal. See Partanen v. Gallagher, 59 N.E. 3 d 1133, 1140 (Mass.
2016). Some provisions already allow courts to exclude biological evidence based on the
child's best interests. See D.C. CODE S 16- 9 o9 (b) (2012); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 608(b)
(UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2002).
405. A Connecticut court suggested the connection between marriage equality and dual parent-
age for male same-sex couples engaging in gestational surrogacy. See Cunningham v. Tar-
diff, No. FAo8-40o9629, 2008 WL 4779641, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 14, 2008) ("[A]ny
children born as a result of these procedures acquire in all respects the status of a legitimate
child; which means that the plaintiffs do not have to terminate the parental rights of the sur-
rogate and her husband, nor do they have to adopt their own children." (citation omitted));
cf Partanen, 59 N.E. 3d at 1138 n.12 (suggesting that a nonbiological reading of the "holding
out" presumption "may apply not only to a child born to two women, but also to a child
born to two men through a surrogacy arrangement").
4o6. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.903 (West 2016); see also H.B. Rep. No. E2SHB 1267,
at 3 (Wash. 2011), http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2oll-12/Pdf/Bill%2oReports
/House/126 7 -S2.E%2oHBR%2oPL%2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/NX3D-AGPR].
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nia to have children with his same-sex partner.407 As part of the same bill, he
had attempted to repeal the state's ban on compensated surrogacy and instead
to facilitate gestational surrogacy.408 Despite support from both LGBT and
women's rights organizations in the state, the surrogacy provisions were
dropped.4 09 Yet with the revised marital presumption, women in different-sex
couples and men in same-sex couples may in some circumstances be able to
engage in egg-donor gestational surrogacy and turn to the marital presumption
to claim parentage.
Ideally, legislators would accept primary responsibility for reforming par-
entage law, as they did in Washington. But lawmakers in many states have
been slow to respond to shifts in family formation made possible by ART -
even when urged to do so by judges.410 Consequently, courts are routinely
asked to apply existing parentage principles to new and unforeseen situations.
In many states, courts can rely on existing family law principles to apply the
marital presumption in ways that promote equality and recognize parents on
social grounds.
Following the UPA, parentage codes in many jurisdictions expressly pro-
vide that, where possible, provisions governing the father-child relationship
apply to the mother-child relationship.4 11 Courts have appealed to this gender-
neutrality principle to recognize women in same-sex couples, in both marital
and nonmarital families, on purely social grounds. Going forward, courts could
apply this principle in more far-reaching ways, so as to recognize women in
different-sex couples and men in same-sex couples on social grounds.4 12
407. See Associated Press, Surrogate Mothers Bill Debated, LEWISTON MORNING TRIB. (Mar.
16, 2011), http://Imtribune.com/northwest/surrogate-mothers-bill-debated/article-94a8ds
7 -o9c5 -5f9d-b9bb-6ecf83oo 7 7 c9.html [http://perma.cc/QK52-4DJ5].
408. See H.R. 1267, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 56-57 (Wash. 2011).
409. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.210 (West 2016).
410. See, e.g., Culliton v. Beth Isr. Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133, 1139 (Mass. 2001).
411. See supra notes 165-166 and accompanying text. About half the states have adopted either
the original or revised UPA. See Parentage Act Enactment Status Map, UNIFORM L. Comvis-
SION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Parentage%2oAct [http://perma.cc
/FL 7 9-A6BM]; Parentage Act (1973) Enactment Status Map, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Parentage%2oAct%2o(1973) [http://perma.cc
/62EC-4WYD].
412. More general rules of statutory construction may also aid this move, but they vary in critical
ways across jurisdictions. While some states have absolute gender-neutral rules of construc-
tion, others limit gender-neutrality such that the masculine includes the feminine but the
feminine does not include the masculine. See Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common
Law ofInterpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341, 370 (2010). In addition, use of specifically gendered
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Consider S.N.V, a case from Colorado in which a husband and wife had
been raising a child from the husband's extramarital relationship.4 13 When, two
years after the child's birth, the birth mother sought custody, the husband and
wife claimed to be the child's legal parents to the birth mother's exclusion. Col-
orado's statutory marital presumption provided that "[a] man is presumed to
be the natural father of a child if ... [h]e and the child's natural mother
are ... married to each other and the child is born during the marriage."414 Re-
lying on the parentage code's gender-neutrality principle, the court found that
even though "on its face, [the provision] applies only to paternity determina-
tions," it "extended to maternity determinations."4 15 The biological father's
wife, the court determined, could "bring an action to establish her legal mater-
nity, even though she [was] not the biological mother."416 The court recognized
a social path to parentage by virtue of "[a] woman's proof of marriage to the
child's father."417 This is not to say that the nonbiological mother prevails over
the birth mother, but rather that she simply has standing to assert parentage.
Within a legal regime that limits parentage to two individuals, the decision au-
thorizes a result that would prioritize the social bonds of the biological father's
wife over the claims of the birth mother.
S.N.V's application of the marital presumption is an outlier. If its logic
were accepted more widely, parentage could be derived in the first instance
from the biological father - a transformative shift in the law of parenthood.
Critically, though, this shift would be consistent with equality commitments
that already have reshaped other aspects of family law, and it would eradicate
some of the asymmetries that continue to pervade parentage law.
2. Voluntary Acknowledgments of Parentage
While the marital presumption addresses children born inside marriage,
states maintain statutory frameworks to recognize the parents of nonmarital
terms like mother, father, husband, and wife may be seen to carry their gendered connota-
tions. See Gartner v. Iowa Dep't of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335, 349 (Iowa 2013).
413. In re S.N.V., 284 P.3d 147, 148 (Colo. App. 2011). They contended, against the allegation of
the birth mother, that they had arranged for the birth mother to act as a surrogate. Id.
414. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-105 (West 2016).
415. In re S.N.V, 284 P.3d at 151.
416. Id. at 148.
417. Id. at 151. The parentage code provides that the mother-child relationship may be established
"by proof of her having given birth to the child or by any other proof specified in [the
code] ." COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-104. The same result could be reached through a gen-
der-neutral and nonbiological "holding out" presumption. See In re S.N.V, 284 P.3d at 151.
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children. Every state uses a procedure, commonly termed a Voluntary Ac-
knowledgment of Paternity (VAP), to identify a nonmarital child's father.4 18
VAPs purport to identify the child's biological father. The identification of a sec-
ond legal parent alleviates some of the burdens experienced by nonmarital
children. But because same-sex couples ordinarily include a nonbiological par-
ent, the biological foundation of VAPs does not repair-but instead exacer-
bates-burdens experienced by the nonmarital children of same-sex couples.
The equality principles guiding reform would lead states to open VAPs to
same-sex couples in ways that render VAPs explicitly capable of capturing so-
cial, and not only biological, grounds for parenthood.
As the revised UPA sets out the VAP mechanism, "The mother of a child
and a man claiming to be the genetic father of the child may sign an acknowledg-
ment of paternity with intent to establish the man's paternity."4 19 After sixty
days, VAPs have the force of an adjudication.4 20 VAPs assume biological pater-
nity but do not formally require paternity testing.42 1 Accordingly, they effec-
tively facilitate parental recognition on purely social grounds. In fact, courts in
many states have rejected subsequent challenges to VAPs based on the father's
lack of genetic connection to the child.4 22
Yet VAPs emphasize biological paternity in ways that obscure their nonbio-
logical capacity. This means that VAPs capture nonbiological parenthood only
for different-sex couples who, unlike their same-sex counterparts, can pretend
they are the child's biological parents. So long as the signatories are an unmar-
ried man and woman, the VAP can have the force of an adjudication of paterni-
ty regardless of biological facts. An unmarried lesbian couple, in contrast, can-
not sign a VAP. Accordingly, in most states, the nonbiological mother cannot
establish parentage upon the child's birth. Nonbiological fathers can deploy
their heterosexual relationship to achieve parentage, while nonbiological moth-
ers are excluded.
A more egalitarian system would expressly allow VAPs to recognize parents
not only on biological but also on social grounds.4 23 Voluntary acknowledg-
418. See Harris, supra note 88, at 469.
419. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 301 (UNIF. LAw COMM'N 2002) (emphasis added). " [T]he man and
the mother acknowledge his paternity, under penalty of perjury" but are not required to
prove paternity. Id. § 301 cmt.
420. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)-(D) (2012); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 305, 307, 308.
421. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 302.
422. See J.A.I. v. B.R., 160 So.3d 473, 474 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015); In re Parentage of G.E.M.,
890 N.E.2d 944, 955 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008); In re Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488, 490-91
& n.2 (Mass. 2001).
423. Cf Harris, supra note 88, at 478-88; Jacobs, supra note 1, at 497-98.
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ments of paternity could become voluntary acknowledgments of parentage and
apply to both biological and nonbiological parents, including both men and
women.424 Drafters of revisions to the UPA have proposed this type of reform.
The January 2017 discussion draft included a VAP procedure in which "[t] he
woman who gave birth to a child and an individual claiming to be the alleged
genetic father, intended parent, or presumed parent of the child may sign an ac-
knowledgment of parentage with intent to establish the child's parentage."42 5
3. The Regulation of ART
The marital presumption and VAP procedure envisioned above would ac-
commodate some forms of ART through generally applicable regulations of pa-
rental recognition. Same-sex couples who engaged in donor insemination, for
example, could sign a VAP to establish parentage for the nonbiological mother.
Still, legislatures have compelling reasons to regulate ART through specific
statutory provisions. In fact, states with the most extensive recognition of par-
entage through ART have enacted elaborate regulations aimed solely at assisted
reproduction.
Lawmakers in these states have used the concept of consent to build statu-
tory frameworks that open paths to nonadoptive parentage based on social, and
not simply biological, grounds. The concept of consent already structures ap-
proaches to at least some forms of ART in practically every state. A more com-
prehensive and evenhanded use of consent in the regulation of ART can pro-
mote equality, based on gender, sexual orientation, and marital status.426
Approaches to both donor insemination and gestational surrogacy illustrate
this point.
In every state, the man married to a woman who conceives with donor
sperm is treated as the legal father. Under relevant statutes, his consent to as-
424. As the Massachusetts high court recently suggested in dictum, if "a father validly may exe-
cute [a VAP] absent a genetic relationship," a VAP also "may be executed by a same-sex cou-
ple, even if one member of the couple is not biologically related to the children." Partanen v.
Gallagher, 59 N.E. 3 d 1133, 1139 (Mass. 2016).
425. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 301 (UNIF. LAw COMM'N, Discussion Draft Mar. 17-18,
2017) (emphasis added), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/parentage/2017mar
RUPA Mtg%2oDraft No%2oadd'l%20comments.pdf [http://perma.cc/A3ZS-DQ6A].
426. See Joslin, supra note 1, at 1222 (" [T]he most appropriate solution is to extend the consent =
legal parent rule to all children born through assisted reproduction, regardless of the marital
status, gender, or sexual orientation of the intended parents." (citation omitted)); see also
Polikoff, supra note 18, at 233 (addressing donor insemination). The current draft version of
the UPA takes an approach that applies the concept of consent broadly to ART. See UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT, supra note 425, § 704.
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sisted reproduction authorizes his recognition.4 2 7 in most states, though, his
consent would be legally unavailing if he were not married to the child's moth-
er.428 While this presents obstacles to different-sex couples, its greatest impact
has been on same-sex couples, who rely more heavily on donor insemination to
have children and historically were excluded from marriage. In a regime ani-
mated by equality commitments, an unmarried partner, like a mother's spouse,
would derive parentage from intention - operationalized through written con-
sent to the mother's use of ART with the intent to be a parent. For example, as
Maine's newly enacted parentage code provides, "a person who consents to as-
sisted reproduction by a woman ... with the intent to be the parent of a result-
ing child is a parent of the resulting child."4 29 Not only would this remedy some
of the inequalities that the biological framework governing nonmarital
parenthood imposes specifically on same-sex couples, it would also help un-
married different-sex couples who engage in ART.
Even as states open various forms of assisted reproduction on equal terms,
they might still devise specific regulations for particular practices. Because sur-
rogacy raises concerns with the exploitation of low-income women and the
commodification of children and women's reproductive labor, lawmakers may
continue to treat surrogacy with special caution. Those states that have author-
ized gestational surrogacy for both different-sex and same-sex couples have
done so through specific regulatory frameworks that seek to protect intended
parents, surrogates, and children. Regulating in ways that attend to the inter-
ests of surrogates does not mean that surrogates possess parental rights. In-
stead, these states cut off claims to parental recognition and recognize the in-
tended parents at the child's birth.
Maine's recent reform exemplifies this pattern. The state's parentage code
separately regulates gestational surrogacy by providing that, if certain condi-
tions relating to protection of the surrogate's interests are met,430 intended par-
ents "are by operation of law the .. .parents of the resulting child immediately
upon the birth of the child."43 1 This regime allows both biological and nonbio-
logical intended parents, in both different-sex and same-sex couples, both in-
side and outside of marriage, to attain parentage upon the child's birth.43 2 In
427. See Polikoff, supra note 18, at 234.
428. See infra Appendix B.
429. See ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 1923 (2016).
430. See id. § 1931.
431. See id. § 1933.
432. The current version of the UPA now being drafted and considered also takes this approach.
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, supra note 425, § 809.
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doing so, it recognizes the importance of social contributions for those engag-
ing in ART, and it applies mechanisms that capture those social contributions
in ways that promote equality along lines of gender, sexuality, and marital sta-
tus.
C. Reorienting Constitutional Law on Parenthood
Attention to family law's treatment of parent-child relationships makes vis-
ible emergent constitutional questions. These questions may first arise in state
courts under state law but will likely confront federal courts eventually. Consti-
tutional precedents on the rights of women and gays and lesbians, including
with respect to family and parenting relationships, demonstrate a strong com-
mitment to including as full participants those who have been traditionally ex-
cluded. Nonetheless, courts have not determined what these precedents mean
for purposes of the specific relationships addressed in this Article. This Section
explores how, in response to significant state-level reform, shifting patterns of
family formation, and evolving norms of gender and sexuality, federal constitu-
tional law may develop in ways that expand the space of parental recognition.
1. Equal Protection and Parental Recognition
Today, parental recognition implicates questions of equality -including on
grounds of gender, sexuality, and marital status. But equal protection doctrine,
as currently constituted, may struggle to adequately address issues arising in
parenthood. The following discussion considers doctrinal features that present
obstacles to effective constitutional oversight in the law of parental recognition,
looks to marriage equality as a site in which these features did not prevent
meaningful constitutional review, and then considers how law might develop
on questions of parental recognition.
a. Contested Sites of Equality Law
Some features of current equal protection doctrine may constrain develop-
ments that promote gender and sexual-orientation equality in the law of paren-
tal recognition. As Part I showed, the Court has permitted gender differentia-
tion in the legal regulation of parenthood, justifying such differentiation by
resort to reproductive biology. Reasoning first articulated at the dawn of mod-
ern sex-equality doctrine continues to supply authority for the differential
treatment of mothers and fathers. The failure to see gender differentiation in
parenthood as a sex-equality problem led law to devalue the social contribu-
tions of unmarried biological fathers. In the contemporary regulation of par-
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entage, this failure also leads law to discount the social contributions of women
who separate parenthood from biological ties.
Other features of equal protection doctrine also pose obstacles. The Court
has focused on questions of classification and discriminatory purpose in ways
that mask inequality. For example, the Court has resisted an approach to sex
equality that understands "legislative classification [s] concerning pregnancy
[as] ... sex-based classification[s]."43 And it has required a particularly de-
manding showing of "discriminatory purpose"434 in challenges to laws "neutral
on [their] face"4 35 -that state actors took "a particular course of action at least
in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifia-
ble group."436
In the law of parental recognition, courts might fail to see how a legal re-
gime that privileges biological over social connections discriminates against
lesbian and gay parents. Courts might conclude that so long as the government
treats nonbiological unmarried parents the same (closing paths to their paren-
tal recognition), it acts in accordance with principles of equal protection. Com-
pounding the problem, courts might view access to marriage as curing discrim-
ination against same-sex couples and thus may give the government wide
latitude in drawing distinctions that harm same-sex couples' nonmarital fami-
lies.437
Certainly, these doctrinal features complicate effective constitutional over-
sight in the law of parental recognition. Yet, critically, these features did not
prove dispositive in judicial approaches to marriage equality. Instead, courts
considered social meaning in ways that led them to repudiate forms of exclu-
sion that had long been taken for granted.43 8 The Windsor Court did not appear
to view the question of whether DOMA classified on the basis of sexual orien-
433. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974). But see Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v.
Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 737 (2003) (upholding the Family and Medical Leave Act and treating
laws regulating pregnancy leave as implicating questions of sex equality).
434. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 237 (1976).
435. Id. at 241-
436. Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 258 (1979).
437. Scholars have pointed out how Obergefell may authorize discrimination against nonmarital
family bonds. See, e.g., Melissa Murray, Obergefell v. Hodges and Non marriage Inequality,
104 CALIF. L. REV. 1207 (2016). But see Courtney G. Joslin, The Gay Rights Canon and the
Right to Nonmarriage, 96 B.U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2017) (arguing that Obergefell can sup-
port constitutional protection of nonmarital families).
438. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015) (" [N]ew insights and societal under-
standings can reveal unjustified inequality within our most fundamental institutions that
once passed unnoticed and unchallenged.").
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tation as central, and thus neither addressed nor resolved it.4 3 9 instead, the
Court focused on DOMA's purpose and effect. "The avowed purpose and prac-
tical effect of the law," the Court explained, "are to impose a disadvantage, a
separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages
made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States."440 The harm the
Court sought to remedy was not merely that the law differentiated but that it
excluded and disrespected same-sex couples' family relationships -"tell [ing]
[same-sex] couples, and all the world, that their ... marriages are unworthy of
federal recognition."44 1 Without legal recognition, "same-sex . .. couples ha[d]
their lives burdened . .. in visible and public ways."4 4 2
In striking down state marriage bans in Obergefell, the Court concluded that
"the marriage laws . . . are in essence unequal."4 4 3 While the Court reasoned
primarily in terms of due process, its equality analysis focused not on questions
of discriminatory purpose but instead on the impact of marriage bans on same-
sex couples. The Court condemned the laws because they "serve[d] to disre-
spect and subordinate" gays and lesbians.4 44 "Especially against a long history
of disapproval of their relationships," the exclusion of same-sex couples
"work[ed] a grave and continuing harm."4 45 The Court required the govern-
ment to make insiders of same-sex couples, declaring that "[iut demeans gays
and lesbians for the State to lock them out of a central institution of the Na-
tion's society."446
439. See generally Zachary Herz, The Marrying Kind, 83 TENN. L. REV. 83 (2015). Of course, there
are strong arguments that laws prohibiting same-sex marriage classify on the basis of sexual
orientation. See Douglas Nejaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious Ex-
emptions, and the Production of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, loo CALIF. L. REv. 1169,
1195-99 (2012); Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, Concurring Opinion, in WHAT OBERGE-
FELL V. HODGEs SHOULD HAvE SAID (Jack Balkin ed., forthcoming 2017).
440. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013).
441. Id. at 2694; see also Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court 2012 Term, Foreword: Equality Divided,
127 HARV. L. REv. 1, 90 (2013) (" [T]he Court emphasizes the message the law's enforcement
communicates to people, what it 'tells' them .... This is an account of how people under-
stand and experience the law.").
442. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. As Ackerman argues, the reasoning in Windsor focused on "social
meaning," "moving beyond the law world to the lifeworld." AcKrERmAN, supra note 276, at
308.
443. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604.
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id. at 2602.
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b. Sexual-Orientation Equality and Parental Recognition
The approach to equality that guided resolution of the marriage question
could shape approaches to questions of parental recognition. Disputes emerg-
ing in state courts under state constitutional law are illustrative. In ordering the
state to apply its marital presumption to lesbian couples, the Iowa Supreme
Court relied on its earlier decision holding the state's marriage law unconstitu-
tional.447 Even though the law referred to "mothers" and "fathers" -just as the
marriage law referred to women and men-the court rejected the argument
that it classified only on the basis of sex, and not sexual orientation. Instead,
the court concluded that "the refusal to list the nonbirthing lesbian spouse on
the child's birth certificate 'differentiates implicitly on the basis of sexual orien-
tation.'"44 8 As in its earlier marriage decision, the court addressed the issue as
one of discrimination against gays and lesbians. For the court, the effect of the
law on same-sex couples appeared more important than a formal approach to
questions of classification.
The concern with social meaning in marriage equality jurisprudence ex-
tends to parent-child relationships. In fact, Windsor and Obergefell each focused
on the impact on children. The exclusion of same-sex couples, the Windsor
Court explained, not only "demeans the couple," but also "humiliates tens of
thousands of children now being raised by same-sex couples."449 The Court
emphasized the difficulty that children would experience in "understand[ing]
the integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other fami-
lies in their community and in their daily lives."450 Again, in Obergefell, the
Court declared that for those "gays and lesbians [who] . .. create loving, sup-
portive families," the legal exclusion "harm[s] and humiliate[s] [their] chil-
dren."45 1 The Court observed that "[w]ithout the recognition, stability, and
predictability marriage offers, children [of same-sex couples] suffer the stigma
of knowing their families are somehow lesser."452
In this sense, marriage equality precedents push courts to reevaluate
whether existing parentage regimes furnish equality to gays and lesbians and
their children. As New York's highest court recently acknowledged in repudiat-
447. Gartner v. Iowa Dep't of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335, 341 (Iowa 2013).
448. Id. at 352 (quoting Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 885 (Iowa 2009)).
449. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013).
450. Id.
451. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 26oo-ol.
452. Id. at 26oo. Even the Court's earlier cases on unmarried fathers were driven by concern for
children's welfare. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 391 (1979).
2350
126:226o 2017
THE NATURE OF PARENTHOOD
ing a twenty-five-year precedent that excluded unmarried nonbiological par-
ents from parentage, the "foundational premise of heterosexual parenting and
nonrecognition of same-sex couples is unsustainable, particularly in light of the
enactment of same-sex marriage .. . and the .. . holding in Obergefell v. Hodges,
which noted that the right to marry provides benefits not only for same-sex
couples, but also the children being raised by those couples."4 53 Obergefell may
reshape legal regulation even in traditionally resistant jurisdictions. Indeed, a
Louisiana appellate court recently reevaluated the state's treatment of unmar-
ried nonbiological parents based on Obergefell, which the court read to protect
not only marriage but also "the decision to start a family." 54
Guided by marriage equality precedents, courts would focus on the mean-
ing and impact of the law, rather than simply on whether the law classifies
based on sexual orientation.4 5 Unlike different-sex family formation, same-sex
family formation ordinarily - almost necessarily- features nonbiological paren-
tal ties. Accordingly, treating same-sex couples like different-sex couples is an
empty promise so long as biological connection remains parenthood's animat-
ing logic.
The harms documented in Part III would become relevant to an examina-
tion of the constitutionality of the state's regulation of parentage. Nonrecogni-
tion and resort to adoption are concrete harms inflicted on same-sex parents
and their children. The regime that imposes these burdens treats same-sex
couples' families as less deserving of respect and recognition. As the New York
court reasoned, an approach to parenthood that does not turn on biological
connection is necessary to "ensure[] equality for same-sex parents and pro-
vide [] the opportunity for their children to have the love and support of two
453. Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E. 3d 488, 498 (N.Y. 2016) (citation omitted). Today's
treatment of lesbian and gay parents occurs against the backdrop of a long history of disap-
proval of lesbian and gay parental bonds. See Rosky, supra note 22.
454. Ferrand v. Ferrand, No. 16-CA- 7 , 2016 BL 285753, at *7 (La. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2016); see also
McGaw v. McGaw, 468 S.W.3d 435, 453-54 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (Clayton, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
455. The marriage decisions' approach to equality loosely maps onto antisubordination reason-
ing. See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 157
(1976) (arguing that under the "group-disadvantaging principle," "what is critical ... is that
the ... law or practice aggravates (or perpetuates?) the subordinate position of a specially
disadvantaged group"); see also Balkin, supra note 271, at 2343 ("The Constitution has an
egalitarian demand, ... which ... is a demand for equality of social status. . . ."); Jack M.
Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification orAntisubordi-
nation?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 9 (2003) (describing antisubordination reasoning as envi-
sioning "reform [of] institutions and practices that enforce the secondary social status of
historically oppressed groups").
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committed parents."4 5 6 Social paths to parental recognition, courts might con-
clude, are necessary to treat gays and lesbians as fully belonging in the institu-
tion of parenthood.
c. Sex Equality and Parental Recognition
While the constitutional treatment of gays and lesbians has evolved dra-
matically in recent years, the law of sex equality has received less attention. Yet
issues of gender differentiation in parenthood continue to arise in both family
law and immigration law. While cases in both settings illustrate how law has
insufficiently credited the social contributions of biological fathers, the con-
temporary treatment of ART shows that law also insufficiently credits the social
contributions of nonbiological mothers.
Constitutional precedents have permitted this system by citing biological
differences between women and men to authorize the differential treatment of
mothers and fathers. In rejecting the claims of unmarried fathers in the 1970s
and 1980s,457 the Court justified the state's treatment in terms of reproductive
differences - even in the face of facts that evidenced actual father-child relation-
ships. This dynamic arose even more powerfully in immigration cases. In Ngu-
yen, the Court upheld regulations making it more difficult for fathers to confer
citizenship on nonmarital children. The Court connected a woman's biological
role in reproduction to the "opportunity for mother and child to develop a real,
meaningful relationship."45 8 Yet it dismissed the claim of the father, who had in
fact developed a "real, meaningful relationship," because "[tihe same oppor-
tunity does not result from the event of birth, as a matter of biological inevita-
bility."4 59
Other sex-equality precedents, however, take a different approach to sex-
based classifications that implicate physiological differences between women
and men. In holding the exclusion of women from the Virginia Military Insti-
tute (VMI) unconstitutional, the Court in United States v. Virginia recognized
the persistence of "inherent differences" between women and men, but ex-
plained that such differences cannot form the basis "for denigration of the
members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual's opportuni-
456. Brooke S.B., 61 N.E. 3 d at 498-99.
457. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (blocking a claim to parental recognition); Par-
ham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (rejecting a claim to recovery under a wrongful death
statute).
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ty."4 60 Sex-based classifications, the Court declared, "may not be used, as they
once were, to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of
women. "461 The Court rested its decision on an equality principle premised on
inclusion and participation, impugning laws that deny to women "full citizen-
ship stature -equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute
to society based on their individual talents and capacities."4 62
Virginia and Nguyen share some common themes. They treat sex-based
classifications as presumptively unconstitutional and subject such classifica-
tions to heightened scrutiny regardless of whether they implicate physiological
differences between women and men.46 3 They recognize that in some circum-
stances, sex-based classifications can be justified in light of physiological differ-
ences.464 But they diverge in their approach to those circumstances. The ten-
sion between Virginia and Nguyen manifests itself most clearly in the law of
parental recognition. If courts were to reason about parenthood from Virginia,
rather than Nguyen, they would likely exhibit less tolerance for gender differen-
tiation.
This term, the Court has before it another case challenging the differential
treatment of unmarried mothers and fathers in the immigration context.4 65 The
law imposed longer residency requirements on unmarried fathers who wished
to transmit citizenship to their children. In 2011, an equally divided Court
affirmed per curiam a Ninth Circuit decision upholding these regulations.466
46o. 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). As Reva Siegel shows, even when the Court reasons in what many
consider to be an anticlassification framework, it often vindicates antisubordination values.
See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitu-
tional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1470, 1472-73 (2004).
461. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534 (internal citation omitted). As Cary Franklin argues, the Court's rea-
soning suggests that "equal protection law should be particularly alert to the possibility of
sex stereotyping in contexts where 'real' differences are involved, because these are the con-
texts in which sex classifications have most often been used to perpetuate sex-based inequal-
ity." Franklin, supra note 343, at 146.
462. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532. This resonates with Akhil Amar's discussion of how to address, as a
constitutional matter, the historical exclusion of women from the country's decision-making
community. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 279 (2012) (ask-
ing how, after the Nineteenth Amendment's adoption, "should faithful constitutional inter-
pretation make amends for the retrospectively problematic exclusions that defined the
American constitutional order prior to 1920?").
463. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 61; Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531.
464. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 68; Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532.
465. Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 2545 (2016) (No. 15-1191); see sources cited supra note
123.
466. See Flores-Villar v. United States, 564 U.S. 210 (2011) (per curiam).
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The Ninth Circuit had relied heavily on Nguyen, which involved a different set
of sex-based regulations.4 67
In rejecting the regulations now before the Court, the Second Circuit re-
fused to extend Nguyen. Instead, Virginia guided the court's analysis.4 68 The
court found that, despite differences between women and men with respect to
reproduction, the sex-differentiated residence requirements were "not substan-
tially related to the goal of ensuring a sufficient connection between citizen
children and the United States."4 69 The Second Circuit explained that the sex-
based distinction in the immigration regulations "arguably reflect[s] gender-
based generalizations concerning who would care for and be associated with a
child born out of wedlock." 4 7 0 By imposing more onerous requirements on bio-
logical fathers, the regulations not only enforced views that inevitably imposed
child rearing on women but also failed to adequately credit the father-child re-
lationship at stake. Indeed, the father had legitimated the child by marrying the
mother when the child was eight.4 7 1
Decisions on questions of parenthood in immigration may shape decisions
in family law, just as earlier decisions relating to family law underwrote subse-
quent decisions regarding citizenship status. If the Court affirms the Second
Circuit's decision regarding parenthood in immigration law, it may also begin
to question the wisdom of relying on biological justifications to distinguish be-
tween motherhood and fatherhood for purposes of family law.472 State court
reasoning that relies on Nguyen to justify the nonrecognition of nonbiological
mothers for purposes of parentage law could become suspect.
Consider Amy G. v. M.W, 4 73 a California case with facts reminiscent of
S.N.V, 474 the Colorado marital presumption case discussed earlier. The biolog-
ical father and his wife had been raising the child, who at the time of the deci-
467. See Flores-Villar v. United States, 536 F.3 d 990, 996 (9 th Cir. 2008), aff'd, 564 U.S. 210.
468. See Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520, 528-31 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct.
2545 (2016) (No. 15-1191).
469. Id. at 531.
470. Id. at 533-34.
471. Id. at 524.
472. See Siegel, supra note 122, at 264-65 (discussing how questions of gender equality are ob-
scured by physiological reasoning about reproduction in the legal regulation of abortion).
On the confused treatment of parentage through ART in citizenship law, see Abrams & Pia-
centi, supra note 123, at 699-700.
473. 142 Cal. App. 4 th 1 (20o6), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 934 (2007), superseded by statute in part,
2008 Cal. Stat. 233, as recognized in In re Bryan D., 199 Cal. App. 4 th 127, 139 (2011).
474. In re S.N.V., 284 P.3d 147, 148 (Colo. App. 2011).
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sion was three, since he was one month old.475 The birth mother had surren-
dered the one-month-old child to the father and had signed an agreement con-
senting to adoption by the father's wife, but months later filed a petition to es-
tablish a parental relationship.4 76 Unlike in Colorado, the California court held
that the father's wife did not have standing to establish parentage pursuant to
the marital presumption.4 7 7 Rejecting her equal protection argument, the court
explicitly resorted to the Court's reasoning in Nguyen:
While a biological father's genetic contribution to his child may arise
from nothing more than a fleeting encounter, the biological mother car-
ries the child for the nine-month gestational period. Because of this in-
herent difference between men and women with respect to reproduc-
tion, the wife of a man who fathered a child with another woman is not
similarly situated to a man whose wife was impregnated by another
man.
4 7 8
Of course, men and women are not similarly situated with respect to reproduc-
tive biology. But, guided by Nguyen, the court translated biological differences
between women and men into social and legal differences between mothers
and fathers. The point here is not to suggest that the birth mother should not
have prevailed. Rather, it is that the court relied on biological differences to jus-
tify a system that denies standing to assert parentage to a woman who had
formed a parent-child relationship on social grounds.
In contrast, an approach guided by Virginia would have asked whether,
notwithstanding biological differences between women and men, the gender-
differentiated parentage law is substantially related to an important govern-
mental objective. 4 7 9 Parentage laws, as many courts have recognized, are driven
by the state's interests in identifying those individuals responsible for the sup-
port of the child, protecting the integrity of the family, and safeguarding the
child's interest in continuity of care. 48 0 The differentiation between men and
women who step forward to parent children- that is, the recognition of nonbi-
475. Amy G., 142 Cal. App. 4 th at 4.
476. Id. at 5-6.
477. Id. at 13. Like Colorado, California's marital presumption referred to the "natural mother,"
and the parentage law included a gender-neutrality directive. CAL. FAM. CODE. §§ 7611(a),
7650(a) (West 2013).
478. Amy G., 142 Cal. App. 4 th at 17.
479. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 545 (1996).
480. See sources cited and accompanying text supra note 376; see also ALSTOTT, supra note 307, at 5
(stating that "continuity of care helps define what a parent is").
2355
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
ological fathers but not mothers -may not advance those interests but instead
may undermine them. 1 A sex-neutral alternative could promote the govern-
ment's interests as effectively.482 Again, such an approach would not mean that
the biological father's wife in a case like Amy G. would prevail but that she
merely would have standing to assert parentage.
Here, again, the principles animating the Court's recent marriage decisions
provide guidance. If courts were to reason in the tradition of Windsor and
Obergefell, they might focus the constitutional inquiry not simply on means-
ends analysis but also on the law's social meaning.4 83 A court might ask wheth-
er the parentage law devalues women's social bonds in the absence of biological
ties and thereby denigrates important relationships of care and support formed
between parents and children. Again, the harms documented in Part III would
be relevant to the constitutional inquiry. Courts would view with skepticism a
legal regime that forces nonbiological mothers, but not nonbiological fathers,
to adopt their children. A court might ask whether the parentage law reflects
views that tie women to child rearing as a matter of biology. As Part III
showed, the nonrecognition of nonbiological mothers-as seen specifically in
approaches to surrogacy -perpetuates the notion that the social role of moth-
erhood flows inevitably from the biological fact of maternity. Guided by an
equality-inflected approach, the Amy G. court, for instance, might have repudi-
ated the trial court's reasoning, which suggested that the nonbiological mother
was "[no] different from a live-in nanny"484 - presumably also a woman who
cares for a child not biologically her own.
Rather than insulate gender differentiation in parenthood from scrutiny
based on biological differences between women and men, courts might provide
constitutional oversight in ways that detect gender stereotypes and require sex-
neutral alternatives. This may furnish greater recognition of unmarried biolog-
ical fathers - like those in Parham and Nguyen - who commit to the social work
of parenting. It may also dislodge motherhood from biological ties in ways that
recognize women-like those in Doe and S.N.V-who parent children to
481. Cf Gartner v. Iowa Dep't of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335, 353 (Iowa 2013) ("When a lesbian
couple is married, it is just as important to establish who is financially responsible for the
child and the legal rights of the nonbirthing spouse.").
482. See Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3 d 520, 529 (2d Cir. 2015) ("In assessing the validity of
the gender-based classification, ... we consider the existence of gender-neutral alternatives
to the classification."), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 2545 (2016) (No. 15-1191).
483. Cf AMAR, supra note 462, at 302 (noting that "social meaning becomes especially important
with regard to certain issues of gender equality" including those that implicate "biological
differences between the sexes").
484. Amy G. v. M.W., 142 Cal. App. 4 th 1, 8 (20o6).
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whom they have neither a gestational nor genetic connection. Both of these de-
velopments would value parenthood's social dimensions in ways that promote
children's interests in continuing and stable relationships.
2. Equality and Parental Liberty
Given that equality concerns have structured the protection of liberty in the
realm of family relationships, the law of parental recognition might also evolve
as a matter of due process, which this Section only briefly considers.485 As Part
I showed, the Court's efforts in the 1970s to protect the parental rights of un-
married fathers grew out of concerns with the inequalities experienced by
nonmarital parents and children. At that time, the Court announced that un-
married fathers have a due process interest in parenthood that springs from
their biological connection to the child.4 86 Even though the Court required so-
cial performance from biological fathers, biological connection continued to
ground the claim to constitutional protection.48 7 Since then, challenges to the
biological limitation on constitutional protection have largely failed.488
485. See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 439. Liberty and equality are entwined in what Laurence
Tribe identifies as "a legal double helix." Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Funda-
mental Right" That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1893, 1898 (2004); see also
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive Equal Protection, 47 UCLA L.
REv. 1183 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Re-
lationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1161 (1988); Kenji
Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARv. L. REv. 747, 749 (2011).
486. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972).
487. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983) ("[T]he biological connection ... offers the
natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his
offspring:"). The biological basis of parental liberty trades on a negative-liberty understand-
ing of constitutional rights, rather than a due process doctrine that confers affirmative
recognition. For competing accounts of this negative-positive distinction in constitutional
approaches to family law, compare Anne L. Alstott, Neoliberalism in U.S. Family Law: Nega-
tive Liberty and Laissez-Faire Markets in the Minimal State, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25
(2014), with Susan Frelich Appleton, Obergefell's Liberties: All in the Family, 77 OHIo ST. L.J.
919 (2016). For an approach that grounds rights to parental recognition in due process, see
NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 439.
488. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844-45 (1977) (re-
jecting the claims of foster parents and affirming the importance of "natural" parent-child
bonds, but leaving unsettled when, if ever, foster parents might have constitutional liberty
interests). But see Elwell v. Byers, 699 F.3 d 1208, 1216 (loth Cit. 2012) (extending constitu-
tional protection to "preadoptive parents [who] have a more significant relationship than
foster care because of the possibility of developing a permanent adoptive relationship" (quo-
tation marks omitted)). Notably, in Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court assumed the litigant,
who was the legal guardian of her niece, could claim constitutional parental rights vis-a-vis
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But with new appreciation for the equal status of gay and lesbian parents,
courts might eventually recognize the social bonds of parenthood as a matter of
due process.489 Again, marriage equality jurisprudence provides support for
this approach, suggesting how emergent understandings of equality can re-
shape understandings of liberty.4 90 In Obergefell, the Court observed that the
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage "may long have seemed natural
and just . * "491 But, it reasoned, new understandings of the equal status of
gays and lesbians made clear that the exclusion impermissibly "impose[s]
stigma and injury . .. "492 Echoing the emphasis in Windsor's equal protection
analysis, the Obergefell Court's due process analysis focused on how the "exclu-
sion [from marriage] has the effect of teaching that gays and lesbians are une-
qual in important respects."49 3 Explaining how the lack of recognition "con-
signed [same-sex couples] to an instability many opposite-sex couples would
deem intolerable in their own lives,"494 the Court, as a matter of due process,
required the government to treat gays and lesbians as insiders.
If Obergefell were to guide approaches to parental recognition, courts might
extend due process protection to social bonds in the absence of biological con-
nection. Indeed, this development would build on and elaborate commitments
that animated the Court's earlier precedents. Decisions on unmarried fathers
emphasized men's social contributions, even as constitutional protection was
rooted in the biological tie. And when the Court articulated the due process in-
terest in parental recognition, it did so to promote equality for nonmarital par-
her niece, even though it ultimately upheld the governmental intervention. 321 U.S. 158, 161
(1944).
489. A federal district court recently recognized a nonbiological same-sex spouse's "right to be a
parent" as a matter of due process. Henderson v. Adams, No. 1:15-cv-oo22o-TWP-MJD,
2016 WL 3548645, at *15 (S.D. Ind. June 30, 2016). At least one court has suggested that an
unmarried nonbiological mother may have a constitutional liberty interest to maintain the
parental relationship. See In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 177 n.27 (Wash. 2005) (noting
that the nonbiological mother "persuasively argue[s] that [she and the child] ... have con-
stitutionally protected rights to maintain their parent-child relationship," but concluding
that "granting defacto parental standing to [nonbiological mother] renders these additional
constitutional concerns moot").
490. See Cary Franldin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay Rights, loo
VA. L. REv. 817 (2014); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (striking down
sodomy prohibitions by stressing how protection for same-sex sexuality is necessary to
shield gays and lesbians from stigma and discrimination).
491. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015).
492. Id.
493 Id.
494. Id. at 2601.
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ents and children. Since then, it has become clear that the biological lines
drawn to vindicate unmarried parents and children have resulted in the exclu-
sion of same-sex couples' families. Now, due process protection for the social
dimensions of parenthood would remedy harms imposed on the nonmarital
families formed by gays and lesbians.
Further, due process protections for social bonds of parenthood would
more broadly protect nonbiological mothers.4 95 The woman who commits to
the difficult task of parenting-even without biological connections -would
have the importance of her parental work and the significance of her relation-
ship with the child recognized as a matter of liberty. Due process protection of
this kind would also affirm values that the Court has articulated in protecting
women's liberty interests in reproductive decision making. The Court has ex-
plained that women's ability to separate pregnancy from motherhood and
thereby break from traditional norms that tie them naturally to child rearing is
critical to women's equal standing.4 96 In the regulation of ART, this insight has
implications for intended mothers and surrogates, both of whom separate the
biological fact of maternity from the social role of motherhood. Law would not
only protect the intended mother's social contributions, but also the surrogate's
decision to carry and give birth to a child she does not wish to parent. Women
who occupy unconventional gender roles -both those who seek to parent and
those who do not -would have their decisions respected.
At this point, it is unclear what doctrinal form constitutional oversight of
parental recognition might take. Both equal protection and due process might
contribute to developments in the law of parental recognition. In either area,
though, meaningful constitutional interventions are likely to arise only after a
number of states have reckoned with the burdens placed on women and same-
sex couples whose parent-child relationships the government fails to respect
and recognize.
CONCLUSION
This Article uncovers the harms countenanced by a legal regime rooted in
marital and biological frameworks of parental recognition. Because those
frameworks were designed around the gender-differentiated, heterosexual fam-
495. While this discussion focuses on parental rights, there may be plausible arguments regard-
ing a "child's liberty interest in preserving established familial or family-like bonds." Troxel
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 88 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, little constitution-
al authority currently supports this child-centered approach.
496. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992); see also Siegel, supra
note 122.
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ily, gender- and sexuality-based asymmetries remain embedded in the law of
parental recognition. Even as courts and legislatures seek to conform parentage
law with more recent egalitarian commitments, their progress remains partial.
To repair the problems that exist in current approaches to parental recogni-
tion, this Article proposes reforms that continue to use marital and biological
ties as markers of parentage. Perhaps this reform project holds more trans-
formative potential than one might assume. The shifts in legal parenthood en-
visioned here may ultimately destabilize both marital and biological logics by
transcending the two-parent limit on which both are premised.4 9 7 Indeed, a
subsequent phase of liberalization focused on recognition of multiple parents
may have just begun.4 98
In Michael H., the seminal case on the conflict between unmarried biologi-
cal fathers and married nonbiological fathers, Justice Scalia declared that "Cali-
fornia law, like nature itself, makes no provision for dual fatherhood."4 9 9 Yet his
plurality opinion protected the nonbiological father-the mother's husband
who claimed parenthood by virtue of the marital presumption-by rejecting
the natural father's constitutional claim. Marriage, in that case, did not simply
vindicate social understandings of parenthood; it also cabined reproduction
and parenting within the two-parent unit. 00 The child emerged with only one
legal mother and father.
Since Michael H., California law has changed. The state allows biological
fathers to challenge the parentage of husbands;' recognizes unmarried non-
biological fathers,502 even over their biological counterparts; 0 3 and protects the
parental rights of same-sex couples. 5 0 4 The state regulates ART, for both mar-
ried and unmarried couples and different-sex and same-sex couples, in ways
that furnish a range of paths to nonbiological parentage. 0 5
497. Marquardt, supra note 321, at 36-37. It is worth noting, though, the recent birth of a child
with three genetic parents. See Gina Kolata, Birth of Baby with Three Parents' DNA Marks
Success for Banned Technique, N.Y. THvEs (Sept. 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2o16
/o9/28/health/birth-of-3-parent-baby-a-success-for-controversial-procedure.html [http://
perma.cc/K8SN-5UWQ].
498. See Eskridge, supra note 3, at 1975; NeJaime, supra note 16, at 1263-65.
499. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118 (1989) (emphasis added).
500. See Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 UCLAL. REv. 637,
649-50 (1993).
501. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541 (West 2016).
502. In re Nicholas H., 46 P.3d 932 (Cal. 2002).
503. Steven W. v. Matthew S., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535 (Ct. App. 1995).
504. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611.
505. Id. § 7613.
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Eventually, when confronted with the many types of parental configura-
tions that California law could produce,506 California legislators decided to al-
low recognition of more than two legal parents. 0 7 Without marriage, biology,
gender, and sexual orientation as constraints on parenthood, the two-parent
rule seemed neither doctrinally sound nor normatively desirable. Now, marital
and biological bonds need not define nor limit parentage. Legal parental ties
can spill out of both the biological and marital units, making each less mean-
ingful to parentage.sas
Ironically, pushing beyond the two-parent limit might in some ways vindi-
cate biological ties -but in ways that reflect the changes wrought by ART. 0 9
Recognition of more than two parents may accommodate situations in which
parents seek to have gamete donors or surrogates maintain a relationship to the
child, even if not as a primary parent.s1 o Recognition of multiple parents may
also address objections to a less biologically oriented parentage regime.' If the
marital presumption were thoroughly gender-neutral, concerns about the
rights of birth mothers could be addressed by recognizing a nonbiological par-
ent's interest in addition to, rather than in place of, the birth mother's interest.
In fact, recognition of multiple parents might address potential constitutional
objections to a system that would otherwise allow the birth mother's parental
rights to be rebutted.512 In the end, law might adapt to many kinds of families
forming today, recognizing the continued attraction of biological parenthood
506. See, e.g., In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 861 (Ct. App. 2011) (describing a case involving a
birth mother, her same-sex spouse, and the biological father who stepped forward to par-
ent).
507. 2013 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 564 (West).
5o8. This result is now also possible under parentage codes in other jurisdictions. See D.C. CODE
§ 16-831.01 (2013); ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 1853(2) (2016).
509. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613.
510. See Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of Caregiving
and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REv. 385, 426 (2008); Nancy D. Polikoff, Breaking the Link Between
Biology and Parental Rights in Planned Lesbian Families: When Semen Donors Are Not Fathers, 2
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 57, 81-86 (2000). For work conceptualizing the legal relationships that
may flow from donor arrangements, see Naomi Cahn, The New Kinship, oo GEO. L.J. 367
(2012).
511. For example, recognizing nonbiological fathers of nonmarital children would not prevent
imposing obligations on biological fathers.
512. See E. Gary Spitko, The Constitutional Function of Biological Paternity: Evidence of the Biological
Mother's Consent to the Biological Father's Co-Parenting of Her Child, 48 ARiz. L. REv. 97, loo
(20o6) (identifying the gestational mother as "the initial constitutional parent"); see also
Frank G. v. Renee P-F., 3 7 N.Y.S. 3d 155, 156 (App. Div. 2016) (granting custody to the non-
biological father in a same-sex couple while preserving the surrogate's parental status).
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while accommodating the growing number of nonbiological bonds that are
possible.
Of course, this approach is not without costs. In facilitating additional
claims, law might change the very meaning of parenthood-divesting the pow-
er to exclude that has historically been central to parental status."' Moreover, it
is not clear when exactly recognition of multiple parents serves, and when it
undermines, children's interests. Further, as we have already seen, efforts at lib-
eralization may fail to eradicate inequalities. Those with nonbiological bonds -
including same-sex couples and women engaging in egg-donor gestational sur-
rogacy- may have valid objections to a system of parentage that exposes their
families to biological claims, even if the claimants seek to supplement rather
than supplant the nonbiological parents. Within this regime, inequalities based
on gender and sexuality may persist. These concerns do not counsel in favor of
abandoning current efforts to reform parentage. Rather, they suggest the im-
portance of learning from the past -moving forward with an appreciation for
how inequalities may endure even as legal regimes are transformed.5 14
2362
513. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Al-
ternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REv. 879, 944 (1984).
514. See Siegel, supra note 271.
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APPENDIX A
GENDER NEUTRALITY IN DONOR-INSEMINATION REGULATION AND MARITAL
PRESUMPTIONS
This Appendix documents jurisdictions in which donor-insemination stat-
utes and marital presumptions apply to not only different-sex but also same-
sex couples. With respect to the marital presumption, except in the case of
Washington State, the gender-neutral presumption applies to female same-sex
couples - recognizing the woman married to the birth mother as the legal par-
ent -but not to male same-sex couples.
Gender-
Neutral Gender-Neutral




ARz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-501 (2016)
CAL. FAMv. CODE § 7613
(West 2o16)
ivictauginii v. Jones,
X 382 P.3 d 118 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2016)
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611
X (West 2o161
Barse v. Pasternak, Barse v. Pasternak,
No. No.
Connecticut Xsi7 HHBFA124o3o541S, Xsis HHBFA124030 541S,
2015 WL 6oo973 2015 WL 6oo973
(Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan.
515. The statute refers to support obligations and not parental recognition.
516. After Obergefell, the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the state's refusal to issue birth certifi-
cates for children of married female couples listing the nonbiological mother as the second
parent. See Smith v. Pavan, 505 S.W.3 d 169 (Ark. 2016).
517. The case is an unreported trial-court decision.
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Gender-
Neutral Gender-Neutral
State Donor- Authority Marital Authority
Insemination Presumption
Regulation
District of D.C. CODE § 16-909 D.C. CODE § 16-909
(2016)
X GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7
21 (2015)
(2016)




Indiana X TWP-MJD, 2016 WL
3548645 (S.D. Ind.
Tune ;o. 2016)
iviane v. iviosier, INo.
Kansas X 14-cV-02 518-DDC-TJJ,
2016 WL 3951744 (D.





sig. The reach of authority on the question of the marital presumption, as distinct from donor-
insemination provisions, is unclear.
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Gender-
Neutral Gender-Neutral
State Donor- Authority Marital Authority
Insemination Presumption
Regulation
Nevada X NEv. REv. STAT. ANN.
N X11A1(Wi-9n12)
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1
,, (TAXact innA N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-X, ruractanna
IN. I . JJUMI. lhE. _LAW VV
Wendy G-M. v. Erin 24 (McKinney 2008);
New York X G-M., 985 N.Y.S.2d X5 Wendy G-M. v. Erin








Roe v. Patton, No.
X 2:15-cv-00253-DB,
2015 WL 4476734 (D.Utah
-giiiiaL
521. Although statutes regulating marital parentage have not been updated, presumably civil un-
ion statutes treating same-sex partners like spouses for parentage would extend to same-sex
spouses in the era of marriage equality.
522. Case law in New York remains mixed over the extent to which marital presumptions of par-
entage apply to same-sex spouses.
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APPENDIX B
MARITAL STATUS IN DONOR-INSEMINATION STATUTES
This Appendix lists statutes for those jurisdictions that maintain provisions
specifically governing parentage in the context of donor insemination. It then
addresses the role of marital status in these statutes -first, whether the statute
recognizes only a woman's spouse as a legal parent, and second, whether the




Relevant Donor-Insemination Recognizes SpermState Only Spouse DonorAuthority Statute A ea nyWt
As Legal Only With
Parent Married
Donee







X ARuz. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 25-501 (2016)523
X ARK. CODE)FANN. sS 9-10-
X CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(West 2016)
X COLN. RE. STAT. § 4-106 (2016)





Geri. GA. CODE ANN. 5 19-7-21x
Goga X X X(2015)
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Statute
Statute Divests
Relevant Donor-Insemination Recognizes SpermState Only Spouse Donor
Authori Statute As Legal Only With
Parent Married
Donee
x IDAHO CODE § 39-5405(2o11)




MD. CODE ANN., EST. &
X TRUSTS § 1-206 (West X X
x x x
x MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6- x x
1o6 (1995)
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
X §§ 126.660, 126.670,
126.041 (West 201:0
New Jersey X
'AT. ANN. 5 9:-17-44
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Statute
Statute Divests
Relevant Donor-Insemination Recognizes SpermState Only Spouse DonorAuthority Statute As Legal Only With
Parent Married
Donee
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-
20-60, -61 (200)
UKIA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,x x x
TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-X nA (,A
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 7 8B-
X 15-702 to -703 (LexisNexis
2016)
x




Wyoming X WYO. STAT. ANN. SS 14-2-
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APPENDIX C
AVAILABILITY OF PATHS TO PARENTAL RECOGNITION FOR UNMARRIED,
NONBIOLOGICAL PARENTS
This Appendix documents jurisdictions in which unmarried, nonbiological
parents may attain some form of parental recognition without having adopted
the child. It provides relevant authority both for jurisdictions in which parental








Ex parte N.B., 66 So. 3d 249 (Ala. 2010)
Eate .rkidlp v. StiLe 2,5 11P. 3d 18 (Alaszka 2OCA 2
Egani v. Fridlund-Horne, 211 1.-d 1213 (Aiz/. Ct. App. 2009))
X Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.;d 66o (Cal. 200
X D.C. CODE N. tit. 1-, 8-201(c) (2014)









524. The Illinois court decision is limited to common-law contract and promissory estoppel







A.C. v. N.J., 1 N.E. 3d 685 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). But see
Brown v. Lusford, 63 N.E. 3d 1057 (nd. C. App. 2016)
Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3 d 542 (Kan. 2013); Downs v.
X Conover v. Conover, 14 i A.3 d 3 1 (Md. 2016)
vL.M.M.,/1 711 N.E.2d 886 ([Mass 1999
Van v. Zahorik, 597 N.W.2d 15 (Mich. 1999); Lake v. Put-
nam, No. 330955, 2016 WL 3606081 (Mich. Ct. App. July 5,
x IVIONI. oLDEmmNN. , 40-4-225(2) (a)-(D) (2009), as iner
preted by Kulstad v. Maniaci, 220 P.3 d 59 (Mont. 2009)




V.C . v M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2ooo)
Crtteijee v. kinag, 280 ..d 28, (N.. 206)
Briook~e SB8. v. Elizabteth iA.C.C., 61 N.E.;d 4t88 (N.Y. 2016)
North Dakota X McAllister v. McAllister, 779 N.W2d 652 (N.D. 2olo)
Ohio X In re honfield, 780 N.E.2d 241 (Ohio 2ooz)
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State Available AuthorityStPath
Oldahoma S Ramey v. Sutton, 362 P.3 d 217 (Olda. 2015)
OleoOR.1 REV. STA\T. ANN. S 109.243 (W\est 2016),' Of iterree by)
Oregonh InCr Mdrone, 350 P.3d 495 (Or. ('t APP. 2015)52
T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913 (Pa. 2oo); S.A. v. C.G.R., 856
A.2d 1248 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004)
Rh\1ode Is11and X Rubano v.0 DiCenIZO, 759) A.2d Q5Q (P-I. 2000)
Sou~th Marquez v. Caudill, 656 S.E.2d 737 (S.C. 2008); Middleton
Carolina v. Johnson, 633 S.E.2d 162 (S.C. Ct. App. 2oo6)
Sou~th Dako\ta D.G. \. D.M.K., 55- NA..d i35 (S.D. 199t6)
In re Hayden C.G-J., No. M2012-o2 7 01-COA-R3-CV, 2013
WL 6040348 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 20131)
Texas
Utahl Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808 (Utah 2007)
Vermont
Virginlia Staditer v. Siperko, 661 S.E.2d 494 (Val. Ct. App.) 2008)
Washngto X i~ In etretage of L.B., 122 1P.,d 161 (WashI.20)
West Virginia X In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d 138 (W. Va. 2oo5)
Wysonin LvLFto of H.S.H.-K., 908 NAW.2d 419 (WI0. 14)5)
Wyoming LP v. EF, 338 P.3 d 90,8 (WYO. 2014)
526. Parental recognition is afforded only upon showing that the couple was unable to legally
marry, that they engaged in intentional family planning to have a child and to coparent, and
that the biological parent consented.
527. Parental recognition is afforded only upon showing that the couple would have chosen to
marry had the choice been available to them (rather than merely that they were unable to
marry).
528. The Wisconsin case applies to visitation only and not full parental rights.
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APPENDIX D
STATUTES EXPRESSLY REGULATING DONOR STATUS AND INTENDED-PARENT
STATUS IN THE CONTEXT OF EGG AND EMBRYO DONATION
This Appendix lists statutes for those jurisdictions that maintain provisions
specifically governing parentage in the context of egg and/or embryo donation.
It then addresses two specific aspects of these statutes -first, whether the stat-
ute provides that egg or embryo donors are not legal parents, and second,
whether the statute recognizes as legal parents those who use donor eggs or
embryos with the intent to be a parent.
Statute Divests Statute
Relevant Egg/Embryo Egg/Embryo RecognizesState Donor Donor of Intended
Statute Parental Parent as
Rights Legal Parent




Californlia x CAL. FAM. CODE§57613xxX X X
(Wes o"mA
ConcicX CONN. GEN. STAT. §§
45a-771a to -775 (2015)
Deltrte
District of
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Statute Divests Statute
Relevant Egg/Embryo Egg/Embryo RecognizesState Donor Donor of Intended
Statute Parental Parent as
Rights Legal Parent
Kansas
LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-
Louisiana X 130 (2016);529 LA. Civ.
CODE ANN. art. 188
(2016)
ME1. REV. STA\T. N\. tit.









NEV. REv. STAT. ANN.






529. Statutory provisions define an "in vitro fertilized human ovum [as] a juridical person." LA.
STAT. ANN. § 9:130 (2016).
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x TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-
2-403 (2016)
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APPENDIX E
STATUTES AND APPELLATE CASES REGARDING PARENTAGE IN GESTATIONAL
SURROGACY
This Appendix documents relevant statutory and judicial authority on ges-
tational surrogacy. It first lists jurisdictions that explicitly restrict gestational
surrogacy and then lists jurisdictions that explicitly permit gestational surroga-
cy. It then covers jurisdictions extending parental recognition to intended
mothers who use their own egg but engage a gestational surrogate. Finally, it
covers jurisdictions extending parental recognition to intended parents who
engage a gestational surrogate and do not have a genetic connection to the
child.
Gestational Gestational Authority Authority
Recognizing RecognizingState Surrogacy Surrogacy Genetic Nonbiological
SaeExpressly Expressly Intended Intended
Restricted by Permitted by Mothe aPrentea
Statute Statute LMother as Parent as
Legal Mother Legal Parent
Alabama
Alaska
ARiz. Rinv. STAT. Soos v. Superior
o ACourt, 897 P.2dArizona ANN. § 25-218 15(Ai.Ct
(2016)1356 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1994)
Atux. COD ANN AR. CoDE F ANN ARtu. CODE NA\.
Arkna 9)-1-201 9)-10-01 _ 9)-10-201
(2o15) (2015) (2015)53
CAL. FAm. CODE CAL. FAM. CODE CAL. FAM. CODE
California § 7962 (West §§ 7606, 7960, §§ 7606, 7960,
7962 (West 2013 7962 (West 2013
& Supp. 2017) & Supp. 2017)
ColoradoBN
CONN. GEN. CONN. GEN. CONN. GEN.
Connecticut STAT. §§ 7-36, 7- STAT. §§ 7-36, 7- STAT. §§ 7-36, 7-
48a (2016) 48a (2016) 48a (2016)
53o. The statute is expressly limited to different-sex couples and single individuals.
531. For a trial-court order recognizing a genetic mother as a legal mother, see In re Babies S, No.
o6CV4323, 2o6 WL 5502456 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 20o6).
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D.C. CODE D.C. CODE
District of D.C. CODE DC 6OD, DC CO43




IND. CODE ANN. 'I re intant K.,
- 922 N.E.2d 59Indiana S 31-20-1-1 (Lex- 922 . Ap
S(Ind. Ct. App.isNexis 2013)
Kansas
KentucI
Louisia LA. STAT. AN LA. STAT. AN
532. The statute is limited to different-sex couples and female same-sex couples by the require-
ment that there be a "commissioning mother." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (West 2016).
533. The statute is limited to different-sex couples by the requirement that the couple "create the
child using only their own gametes." LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2718 (2016).
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Gestational Gestational Authority Authority
Recognizing RecognizingSurrogacy Surrogacy Genetic Nonbiological
State Expressly Expressly Intended Intended
Restricted by Permitted by Mothe aPrentea
Statute Statute LMother as Parent as
Legal Mother Legal Parent
Maryland
MICH. COMP.





NEv. REV. STAT. NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 126.750, ANN. § 126.750





534. This case did not involve a genetic intended mother. Nevertheless, the Maryland court or-
dered disestablishment of the gestational surrogate's maternity, such that the intended father
became the sole legal parent.
535. Applying Illinois law per the terms of the agreement, the court ordered disestablishment of
the gestational surrogate's maternity.
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Authority Authority
Gestational Gestational Recoin Recoin
Surrgacy Surrgacy Recognizing RecognizingSurrogacy Surrogacy Genetic Nonbiological
State Expressly Expressly Intended Intended
Restricted by Permitted by Mothe aPrentea
Statute Statute LMother as Parent as

















I.V. V. IN. 1.
State Dep't of








536. The authority applies to noncompensated surrogacy and includes a waiting period.
537. New Mexico prohibits compensated surrogacy.
538. The authority applies to noncompensated surrogacy and includes a waiting period.
539. The statute is limited to different-sex couples by the requirement that "the embryo is con-
ceived by using the egg and sperm of the intended parents." N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-01
(2009).
540. The Ohio case enforced a contract so as to preclude the gestational surrogate from being
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Gestational Gestational Authority Authority
Recognizing RecognizingSurrogacy Surrogacy Genetic Nonbiological
State Expressly Expressly Intended Intended
Restricted by Permitted by Mothe aPrentea
Statute Statute LMother as Parent as
Legal Mother Legal Parent
In re Baby S, 128







In re Baby S, 128
A. 3d 296 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2015)
UTAH LODEUTAH CODE UTAH CODE
ANN. § 7 8B-1 5 - ANN. §§ 7 8B-15 - ANN. § 7 8B-1 5 -80l (LexisNexis ., 7 7 Soi (LexisNexis










541. The statute contemplates gestational surrogacy in which the embryo results from the "wife's
egg and husband's sperm," but nonetheless provides that nothing in the statute "shall be
construed to expressly authorize the surrogate birth process." TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-
102(48) (2016).
542. The statute may be limited to different-sex couples and female same-sex couples given pro-
visions that "the intended mother [show she] is unable to carry a pregnancy to term ....."
TEX. FAM. CODE § 16o.7 56(b)(2) (West 2016).
543. The application to same-sex couples is unclear.
544. The statute restricts compensated surrogacy.
545. The statute is limited to cases of noncompensated surrogacy.
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Authority Authority
Gestational Gestational Recoin Recoin
Surrgacy Surrgacy Recognizing RecognizingSurrogacy Surrogacy Genetic Nonbiological
State Expressly Expressly Intended Intended
Restricted by Permitted by Mthe aPrentea
Statute Statute LMother as Parent as
Legal Mother Legal Parent
Wiycomin
Wyoming
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